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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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Joseph S. Nye, Jr. — Limits of American Power

Dalia Dassa Kaye — The Israeli Decision to Withdraw from Southern Lebanon: Political Leadership and Security Policy

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Dajin Peng — Subregional Economic Zones and Integration in East Asia

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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. discusses the paradox of the United States having unparalleled military power, yet being unable to impose its will unilaterally on either its allies or its antagonists. He explains clearly why America must adopt a more cooperative engagement with the rest of the world.

DALIA DASSA KAYE argues that neither military-strategic considerations nor domestic pressure can adequately explain the Israeli decision to withdraw unilaterally from southern Lebanon. The key trigger for withdrawal was the reframing of the issue by the Israeli political leadership, particularly by Ehud Barak.

DANIEL J. TICHENOR and RICHARD A. HARRIS present new findings about interest group lobbying in national politics from the 1830s to the 1920s, raising important questions about the theoretical presumptions and empirical arguments surrounding contemporary interest group scholarship. They conclude that modern, sophisticated, and national interest group politics emerged far earlier than political scientists have assumed.

DAJIN PENG examines subregional economic zones (SREZs) as an emergent means of economic integration in East Asia. He argues that SREZs are quietly forming a new geoeconomic configuration in the region, although their pattern of development is different from the expectations of the proponents.

STEFANIE CHAMBERS analyzes school politics in Chicago and the impact that two very different school reforms have had on those served by the school system: Chicago's minority student body and the community at large. Her findings are significant in terms of the future of minority inclusion in educational policy making, especially as other big cities wish to replicate Chicago-style school reform.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

S. WILLIAM GREEN, 1929–2002

The board of directors of the Academy of Political Science notes with sorrow the loss of S. William Green, who died on 14 October 2002. Bill Green, as he liked to be called, was a member of the Academy since 1967, and was its vice chairman and treasurer at the time of his death. He devoted his entire life to the public good, including his eight terms of service in the U.S. House of Representatives. His intellectual, moral, and generous financial support of the Academy was greatly appreciated, and we will all miss his commitment to the objective, nonpartisan analysis of political issues to which the Academy is devoted.

George B. Munroe, Chairman
Demetrios J. Caraley, President

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Limits of American Power

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others. In the words of *The Economist*, "the United States bestrides the globe like a colossus. It dominates business, commerce and communications; its economy is the world's most successful, its military might second to none."[1] French foreign minister Hubert Védrine argued in 1999 that the United States had gone beyond its superpower status of the twentieth century. "U.S. supremacy today extends to the economy, currency, military areas, lifestyle, language and the products of mass culture that inundate the world, forming thought and fascinating even the enemies of the United States."[2] Or as two American triumphalists put it, "Today's international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony."[3] As global interdependence has increased, many have argued that globalization is simply a disguise for American imperialism. The German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* reported that "American idols and icons are shaping the world from Katmandu to Kinshasa, from Cairo to Caracas. Globalization wears a 'Made in USA' label."[4]

The United States is undoubtedly the world's number one power, but how long can this situation last, and what should we do with it? Some pundits and

[1] "America's World," *The Economist*, 23 October 1999.

[2] Lara Marlowe, "French Minister Urges Greater UN Role to Counter US Hyperpower," *The Irish Times*, 4 November 1999. In 1998, Védrine coined the term "hyperpower" to describe the United States because "the word 'superpower' seems to me too closely linked to the cold war and military issues." Hubert Védrine with Dominique Moisi, *France in an Age of Globalization* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 2.

[3] Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The Present Danger," *The National Interest* (Spring 2000).

[4] William Drozdiak, "Even Allies Resent U.S. Dominance," *Washington Post*, 4 November 1997.

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., is dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and was chairman of the National Intelligence Council and an assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. A frequent contributor to the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal*, he is the author of several books, including *Governance in a Globalizing World* and *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. This article is adapted from his most recent book, *The Paradox of American Power*.

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scholars argue that U.S. preeminence is simply the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and that this "unipolar moment" will be brief.[5] American strategy should be to husband strength and engage the world only selectively. Others argue that America's power is so great that it will last for decades, and the unipolar moment can become a unipolar era.[6] Charles Krauthammer argued in early 2001 that "after a decade of Prometheus playing pygmy, the first task of the new administration is to reassert American freedom of action." We should refuse to play "the docile international citizen. . . . The new unilateralism recognizes the uniqueness of the unipolar world we now inhabit and thus marks the real beginning of American post-Cold War foreign policy."[7]

Even before September 2001, this prescription was challenged by many, both liberals and conservatives, who consider themselves realists and consider it almost a law of nature in international politics that if one nation becomes too strong, others will team up to balance its power. In their eyes, America's current predominance is ephemeral.[8] As evidence, they might cite an Indian journalist who urges a strategic triangle linking Russia, India, and China "to provide a counterweight in what now looks like a dangerously unipolar world,"[9] or the president of Venezuela telling a conference of oil producers that "the 21st century should be multipolar, and we all ought to push for the development of such a world."[10] Even friendly sources such as *The Economist* agree that "the one-superpower world will not last. Within the next couple of decades a China with up to 1½ billion people, a strongly growing economy and probably a still authoritarian government will almost certainly be trying to push its interests. . . . Sooner or later some strong and honest man will pull post-Yeltsin Russia together, and another contender for global influence will have reappeared."[11] In my view, terrorism notwithstanding, American preponderance will last well into this century—but only if the United States learns to use power wisely.

Predicting the rise and fall of nations is notoriously difficult. In February 1941, publishing magnate Henry Luce boldly proclaimed the "American cen-

[5] See Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1990–1991): 23–33; Christopher Lane, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," *International Security* (Spring 1993): 5–51; Charles Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity," *International Security* (Fall 1998).

[6] William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World" in Michael Brown et al., *America's Strategic Choices*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 305, 309; also from a liberal perspective, G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Security* (Winter 1998–99): 43–78.

[7] Charles Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism," *Washington Post*, 8 June 2001.

[8] Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," *Political Science and Politics* (December 1999): 700.

[9] Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, "Will Dream Partnership Become Reality?" *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 25 December 1998.

[10] Hugo Chavez quoted in Larry Rohter, "A Man with Big Ideas, a Small Country . . . and Oil," *New York Times*, 24 September 2000.

[11] "When the Snarling's Over," *The Economist*, 13 March 1999.

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tury." Yet by the 1980s, many analysts thought Luce's vision had run its course, the victim of such culprits as Vietnam, a slowing economy, and imperial overstretch. In 1985, economist Lester Thurow asked why, when Rome had lasted a thousand years as a republic and an empire, we were slipping after only fifty.[12] Polls showed that half the public agreed that the nation was contracting in power and prestige.[13]

The declinists who filled American bestseller lists a decade ago were not the first to go wrong. After Britain lost its American colonies in the eighteenth century, Horace Walpole lamented Britain's reduction to "a miserable little island" as insignificant as Denmark or Sardinia.[14] His prediction was colored by the then current view of colonial commerce and failed to foresee the coming industrial revolution that would give Britain a second century with even greater preeminence. Similarly, the American declinists failed to understand that a "third industrial revolution" was about to give the United States a "second century."[15] The United States has certainly been the leader in the global information revolution.

On the other hand, nothing lasts forever in world politics. A century ago, economic globalization was as high by some measures as it is today. World finance rested on a gold standard, immigration was at unparalleled levels, trade was increasing, and Britain had an empire on which the sun never set. As author William Pfaff put it, "Responsible political and economic scholars in 1900 would undoubtedly have described the twentieth-century prospect as continuing imperial rivalries within a Europe-dominated world, lasting paternalistic tutelage by Europeans of their Asian and African colonies, solid constitutional government in Western Europe, steadily growing prosperity, increasing scientific knowledge turned to human benefit, etc. All would have been wrong."[16] What followed, of course, were two world wars, the great social disease of totalitarian fascism and communism, the end of European empires, and the end of Europe as the arbiter of world power. Economic globalization was reversed and did not again reach its 1914 levels until the 1970s. Conceivably, it could happen again.

Can we do better as we enter the twenty-first century? The apocrypha of Yogi Berra warns us not to make predictions, particularly about the future. Yet we have no choice. We walk around with pictures of the future in our heads as

[12] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); Lester Thurow, *The Zero Sum Solution* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

[13] Martilla and Kiley, Inc. (Boston, MA), *Americans Talk Security*, no. 6, May 1988, and no. 8, August 1988.

[14] Quoted in Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 221.

[15] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1999 [1973]), new introduction.

[16] William Pfaff, *Barbarian Sentiments: America in the New Century*, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 280.

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a necessary condition of planning our actions. At the national level, we need such pictures to guide policy and tell us how to use our unprecedented power. There is, of course, no single future; there are multiple possible futures, and the quality of our foreign policy can make some more likely than others. When systems involve complex interactions and feedbacks, small causes can have large effects. And when people are involved, human reaction to the prediction itself may make it fail to come true.

We cannot hope to predict the future, but we can draw our pictures carefully so as to avoid some common mistakes.[17] A decade ago, a more careful analysis of American power could have saved us from the mistaken portrait of American decline. More recently, accurate predictions of catastrophic terrorism failed to avert a tragedy that leads some again to foresee decline. It is important to prevent the errors of both declinism and triumphalism. Declinism tends to produce overly cautious behavior that could undercut influence; triumphalism could beget a potentially dangerous absence of restraint, as well as an arrogance that would also squander influence. With careful analysis, the United States can make better decisions about how to protect its people, promote values, and lead toward a better world over the next few decades. I begin this analysis with an examination of the sources of U.S. power.

The Sources of American Power

We hear a lot about how powerful America has become in recent years, but what do we mean by power? Simply put, power is the ability to effect the outcomes you want and, if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen. For example, NATO's military power reversed Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and the promise of economic aid to Serbia's devastated economy reversed the Serbian government's initial disinclination to hand Milosevic over to the Hague tribunal.

The ability to obtain the outcomes one wants is often associated with the possession of certain resources, and so we commonly use shorthand and define power as possession of relatively large amounts of such elements as population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and political stability. Power in this sense means holding the high cards in the international poker game. If you show high cards, others are likely to fold their hands. Of course, if you play your hand poorly or fall victim to bluff and deception, you can still lose, or at least fail to get the outcome you want. For example, the United States was the largest power after World War I, but it failed to prevent the rise of Hitler or Pearl Harbor. Converting America's potential power resources into realized power requires well-designed policy and skillful leadership. But it helps to start by holding the high cards.

[17] On the complexities of projections, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Peering into the Future," *Foreign Affairs* (July-August 1994); see also Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" *International Security* (Winter 1991–1992).

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Traditionally, the test of a great power was "strength for war."[18] War was the ultimate game in which the cards of international politics were played and estimates of relative power were proven. Over the centuries, as technologies evolved, the sources of power have changed. In the agrarian economies of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, population was a critical power resource because it provided a base for taxes and the recruitment of infantry (who were mostly mercenaries), and this combination of men and money gave the edge to France. But in the nineteenth century, the growing importance of industry benefited first Britain, which ruled the waves with a navy that had no peer, and later Germany, which used efficient administration and railways to transport armies for quick victories on the Continent (though Russia had a larger population and army). By the middle of the twentieth century, with the advent of the nuclear age, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed not only industrial might but nuclear arsenals and intercontinental missiles.

Today the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest. Paradoxically, nuclear weapons were one of the causes. As we know from the history of the cold war, nuclear weapons proved so awesome and destructive that they became muscle bound—too costly to use except, theoretically, in the most extreme circumstances.[19] A second important change was the rise of nationalism, which has made it more difficult for empires to rule over awakened populations. In the nineteenth century, a few adventurers conquered most of Africa with a handful of soldiers, and Britain ruled India with a colonial force that was a tiny fraction of the indigenous population. Today, colonial rule is not only widely condemned but far too costly, as both cold war superpowers discovered in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The collapse of the Soviet empire followed the end of European empires by a matter of decades.

A third important cause is societal change inside great powers. Postindustrial societies are focused on welfare rather than glory, and they loathe high casualties except when survival is at stake. This does not mean that they will not use force, even when casualties are expected—witness the 1991 Gulf War or Afghanistan today. But the absence of a warrior ethic in modern democracies means that the use of force requires an elaborate moral justification to ensure popular support (except in cases where survival is at stake). Roughly speaking, there are three types of countries in the world today: poor, weak preindustrial states, which are often the chaotic remnants of collapsed empires; modernizing industrial states such as India or China; and the postindustrial societies that prevail in Europe, North America, and Japan. The use of force is common in the first type of country, still accepted in the second, but less toler-

[18] A. J. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1954), xxix.

[19] Whether this would change with the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states is hotly debated among theorists. Deterrence should work with most states, but the prospects of accident and loss of control would increase. For my views, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Nuclear Ethics* (New York: Free Press, 1986).

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ated in the third. In the words of British diplomat Robert Cooper, "A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or to conquer."[20] War remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was a century or even half a century ago.[21]

Finally, for most of today's great powers, the use of force would jeopardize their economic objectives. Even nondemocratic countries that feel fewer popular moral constraints on the use of force have to consider its effects on their economic objectives. As Thomas Friedman has put it, countries are disciplined by an "electronic herd" of investors who control their access to capital in a globalized economy.[22] And Richard Rosecrance writes, "In the past, it was cheaper to seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it."[23] Imperial Japan used the former approach when it created the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the 1930s, but Japan's post-World War II role as a trading state turned out to be far more successful, leading it to become the second largest national economy in the world. It is difficult now to imagine a scenario in which Japan would try to colonize its neighbors, or succeed in doing so.

As mentioned above, none of this is to suggest that military force plays no role in international politics today. For one thing, the information revolution has yet to transform most of the world. Many states are unconstrained by democratic societal forces, as Kuwait learned from its neighbor Iraq, and terrorist groups pay little heed to the normal constraints of liberal societies. Civil wars are rife in many parts of the world where collapsed empires left power vacuums. Moreover, throughout history, the rise of new great powers has been accompanied by anxieties that have sometimes precipitated military crises. In Thucydides' immortal description, the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece was caused by the rise to power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta.[24] World War I owed much to the rise of the kaiser's Germany and the fear that it created in Britain.[25] Some foretell a similar dynamic in this century arising from the rise of China and the fear it creates in the United States.

Geoeconomics has not replaced geopolitics, although in the early twenty-first century there has clearly been a blurring of the traditional boundaries between the two. To ignore the role of force and the centrality of security would

[20] Robert Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order* (London: Demos, 2000), 22.

[21] John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[22] Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), chap. 6.

[23] Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 16, 160.

[24] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), book I, chapter 1.

[25] And in turn, as industrialization progressed and railroads were built, Germany feared the rise of Russia.

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be like ignoring oxygen. Under normal circumstances, oxygen is plentiful and we pay it little attention. But once those conditions change and we begin to miss it, we can focus on nothing else.[26] Even in those areas where the direct employment of force falls out of use among countries—for instance, within Western Europe or between the United States and Japan—nonstate actors such as terrorists may use force. Moreover, military force can still play an important political role among advanced nations. For example, most countries in East Asia welcome the presence of American troops as an insurance policy against uncertain neighbors. Moreover, deterring threats or ensuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf increases America's influence with its allies. Sometimes the linkages may be direct; more often they are present in the back of statesmen's minds. As the Defense Department describes it, one of the missions of American troops based overseas is to "shape the environment."

With that said, economic power *has* become more important than in the past, both because of the relative increase in the costliness of force and because economic objectives loom large in the values of postindustrial societies.[27] In a world of economic globalization, all countries are to some extent dependent on market forces beyond their direct control. When President Clinton was struggling to balance the federal budget in 1993, one of his advisers stated in exasperation that if he were to be reborn, he would like to come back as "the market" because that was clearly the most powerful player.[28] But markets constrain different countries to different degrees. Because the United States constitutes such a large part of the market in trade and finance, it is better placed to set its own terms than are Argentina or Thailand. And if small countries are willing to pay the price of opting out of the market, they can reduce the power that other countries have over them. Thus American economic sanctions have had little effect, for example, on improving human rights in isolated Myanmar. Saddam Hussein's strong preference for his own survival rather than the welfare of the Iraqi people meant that crippling sanctions failed for more than a decade to remove him from power. And economic sanctions may disrupt but not deter nonstate terrorists. But the exceptions prove the rule. Military power remains crucial in certain situations, but it is a mistake to focus too narrowly on the military dimensions of American power.

[26] Henry Kissinger portrays four international systems existing side by side: the West (and Western Hemisphere), marked by democratic peace; Asia, where strategic conflict is possible; the Middle East, marked by religious conflict; and Africa, where civil wars threaten weak postcolonial states. "America at the Apex," *The National Interest* (Summer 2001).

[27] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2000), chap. 1.

[28] James Carville quoted in Bob Woodward, *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 302.

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Soft Power

In my view, if the United States wants to remain strong, Americans need also to pay attention to our soft power. What precisely do I mean by soft power? Military power and economic power are both examples of hard command power that can be used to induce others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). But there is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power—getting others to want what you want—I call soft power.[29] It coopts people rather than coerces them.

Soft power rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others. At the personal level, wise parents know that if they have brought up their children with the right beliefs and values, their power will be greater and will last longer than if they have relied only on spankings, cutting off allowances, or taking away the car keys. Similarly, political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from setting the agenda and determining the framework of a debate. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions. If I can get you to *want* to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do *not* want to do. If the United States represents values that others want to follow, it will cost us less to lead. Soft power is not merely the same as influence, though it is one source of influence. After all, I can also influence you by threats or rewards. Soft power is also more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation.

Soft power arises in large part from our values. These values are expressed in our culture, in the policies we follow inside our country, and in the way we handle ourselves internationally. The government sometimes finds it difficult to control and employ soft power. Like love, it is hard to measure and to handle, and does not touch everyone, but that does not diminish its importance. As Hubert Védrine laments, Americans are so powerful because they can "inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and because, for these same reasons, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies."[30] Soft power is an important reality.

[29] For a more detailed discussion, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), chap. 2. This builds on what Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz called the "second face of power" in "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," *American Political Science Review* (September 1963): 632–42.

[30] Védrine, *France in an Age of Globalization*, 3.

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Of course, hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behavior of others. Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction.[31] A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its attractiveness. And some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states—witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. But soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And some countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. These are lessons that the unilateralists forget at their and our peril.

Britain in the nineteenth century and America in the second half of the twentieth century enhanced their power by creating liberal international economic rules and institutions that were consistent with the liberal and democratic structures of British and American capitalism—free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain, the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and other institutions in the case of the United States. If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If it can establish international rules that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as many costly carrots and sticks.

[31] The distinction between hard and soft power is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve one's purposes by affecting the behavior of others. Command power—the ability to change what others do—can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power—the ability to shape what others want—can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. The forms of behavior between command and co-optive power range along a continuum: command power, coercion, inducement, agenda setting, attraction, co-optive power. Soft power resources tend to be associated with co-optive power behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behavior. But the relationship is imperfect. For example, countries may be attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate. But the general association is strong enough to allow the useful shorthand reference to hard and soft power.

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In short, the universality of a country's culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power. The values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility, and openness that are often expressed in American popular culture, higher education, and foreign policy contribute to American power in many areas. In the view of German journalist Josef Joffe, America's soft power "looms even larger than its economic and military assets. U.S. culture, lowbrow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire—but with a novel twist. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets."[32]

Of course, soft power is more than just cultural power. The values the U.S. government champions in its behavior at home (for example, democracy), in international institutions (listening to others), and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights) also affect the preferences of others. America can attract (or repel) others by the influence of its example. But soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does. Some hard power assets (such as armed forces) are strictly governmental, others are inherently national (such as our oil and gas reserves), and many can be transferred to collective control (such as industrial assets that can be mobilized in an emergency). In contrast, many soft power resources are separate from American government and only partly responsive to its purposes. In the Vietnam era, for example, American government policy and popular culture worked at cross-purposes. Today popular U.S. firms or nongovernmental groups develop soft power of their own that may coincide or be at odds with official foreign policy goals. That is all the more reason for the government to make sure that its own actions reinforce rather than undercut American soft power. All these sources of soft power are likely to become increasingly important in the global information age of this new century. And, at the same time, the arrogance, indifference to the opinions of others, and narrow approach to our national interests advocated by the new unilateralists are a sure way to undermine American soft power.

Power in the global information age is becoming less tangible and less coercive, particularly among the advanced countries, but most of the world does not consist of postindustrial societies, and that limits the transformation of power. Much of Africa and the Middle East remains locked in preindustrial agricultural societies with weak institutions and authoritarian rulers. Other countries, such as China, India, and Brazil, are industrial economies analogous to parts of the West in the mid-twentieth century.[33] In such a variegated world, all three sources of power—military, economic, and soft—remain relevant, although to different degrees in different relationships. However, if current economic and social trends continue, leadership in the information revolution and

[32] Josef Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?" *The National Interest* (Summer 2001): 43.

[33] See Cooper, *Postmodern State*; Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society.*

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TABLE 1

Leading States and Their Power Resources, 1500–2000

Period	*State*	*Major Resources*
Sixteenth century	Spain	Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary armies, dynastic ties
Seventeenth century	Netherlands	Trade, capital markets, navy
Eighteenth century	France	Population, rural industry, public administration, army, culture (soft power)
Nineteenth century	Britain	Industry, political cohesion, finance and credit, navy, liberal norms (soft power), island location (easy to defend)
Twentieth century	United States	Economic scale, scientific and technical leadership, location, military forces and alliances, universalistic culture and liberal international regimes (soft power)
Twenty-first century	United States	Technological leadership, military and economic scale, soft power, hub of transnational communications

soft power will become more important in the mix. Table 1 provides a simplified description of the evolution of power resources over the past few centuries.

Power in the twenty-first century will rest on a mix of hard and soft resources. No country is better endowed than the United States in all three dimensions—military, economic, and soft power. Its greatest mistake in such a world would be to fall into one-dimensional analysis and to believe that investing in military power alone will ensure its strength.

Balance or Hegemony?

America's power—hard and soft—is only part of the story. How others react to American power is equally important to the question of stability and governance in this global information age. Many realists extol the virtues of the classic nineteenth-century European balance of power, in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a balance of power at the global level today. Already in the 1970s, Richard Nixon argued that "the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitors that the danger of

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war arises."[34] But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad for the United States and for the world is debatable. I am skeptical.

War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500.[35] Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear.

Many regions of the world and periods in history have seen stability under hegemony—when one power has been preeminent. Margaret Thatcher warned against drifting toward "an Orwellian future of Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia—three mercantilist world empires on increasingly hostile terms. . . . In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage."[36] Both the Nixon and Thatcher views are too mechanical because they ignore soft power. America is an exception, says Josef Joffe, "because the 'hyperpower' is also the most alluring and seductive society in history. Napoleon had to rely on bayonets to spread France's revolutionary creed. In the American case, Munichers and Muscovites *want* what the avatar of ultra-modernity has to offer."[37]

The term "balance of power" is sometimes used in contradictory ways. The most interesting use of the term is as a predictor about how countries will behave; that is, will they pursue policies that will prevent any other country from developing power that could threaten their independence? By the evidence of history, many believe, the current preponderance of the United States will call forth a countervailing coalition that will eventually limit American power. In the words of the self-styled realist political scientist Kenneth Waltz, "both friends and foes will react as countries always have to threatened or real predominance of one among them: they will work to right the balance. The present condition of international politics is unnatural."[38]

In my view, such a mechanical prediction misses the mark. For one thing, countries sometimes react to the rise of a single power by "bandwagoning"—that is, joining the seemingly stronger rather than weaker side—much as Mussolini did when he decided, after several years of hesitation, to ally with Hitler. Proximity to and perceptions of threat also affect the way in which countries react.[39] The United States benefits from its geographical separation from Eu-

[34] Nixon quoted in James Chace and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "Towards a New Concert of Nations: An American Perspective," *World Policy Journal* (Fall 1999): 9.

[35] Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 97.

[36] Margaret Thatcher, "Why America Must Remain Number One," *National Review*, 31 July 1995, 25.

[37] Josef Joffe, "Envy," *The New Republic*, 17 January 2000, 6.

[38] Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and American Power," *The National Interest* (Spring 2000): 55–56.

[39] Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," *International Security* (Spring 1985).

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rope and Asia in that it often appears as a less proximate threat than neighboring countries inside those regions. Indeed, in 1945, the United States was by far the strongest nation on earth, and a mechanical application of balancing theory would have predicted an alliance against it. Instead, Europe and Japan allied with the Americans because the Soviet Union, while weaker in overall power, posed a greater military threat because of its geographical proximity and its lingering revolutionary ambitions. Today, Iraq and Iran both dislike the United States and might be expected to work together to balance American power in the Persian Gulf, but they worry even more about each other. Nationalism can also complicate predictions. For example, if North Korea and South Korea are reunited, they should have a strong incentive to maintain an alliance with a distant power such as the United States in order to balance their two giant neighbors, China and Japan. But intense nationalism resulting in opposition to an American presence could change this if American diplomacy is heavy-handed. Nonstate actors can also have an effect, as witnessed by the way cooperation against terrorists changed some states' behavior after September 2001.

A good case can be made that inequality of power can be a source of peace and stability. No matter how power is measured, some theorists argue, an equal distribution of power among major states has been relatively rare in history, and efforts to maintain a balance have often led to war. On the other hand, inequality of power has often led to peace and stability because there was little point in declaring war on a dominant state. The political scientist Robert Gilpin has argued that "*Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana*, like the *Pax Romana*, ensured an international system of relative peace and security." And the economist Charles Kindleberger claimed that "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer."[40] Global governance requires a large state to take the lead. But how much and what kind of inequality of power is necessary—or tolerable—and for how long? If the leading country possesses soft power and behaves in a manner that benefits others, effective countercoalitions may be slow to arise. If, on the other hand, the leading country defines its interests narrowly and uses its weight arrogantly, it increases the incentives for others to coordinate to escape its hegemony.

Some countries chafe under the weight of American power more than others. *Hegemony* is sometimes used as a term of opprobrium by political leaders in Russia, China, the Middle East, France, and others. The term is used less often or less negatively in countries where American soft power is strong. If hegemony means being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations are conducted, as Joshua Goldstein argues, then the United States is hardly a hegemon today.[41] It does have

[40] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 144–45; Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 305.

[41] Joshua S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 281.

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a predominant voice and vote in the International Monetary Fund, but it cannot alone choose the director. It has not been able to prevail over Europe and Japan in the World Trade Organization. It opposed the Land Mines Treaty but could not prevent it from coming into existence. Saddam Hussein remained in power for more than a decade despite American efforts to drive him out. The U.S. opposed Russia's war in Chechnya and civil war in Colombia, but to no avail. If hegemony is defined more modestly as a situation where one country has significantly more power resources or capabilities than others, then it simply signifies American preponderance, not necessarily dominance or control.[42] Even after World War II, when the United States controlled half the world's economic production (because all other countries had been devastated by the war), it was not able to prevail in all of its objectives.[43]

Pax Britannica in the nineteenth century is often cited as an example of successful hegemony, even though Britain ranked behind the United States and Russia in GNP. Britain was never as superior in productivity to the rest of the world as the United States has been since 1945, but Britain also had a degree of soft power. Victorian culture was influential around the globe, and Britain gained in reputation when it defined its interests in ways that benefited other nations (for example, opening its markets to imports or eradicating piracy). America lacks a global territorial empire like Britain's, but instead possesses a large, continental-scale home economy and has greater soft power. These differences between Britain and America suggest a greater staying power for American hegemony. Political scientist William Wohlforth argues that the United States is so far ahead that potential rivals find it dangerous to invite America's focused enmity, and allied states can feel confident that they can continue to rely on American protection.[44] Thus the usual balancing forces are weakened.

Nonetheless, if American diplomacy is unilateral and arrogant, our preponderance would not prevent other states and nonstate actors from taking actions

[42] See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 235.

[43] Over the years, a number of scholars have tried to predict the rise and fall of nations by developing a general historical theory of hegemonic transition. Some have tried to generalize from the experience of Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, and Britain. Others have focused more closely on Britain's decline in the twentieth century as a predictor for the fate for the United States. None of these approaches has been successful. Most of the theories have predicted that America would decline long before now. Vague definitions and arbitrary schematizations alert us to the inadequacies of such grand theories. Most try to squeeze history into procrustean theoretical beds by focusing on particular power resources while ignoring others that are equally important. Hegemony can be used as a descriptive term (though it is sometimes fraught with emotional overtones), but grand hegemonic theories are weak in predicting future events. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations: Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 38, 41; George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (April 1978); George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987). For a detailed discussion, see Nye, *Bound to Lead*, chap. 2.

[44] Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World."

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that complicate American calculations and constrain its freedom of action.[45] For example, some allies may follow the American bandwagon on the largest security issues but form coalitions to balance American behavior in other areas such as trade or the environment. And diplomatic maneuvering short of alliance can have political effects. As William Safire observed when Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush first met, "Well aware of the weakness of his hand, Putin is emulating Nixon's strategy by playing the China card. Pointedly, just before meeting with Bush, Putin traveled to Shanghai to set up a regional cooperation semi-alliance with Jiang Zemin and some of his Asian fellow travelers."[46] Putin's tactics, according to one reporter, "put Mr. Bush on the defensive, and Mr. Bush was at pains to assert that America is not about to go it alone in international affairs."[47]

Pax Americana is likely to last not only because of unmatched American hard power but also to the extent that the United States "is uniquely capable of engaging in 'strategic restraint,' reassuring partners and facilitating cooperation."[48] The open and pluralistic way in which U.S, foreign policy is made can often reduce surprises, allow others to have a voice, and contribute to soft power. Moreover, the impact of American preponderance is softened when it is embodied in a web of multilateral institutions that allow others to participate in decisions and that act as a sort of world constitution to limit the capriciousness of American power. That was the lesson the United States learned as it struggled to create an antiterrorist coalition in the wake of the September 2001 attacks. When the society and culture of the hegemon are attractive, the sense of threat and need to balance it are reduced.[49] Whether other countries will unite to balance American power will depend on how the United States behaves as well as the power resources of potential challengers.

[45] Stephen Walt, "Keeping the World 'Off-Balance': Self-Restraint and US Foreign Policy," *Kennedy School Research Working Paper Series 00–013*, October 2000.

[46] William Safire, "Putin's China Card," *New York Times*, 18 June 2001.

[47] Patrick Tyler, "Bush and Putin Look Each Other in the Eye," *New York Times*, 17 June 2001.

[48] Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint," 47; also Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right," *The National Interest* (Spring 2001): 17–24.

[49] Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 1997).

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

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The Israeli Decision to Withdraw from Southern Lebanon: Political Leadership and Security Policy

DALIA DASSA KAYE

For over fifteen years, Israelis believed that their presence in southern Lebanon was an unfortunate necessity. Only such a "security zone," it was widely thought, could provide northern Israel with adequate protection from terrorist attacks stemming from Lebanese territory. But within a few years the Israeli consensus shifted, leading to broad public support for a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Despite nearly unified military opposition to a unilateral withdrawal, Israeli forces withdrew from the security zone on 24 May 2000. The decision to withdraw from southern Lebanon marked a dramatic turning point in Israeli security policy.[1]

Why did Israel withdraw? Military leaders and strategic analysts warned that unilateral withdrawal risked the security of northern Israel and even Israel's larger deterrent posture. Some claimed later that Israel's withdrawal set the stage for the Palestinian al Aksa intifada the following fall.[2] Given the military's

[1] For a discussion of the wider regional implications of the Israeli withdrawal, see Thomas L. Friedman, "All Fall Down," *New York Times*, 26 May 2000.

[2] See, for example, Ze'ev Schiff, "Another Lesson from the Riots" *Ha'aretz* (http://www.haaretz daily.com), 13 October 2000 (English), accessed on 13 October 2000. See also Ronen Sebag, "Lebanon: The *Intifada's* False Premise," *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2002): 13–21. On the implications of the withdrawal, see Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, eds., *The Last Arab-Israeli Battlefield? Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000); and analyses from the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies: Shai Feldman, "Israel's Deterrent Power after its Withdrawal From Lebanon," *Strategic Assessment* 3 (June 2000); Mark A. Heller, "Implications of the Withdrawal from Lebanon For Israeli-Palestinian Relations," *Strategic Assessment* 3 (June 2000); and Shlomo Brom, "After the Withdrawal: Three Scenarios," *Strategic Assessment* 3 (June 2000). See also Frederick C. Hof, "Israel Withdraws from Lebanon: May 24th and Beyond," *Middle East Policy* 7 (June 2000): 165–167.

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opposition to withdrawal, strategic considerations cannot adequately explain the Israeli decision. The common view that the Israeli withdrawal resulted from domestic pressure as Israel Defense Force (IDF) casualties mounted also cannot fully explain this decision.[3] Leaders do not merely respond to public opinion; they also help shape it, legitimizing trends and reframing policies that conform to their own beliefs and strategic interests.[4] Public opinion and the changing political culture in Israel, particularly with respect to military issues, set the stage for a policy reversal on Lebanon. But for the proposal actually to be considered a serious policy option and enacted, political leadership had to shape the public debate and legitimize the emerging public opinion trends.

Political elites helped shift the narrative on Lebanon and reframed the problem in a way that made withdrawal an acceptable and even preferable policy to the Israeli public.[5] Political leaders on both the left and right, each for different reasons, participated in reframing the Lebanon issue, leading to an unusual convergence of hardliners and doves supporting withdrawal. Although longstanding concerns about Israel's role in Lebanon created a ripe environment, the catalyst leading to new thinking on Lebanon was the devastating helicopter accident in 1997. Between 1997 and 2000, there emerged not only new social movements opposed to the security zone, but also a shift in elite thinking and packaging of the Lebanon issue across party lines. While this shift was most apparent during the 1999 Israeli elections, electoral concerns were not the only, or even the central, factors shaping elite positions. Other interests were also at stake. While Labor leaders supported withdrawal because they thought it would facilitate a political agreement with Syria, Likud elites began supporting the withdrawal option to avoid an agreement with Syria that would entail Israeli concessions on the Golan Heights. The result was an alliance of political elites who capitalized on the public's emerging skepticism toward the security zone and made withdrawal an acceptable and viable option. Political leaders, particularly Prime Minister Ehud Barak, legitimized the idea of withdrawal and enabled a new consensus to form on this issue.

[3] On the role of domestic pressures in pushing for an Israeli withdrawal, see Henry Siegman, "Being Hafiz al-Assad: Syria's Chilly but Consistent Peace Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (May/June 2000): 2–7; and Gal Luft, "Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon—A 'Tragedy'?" *Middle East Quarterly* 7 (September 2000): 13–20.

[4] On the relationship between leaders and publics in shaping opinion in foreign policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43 (July 1991): 479–512. For a review of research on public opinion and foreign policy, see Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (December 1992): 439–466; and M. Nincic, "A Sensible Public: New Perspectives on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (December 1992): 772–789.

[5] I draw here on concepts developed in an analysis of another Israeli foreign policy decision, the Oslo process, by Michael Barnett. See Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," *European Journal of International Relations* 5 (March 1999): 5–36.

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By exploring this case, this article joins others in the international relations literature that show the limitations of realist-oriented explanations for security policy that are based solely on external strategic–military considerations. Instead, it emphasizes the role of ideas in defining interests and shaping national security policy.[6] Unlike other constructivist accounts, however, this article focuses less on explanations at the collective level (that is, global norms or culture) than on the role of leadership, an often neglected variable in international relations scholarship.[7] In particular, it draws on the concepts of frames and narratives discussed in the social movement literature to demonstrate how leaders manipulate frames to make important policy shifts. Framing is an ideational-based exercise, yet leaders often engage in framing for instrumental reasons. Moreover, although framing may take place at both the elite and popular levels, this article argues that elite framing is particularly critical to shifts in national security policy, even in states like Israel where the public is far more engaged in security issues than in other democracies.

To set the stage for an analysis of the withdrawal decision, I begin with a review of the rationale behind the establishment of the security zone in 1985 and outline the Israeli consensus on Lebanon policy. Until 1997, there was surprisingly little public debate on the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon. What happened in 1997 to convert withdrawal into a major public policy issue? The subsequent sections consider various explanations that might account for this shift. I begin with military-strategic considerations, which militated against a withdrawal option. I then turn to a domestic pressure explanation, considering protest movements, public opinion, and the role of political culture in setting the stage for the withdrawal. But to fully explain this security decision, I focus on the role of political leadership in reframing the Lebanon issue. I conclude by considering the implications of this case both for broader Israeli national security policy and current security debates taking place in the U.S. context.

The Development of the Consensus on Lebanon: 1985–1997

The origins of the security zone begin with the growth of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) presence in southern Lebanon in the early 1970s, when PLO headquarters moved from Jordan to Beirut. Southern Lebanon became a haven for terrorist activity and attacks across the Israeli border. Such attacks led to Israeli retaliations and to two Israeli invasions. The 1978 Litani Operation and the more extensive 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee were intended to remove the PLO from southern Lebanon and destroy the organization. While the first goal was accomplished in the 1982 war, the PLO survived and moved its operations to Tunis. Although the war succeeded in removing

[6] See, for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[7] For such a critique, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In," *International Security* 25 (Spring 2001): 107–146.

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the PLO from Lebanon, it "failed to create the new order Israel desired; instead of the PLO, Israel now faced Hizbullah, an Iranian-inspired organization of radical Shiite Muslims."[8] Indeed, the Lebanon war led to unprecedented public questioning of the Israeli military's goals and widespread calls to end the war as quickly as possible.[9]

In 1983 Israel reached a peace agreement with Lebanon ending the war, but Syria forced Lebanon to abrogate the treaty in March 1984. In the absence of a peace agreement with Lebanon, Israel remained in southern Lebanon,[10] rejecting United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 425 of 1978, which called for an Israeli withdrawal to the recognized international border and for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the withdrawal and secure the border area.[11] Israel did not believe UNIFIL was capable of securing the border, and the first debate on the security zone ensued in December 1984 and January 1985. At this time, Israel considered various options for disengaging from Lebanon, the most critical of which was a choice between withdrawing to the international border or formally establishing a security zone (Israel had maintained a presence in southern Lebanon since 1978) to create a buffer between northern Israel (the Galilee) and hostile forces in Lebanon.[12] The IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian militia group allied with, trained, and financed by Israel, would occupy such a zone. Supporters of the zone, including prominent security elites from across the political spectrum such as Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, and Moshe Arens, argued that only a buffer area could adequately protect Israel's north from terrorist incursions along the border. Intelligence estimates supported this position.[13] Despite some dissenting voices, proponents of the security zone won out, and

[8] Luft, "Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon—A 'Tragedy'?" 13.

[9] On the Lebanon war in general, see Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's War in Lebanon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

[10] For more details on the history of Israeli-Lebanese relations across the border area, see Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, "Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Israel and Lebanon After the Withdrawal" *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)* 4 (September 2000) (http://meria.biu.ac.il).

[11] While international concern about Israel's presence in southern Lebanon was longstanding, as expressed in UNSC Resolution 425, this factor did not play a critical role in Israel's decision to withdraw at the particular time it did—over two decades after the passing of this resolution. Neither the United States nor the international community launched a specific campaign to pressure Israel to withdraw from the security zone when the issue surfaced in the Israeli debate in the late 1990s. That said, Israel was no doubt interested in receiving international approval for such a withdrawal and thus welcomed the United Nation's certification that Israel's withdrawal was complete.

[12] For a discussion of the options considered during the debate leading to the 1985 decision to establish the security zone, see Reuvan Erlich, "The Security Zone: Perception and Reality" in Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *The Security Zone in Lebanon: A Reconsideration* (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute, 1997): 9–28 (Hebrew).

[13] See Erlich, "The Security Zone: Perception and Reality."

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the government approved the security zone on 14 January 1985.[14] The establishment of the 328 square mile security zone included forty-five SLA and IDF outposts and the deployment of 1,000-1,500 Israeli soldiers and 2,500 SLA members as well as several hundred Israeli intelligence officers.[15]

Remarkably, despite the public controversy in Israel over the Lebanon war, very little public debate developed questioning the security zone. The primary focal points for discussion of the zone before 1997 occurred in the immediate aftermath of the zone's establishment and after major Israeli operations in Lebanon launched to respond to significant Hizbullah attacks across the Israeli border, such as Operation Accountability in 1993 and the Grapes of Wrath operation in 1996. For example, in early 1985 an editorial in a major Israeli newspaper questioned the continued IDF presence in the security zone and called for an IDF retreat to the international border.[16] But such opinions tended to be drowned out by those arguing that the security zone was necessary for the protection of the north. Proposals in the Knesset to raise the issue of an Israeli withdrawal from the zone were readily defeated. In response to one such proposal by a leftist party leader, then Defense Minister Rabin asserted that he had no doubt that the security zone prevented terrorist incursions and the launching of Katyusha missiles into Israel.[17] In another Knesset debate, Rabin noted how the security zone was protecting Israeli civilians from terrorist attacks with fewer IDF casualties than Israel had experienced in the past.[18] And again, in response to criticism from leftist Member of Knesset (MK) Shulamit Aloni about the viability of the security zone, Rabin reiterated that the IDF was the only force capable of preventing terrorist attacks across the border, particularly given UNIFIL's inability to fulfill such a mission.[19] Thus, the widely respected Labor defense minister helped shape the Israeli consensus on Lebanon.

After Israel's Operation Accountability in 1993, some MKs called for withdrawal, but they were in the minority.[20] And despite calls to capitalize on such crises to reach political agreements with Syria and Lebanon, security analysts continued to believe that without such agreements Israel was justified in maintaining the security zone to protect the Galilee.[21] In periodic Knesset debates,

[14] According to a senior Israel military analyst familiar with the debate over the security zone in 1985, no serious opposition to the security zone decision was mounted at the time. Interview by the author, Tel Aviv, 18 January 2001.

[15] Luft, "Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon—A 'Tragedy'?" 14.

[16] "Enough, Get Out of There," *Ha'aretz*, 11 March 1985 (Hebrew).

[17] Knesset Minutes, The 181st meeting of the Eleventh Knesset, Jerusalem, 25 February 1986 (Hebrew).

[18] Knesset Minutes, The 209th meeting of the Eleventh Knesset, Jerusalem, 4 June 1986 (Hebrew).

[19] Knesset Minutes, The 284th meeting of the Eleventh Knesset, Jerusalem, 21 January 1987 (Hebrew).

[20] See Knesset Minutes, The 125th meeting of the Thirteenth Knesset, Jerusalem, 4 August 1993 (Hebrew).

[21] See, for example, Shlomo Gazit, "Is It the Last Din V'esheshbon," *Yediot Ahronot*, daily supplement, 27 July 1993 (Hebrew).

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both Labor and Likud leaders emphasized that the IDF–SLA collaboration was the best alternative to protect the border. Some even warned that "running and panic" could undermine Israel's long-term security interests.[22] Even left-leaning Israeli papers agreed that unilateral withdrawal was not an option for consideration without an agreement with Syria.[23]

Still, after military operations like Grapes of Wrath in 1996, some MKs began to present a rationale for unilateral withdrawal, pointing out that the security zone no longer prevented Katyusha rockets from entering Israel, that unilateral withdrawal would take away the Syrian and Hizbullah excuse for attacking Israel, and that a withdrawal would garner international approval and a recognition that Israel seeks peace.[24] But until February 1997, no sustained domestic debate on the security zone was apparent. The consensus view that Israel had no choice but to occupy southern Lebanon to protect northern Israel appeared solid. The issue was framed such that the security zone, despite the costs to Israel, was the price that had to be paid for security in the north.

All that changed on 4 February 1997, when two Israeli helicopters ferrying soldiers to the Lebanese front crashed, killing seventy-three soldiers—an unusually large number of casualties in Israeli terms. To be sure, this tragedy was not the first to occur in the Lebanon context, given the longstanding Israeli debate about Lebanon policy since the 1982 war. But the crash brought the specific question of Israel's continued occupation of southern Lebanon to the consciousness of the Israeli public and sparked the development of citizen groups opposed to the occupation. Most critically, the public debate led to a shift in elite thinking about Lebanon in both the Likud and Labor parties, allowing the withdrawal option to be considered seriously. In short, the conventional wisdom on the security zone began to shift.

Military-Strategic Considerations

Did Israel leave the security zone because it no longer served a military purpose? Interestingly, while the debate over withdrawal gained momentum after the helicopter crash and other failed IDF operations in 1997, the actual withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 did not follow any significant military disaster. In fact, some military analysts suggest that the IDF was improving its tactics in its war against Hizbullah and proving more successful in gaining the upper hand against its guerrilla activity. In late 1999, for example, Chief of General Staff Shaul Mofaz reported that the air force was operating more accurately against terrorist targets, leading to more hits on terrorists and infrastructure

[22] See Knesset Minutes, The 285th meeting of the Thirteenth Knesset, Jerusalem, 14 December 1994, especially 3325 and 3329 (Hebrew).

[23] Editorial, "Meanwhile, There Are No Solutions," *Ha'aretz*, 18 October 1995 (Hebrew).

[24] See Ronnie Shaked, "Member of Knesset Ezra: Unilateral Withdrawal from the Security Zone Needs Reconsideration," *Yediot Ahronot*, 25 December 1996 (Hebrew).

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and fewer Israeli casualties than in the previous year.[25] The military was largely opposed to a unilateral withdrawal; in their estimation, IDF operations in the zone had been rather successful.

According to military officials responsible for coordinating activity in Lebanon, the security zone proved itself over the years, enabling communities in northern Israel to live peacefully for long periods despite the continued threat of terrorism and Katyusha missiles.[26] As one analyst observed, in the "fifteen years the security zone existed, only nine guerrilla squads succeeded in reaching the border; of those nine, just two successfully crossed into Israel. In both cases, the terrorists were killed before they were able to attack civilian targets . . . the great success of the security zone in preventing infiltration enhanced the sense of security among residents in northern Israel."[27] And in response to the critics of the zone who argued that Katyusha rockets could still reach northern Israel despite the zone, military analysts argued that the buffer zone prevented Hizbullah from launching the Katyushas from their most effective and accurate range of six to eight miles, making most artillery attacks inaccurate.[28] As a result, despite the launching of more than 4,000 Katyusha rockets into the Galilee between 1985 and 2000, "only seven civilians were killed by this weapon."[29]

In addition to the protection of the north, military analysts also pointed to incidental benefits of the security zone, such as the IDF's strategic alliance with the SLA, more training space for Israel's Air Force, and strategic depth so that Israel could fight its war against Hizbullah miles from home.[30] According to many security analysts, such strategic benefits came at a relatively low cost. On average, excluding accidents, about twenty to twenty-five Israeli soldiers died a year in the security zone. While over time this death toll led domestic groups to oppose the zone (especially because they did not differentiate between accidents and combat deaths and thus viewed the death rate as much higher), many in the military believed that twenty to thirty deaths a year was not a prohibitive cost for security in the north. As one analyst framed it, ". . . even for a small country like Israel—a country that tolerates the death of more than 400 in traffic accidents every year—a toll of 20-30 dead per year cannot be considered heavy. . . ."[31]

Not only did security elites largely believe that the security zone had proved a successful policy, but many were predicting dire consequences in the aftermath of an Israeli withdrawal. One of the most serious concerns was the possibility of an escalation with Hizbullah and even Syria after a withdrawal. Ac-

[25] See Nina Gilbert, "Mofaz: Unilateral withdrawal dangerous," *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 November 1999.

[26] See Erlich, "The Security Zone: Perception and Reality," 27.

[27] Luft, "Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon—A 'Tragedy'?" 14.

[28] Ibid., 15.

[29] Ibid., 15.

[30] Ibid., 18.

[31] Ibid., 17.

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cording to an influential security analyst, south Lebanon was a "playground" for the parties to play out their interests, which allowed the conflict to be contained and reduced the chance for escalation. But once this playground was taken away, the risks for escalation were much higher.[32] IDF Chief of Staff Mofaz repeatedly warned of the danger for escalation and renewed Hizbullah attacks in the wake of a unilateral withdrawal.[33] An IDF position paper prepared in June 1999 viewed a unilateral withdrawal as the least favorable option because it estimated that such a withdrawal would not prevent further Hizbullah operations.[34] Even some senior officials in the Labor party under Barak's leadership expressed concern about the risks of withdrawal, warning that Hizbullah could quickly gain control of the security zone area.[35] The Israeli intelligence service warned that a unilateral withdrawal could lead to a confrontation between Israel and Syria, since the Syrians were not likely to let the border area stay quiet while Israel held on to the Golan Heights.[36] Other analysts came to similar conclusions, fearing that a withdrawal would not end attacks by anti-Israel guerrilla groups and could even lead to war.[37]

The military's concern over escalation led many to fear that a withdrawal would once again leave northern Israel vulnerable to attack and would disrupt the ability of its residents to proceed with normal lives. Defense Minister Arens argued that a unilateral withdrawal could harm northern residents.[38] Israel's chief of military intelligence, General Amos Malka, warned that a unilateral withdrawal could put northern villages at risk: "The war would continue much closer to our border than is now the case and any Katyusha rocket attacks could threaten areas of Israel currently spared."[39] Other military leaders echoed this line.[40] Chief of Staff Mofaz expressed concern that withdrawal would be gambling with people's lives in the north.[41]

[32] Author interview with Israeli security analyst, 30 November 2000, Washington, DC.

[33] See, for example, Ze'ev Schiff, "Mofaz and the Lebanese Problem," *Ha'aretz*, 7 December 1998 (Hebrew); Liat Collins and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Mofaz again rejects unilateral pullout," *The Jerusalem Post*, 13 April 1999; Gilbert, "Unilateral withdrawal dangerous"; and "General admits Israel mulling partial pullback in Lebanon," *Agence France Presse*, 13 April 1999.

[34] "Israel: Paper Views Unilateral Pullout from Lebanon as Least Favorable Option," Israel TV Channel 1, Jerusalem, 11 June 1999, reproduced by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 12 June 1999.

[35] Steve Rodan, "Ephraim Sneh: Israeli Deputy Defence Minister," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 33 (7 June 2000).

[36] Yoav Limor, "AMAN: Unilateral Withdrawal from Lebanon Will Bring the Terror to the Border Strip," *Ma'ariv*, 30 November 1999 (Hebrew).

[37] Ron Ben-Yishai, "Not Right to Lebanon," *Yediot Ahronot*, daily supplement, 2 February 1997 (Hebrew).

[38] See "Israeli defence minister opposes unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon," Voice of Israel, Jerusalem (Hebrew), 29 January 1999, reproduced on the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 February 1999; and "Israeli army against unilateral Lebanon pullout, says Arens," Voice of Israel, Jerusalem (English), 25 February 1999, reproduced on the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1999.

[39] "Israeli general warns of risk of Lebanon pullout," *Agence France Presse*, 24 September 1999.

[40] See, for example, Avichay Beker, "Profile on Brig. Gen. Eitam," *Ha'aretz*, Friday Magazine, 6 November 1998 (Hebrew).

[41] Yaacov Erez, "Interview with Shaul Mofaz," *Ma'ariv*, 20 September 1998 (Hebrew).

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In addition to concerns about escalation and renewed attacks on the north, military analysts feared that a withdrawal would be perceived as an Israeli retreat in the face of Hizbullah activity, eroding Israel's deterrence posture in the Lebanese arena and beyond. A former commander in the area, Brigadier General Yossi Peled, warned that a withdrawal could be understood as Israel running away.[42] Another analyst feared that a withdrawal without a political agreement would be considered an Israeli surrender to terror and would in turn induce anti-Israel activity by Hamas and other Palestinian organizations.[43]

While the majority opinion in the military and security community opposed withdrawal, a minority supported unilateral withdrawal. Leftist politicians such as Yossi Beilin had long argued that the security zone made little strategic sense since Katyusha rockets could still threaten northern Israel. But by 1999, some voices in the military also began to question the strategic wisdom of maintaining the zone and worried that they were fighting a guerrilla war that was impossible to win. Even Uri Lubrani, Israel's top coordinator for Lebanon, broke his silence after the Israeli withdrawal and revealed that he had long believed Israel had no role to play in Lebanon.[44] Senior combat commanders in south Lebanon began calling for a withdrawal out of frustration with the political limitations placed on them and the beginnings of the disintegration of the SLA in the spring of 1999.[45] However, while the disintegration of the SLA may have hastened the timing of the Israeli withdrawal, it does not fundamentally explain the decision itself, since discussion of withdrawal and its implementation is what facilitated the SLA's disintegration.

In sum, voices of dissent in the military were in the minority and were based more on concerns about the military's ability to carry out its mission and the indefinite nature of the operation than on questions about the central rationale for the zone—to protect northern Israel. The majority military opinion was opposed to a unilateral withdrawal, arguing not only that the zone had proved effective, but also that the risks of leaving were higher than the costs of staying. To understand why Israel withdrew, one has to look at other explanations.

Domestic Pressures: Setting the Stage

Protest Movements and Public Opinion

Among the more prevalent explanations for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was the domestic pressure initiated by citizen groups, such as the Four Mothers

[42] Yossi Peled, "The Background to the IDF Staying in the Security Zone" in Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *The Security Zone in Lebanon: A Reconsideration*, 9–34.

[43] Amos Harel, "United Front in the Security Community: No Withdrawal from Lebanon," *Ha'aretz*, 30 November 1998 (Hebrew).

[44] David Rudge, "Lubrani: Pullout was long overdue," *The Jerusalem Post*, 29 May 2000.

[45] See Patrick Cockburn, "Generals Call for Lebanon Pull-Out Now," *The Independent*, 20 May 1999, 17; and Laurie Copans, "Report: Top Israeli commanders in south Lebanon back withdrawal," *Associated Press Newswire*, 19 May 1999.

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TABLE 1

Israel Defense Force Combat Casualties in South Lebanon (June 1985–April 2000)

Year	*Killed*	*Wounded*
1985	2	
1986	9	193
1987	20	
1988	21	
1989	2	30
1990	8	14
1991	10	19
1992	13	48
1993	26	67
1994	21	58
1995	23	98
1996	26	96
1997	38*	83
1998	24	101
1999	13	62
2000	9	22
Total	265	891

Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF Spokesman's Office.

* This figure does not include the 73 IDF deaths resulting from the February 1997 helicopter crash, since the figures represent combat deaths only.

movement. Mounting casualties led Israelis increasingly to question the wisdom of a continued presence in Lebanon. According to this view, the military lost the public opinion battle to citizen movements.

The shift began when the 1997 helicopter crash brought the security zone issue to the public's attention. The number of Israeli soldiers killed in combat that year, thirty-eight, was also particularly high. As Table 1 shows, although 1997 was a high casualty year, the years leading up to the withdrawal in May 2000 actually experienced a *decrease* in casualties. Yet, some high-profile deaths occurred in 1999, including the top Israeli general in Lebanon. Public opinion, however, is not based on sterile numbers, which could be presented in different ways to affect the public debate. For example, if one begins counting casualties starting with the 1982 Israeli invasion rather than from the establishment of the zone in 1985, the numbers are much higher and more dramatic: more than 850 dead and more than 3,800 wounded.[46] Protest movements supporting unilateral withdrawal drew on these higher figures to bolster their case against the security zone.

The most visible protest organization was the Four Mothers movement, which was started by mothers of soldiers serving in Lebanon after the February 1997 helicopter crash. As one of the founders explained: "We were always full

[46] Gal Luft, "Securing Northern Israel Following an IDF Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon" in Clawson and Eisenstadt, eds., *The Last Arab-Israeli Battlefield?* 89.

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of concern and fear, but we felt there was no choice: we were told that they had to be in Lebanon and that's all there was to it. . . . But the night of the helicopter disaster was a turning point for us. Families very close to us lost their sons and we realized that if not today, then tomorrow we too could lose ours. And we began to ask, Why?"[47] The mothers began staging protests, lobbying Knesset members, and circulating petitions calling for a withdrawal.[48] As media coverage of Lebanon expanded, the Four Mothers attracted publicity and generous news coverage, and it became a major player in the national debate over the issue. Indeed, the media greatly enhanced the visibility of this group and the general issue of the continued Israeli presence in the security zone. While its appeal was based largely on emotional terms, the movement also drew upon strategic arguments, questioning the usefulness of the zone if the northern communities were still vulnerable. As such, they became a major force in the security discourse over Lebanon.[49] According to some analysts, the "main contribution of the movement was to legitimize the public debate over Lebanon. . . . Before they came along, debating what we were doing in Lebanon was a taboo subject; it wasn't patriotic to raise it."[50] Critique of the movement by high level political and military officials, who argued that the movement was threatening the morale and effectiveness of the IDF, suggests that Four Mothers did emerge as a powerful force in Israeli society.[51]

Such movements undoubtedly influenced and sparked debate on the issue, but it is unclear how much they directly affected the decision for withdrawal.[52] While Four Mothers included several influential individuals with connections to top political and military leaders, the movement never became the kind of mass protest movement that occurred in the United States during the Vietnam War. Nor did these groups represent a swing vote in the 1999 Israeli elections. Despite a great deal of publicity, the social movements only represented a minority of the Israeli population. Until 1999 the majority of the Israeli public still favored staying in the security zone. In the run up to the Israeli elections in March 1999, a Gallup survey in an Israeli newspaper found that 61 percent of those questioned opposed a unilateral withdrawal "without a prior agreement

[47] Leora Eren Frucht, "The movement that shaped the Lebanon pullout," *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 June 2000.

[48] Ibid.

[49] See Danny Rabinovich, "Women in the Security Discourse," *Ha'aretz*, 30 November 1998 (Hebrew).

[50] Fruct, "The movement that shaped the Lebanon pullout."

[51] See, ibid.; "Israeli defense minister rules out unilateral Lebanon pullout," *Agence France Presse*, 14 April 1999; and Bathsheva Tsur, "Weizman says no to Lebanon pullout now," *The Jerusalem Post*, 16 June 1999.

[52] For a discussion of the limited impact of the Four Mother's movement, see Amir Lupovici, "The Influence of the Four Mothers Movement on the Learned Political Behavior in the Withdrawal from Lebanon" (unpublished manuscript, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, September 2000), (Hebrew).

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with Lebanon and Syria," while only 31 percent backed a unilateral withdrawal (8 percent were undecided).[53]

Powerful domestic constituencies in the north were also strongly opposed to withdrawal. One Israeli editorial in 1997 suggested that the public pressure coming from the northern settlements was still higher than the pressure from families of soldiers killed in military operations.[54] The heads of the northern communities declared their opposition to a unilateral withdrawal without international guarantees that would ensure the security of the residents.[55] Mayors from six northern Israeli towns staged protests against a withdrawal, blacking out their town's street lights, as council heads in the north continued such protests.[56]

The most reliable and extensive public opinion data on this issue comes from the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' National Security and Public Opinion Project, initiated in 1984 to monitor Israeli public opinion on issues related to national security. One question in their survey beginning in 1997 asked directly about support for a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Support for this option rose over the years from 41 percent in 1997 and 44 percent in 1998 to 55 percent in 1999.[57] Indeed, the 1999 poll, conducted between 25 January to 7 March in the midst of the 1999 election campaign, was the first Jaffee Center survey in which a majority of the Israeli public agreed to unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon.[58] By the 2000 poll carried out just months before the actual withdrawal, the numbers supporting withdrawal went up to 62 percent.[59] According to these figures, 1999 was the critical year for the shift in Israeli opinion. This happened to coincide with an Israeli election in which the security zone became a major issue as candidates reframed the problem in ways that made withdrawal more acceptable to the Israeli public.

Between 1995 and 1998, the Jaffee Center survey included only one general question about the security rationale of the security zone in Lebanon, asking whether it made a positive contribution to Israel's security and protected the northern settlements from terrorism. Not surprisingly, before 1999, the majority agreed with this proposition, although the numbers began to decrease (77

[53] Cited in "Most Israelis oppose unconditional pullout of Lebanon," *Agence France Presse*, 5 March 1999.

[54] Editorial, "And after the 'Lebanon First'?" *Ha'aretz*, 1 September 1997 (Hebrew).

[55] David Rudge and Arieh O'Sullivan, "PM repeats pledge to pull out of Lebanon," *The Jerusalem Post*, 31 October 1999.

[56] See "Northern Israeli mayors protest against unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon," *Agence France Presse*, 21 November 1999; and David Rudge, "Confrontation line communities to continue protests," *The Jerusalem Post*, 23 November 1999.

[57] Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2000* (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum No. 56, July 2000), 24.

[58] See Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 1999* (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum No. 53, July 1999).

[59] Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2000*, 24.

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percent in 1995, 72 percent in 1996, 62 percent in 1997, and 64 percent in 1998).[60] But in the 1999 and 2000 surveys, this single question was replaced by a series of more comprehensive questions concerning the security zone.[61] Most dramatically, by the 2000 poll, almost all respondents agreed (86 percent) that the security zone was not worth the lives of Israeli soldiers (74 percent supported this statement in 1999). Demonstrating a strategic rationale for leaving the zone (as opposed to critics who claim the public was responding passionately to the high Israeli death toll), a large majority of Israelis also believed that the security zone was an important bargaining chip in future negotiations with Syria (72 percent in 1999 and 79 percent in 2000).[62] But even after the withdrawal, when it was clear a peace agreement with Syria was not then possible, the public continued to support withdrawal, with the numbers approving the policy even higher after the withdrawal than before (75 percent).[63]

In sum, public opinion in Israel began to shift in favor of the withdrawal option largely after 1999, when the issue became a major point of debate in the Israeli elections. Thus, while the protest movements and the high-profile casualties brought the security zone to the public's attention and provided enabling conditions for a policy shift, it is questionable whether this alone led to the change in Israeli policy. If important political elites such as Sharon and Barak had not taken up the withdrawal issue and instead had made arguments against withdrawal based on strategic concerns, might public opinion have remained supportive of the zone? Would policy have shifted if political elites on the left and right did not support withdrawal, especially considering no one expected to lose an election over this issue? But while public opinion may be malleable, it is not irrational.[64] The Israeli public was listening to arguments carefully in the years leading up to withdrawal, and what they were hearing from respected and influential elites was that the withdrawal option was now legitimate and could be carried out without harming Israel's strategic interests and perhaps in a way that could even enhance them.

Changing Political Culture

Public opinion polls are just snapshots of Israeli views at a given time and do not necessarily reveal deeper trends in Israeli society, particularly long-term changes in Israeli political culture and views toward the military. Such changes are difficult to quantify but have been widely noted among political analysts.

[60] Ibid., 25.

[61] For a list of all the questions and the responses, see Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2000*, 26.

[62] Ibid.

[63] See Gallup survey cited in "Israelis give resounding support to Lebanon withdrawal," *Agence France Presse*, 26 May 2000.

[64] Some military analysts, for example, tend to portray the public as succumbing to passion over reason on this issue. See, for example, Luft, "Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon—A 'Tragedy'?"

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The most significant change has been a greater emphasis on the individual over the collective, challenging traditional Israeli support for self-sacrifice for the common good. This trend is apparent across different sectors of Israeli society, from the decay of the kibbutz movement to the "Americanization" of society.[65] But perhaps the clearest sector and the one most affected by this shift has been the Israeli military. The military has historically been the glue in Israeli society, promoting the notion that individual Israelis must sacrifice for the collective nation as Israel faces continuous threats in a dangerous neighborhood. Those who do not serve in the military are stigmatized. In the past, those critical of the military were viewed as unpatriotic, undermining Israeli security.

But increasingly, such positions have begun to change, as Israelis are more willing to challenge military opinion. As one security analyst observes: "Israeli society displays signs of wariness of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict and is more concerned than ever before about personal security, which reflects the greater emphasis on personal rather than collective fulfillment."[66] Another observer of Israeli security policy notes a similar trend: "Growing affluence, the peace process, and the simple passage of time have created a society that today is more individualistic and more willing to criticize the institutions and values inherited from the Jewish state's heroic years. As one of the central national institutions, the IDF has come in for its share of criticism."[67]

Increasingly, military service is viewed less as a way of showing one's commitment to the nation's security than as an obligation necessary to advance one's career in other sectors.[68] Reserve duty is often viewed as a burden rather than a "curiously welcome hardship," with only a third of those eligible actually performing this duty.[69] While it is too early to determine whether these patterns will shift as a result of Israel's massive operation into Palestinian areas in the aftermath of the Passover 2002 suicide bombing, such trends toward military service were firmly in place at the time of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

The greater willingness to challenge military opinion and a greater emphasis on the individual over the collective created the conditions necessary for a shift in policy on Lebanon. It was no longer taboo to criticize military policy. Such trends provided a ripe environment for reframing the Lebanon problem from "we need to sacrifice a few to save the many" to a problem of "why should so many individuals die if the many are still threatened"? The changing national

[65] See, for example, Myron J. Aronoff, "The 'Americanization' of Israeli Politics: Political and Cultural Change," *Israel Studies* 5 (Spring 2000): 92–127.

[66] Efraim Inbar, *Israeli National Security, 1973–1996* (Ramat-Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, February 1998), 81.

[67] Jonathan Marcus, "Israel's Defense Policy at a Strategic Crossroads," *The Washington Quarterly* 22 (Winter 1999), 45.

[68] For a lengthy discussion of this issue, see Stuart A. Cohen, *Towards a New Portrait of the (New) Israeli Soldier* (Ramat-Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, September 1997).

[69] See Eliot A. Cohen, "Israel after Heroism," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (November/December 1998): 112–128.

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ethos allowed the Lebanon story to change "from 'the heroes protecting the northern settlements' to 'It's time to get out of our Vietnam.'"[70] The changing political culture and views toward the military set the stage for a policy reversal, but the immediate trigger was the cooption of the Lebanon issue by influential political elites.

Political Leadership and the Reframing of the Lebanon Problem

Framing Political Issues

Frames, a popular concept among social movement theorists,[71] are sets of interpretations and meanings that guide how political actors view a situation or problem. In any society, many competing frames exist, and political actors are often trying to replace existing frames with their own so that their understanding of a situation will become the widely accepted one or the new national narrative. Narratives, a concept closely related to frames, are collective understandings of how to understand the past, situate the present, and act toward the future.[72] Different historical narratives can suggest different ways for nations to act in the present. For example, in the Israeli case, Michael Barnett suggests that the "Masada complex" or traditional Zionist narrative will lead to very different prescriptions about how Israel should behave today than the narrative presented by the "New Historians."[73] Decision makers can manipulate narratives to better fit their vision of the future,[74] employing frames, or "specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action."[75] As Barnett explains, actors "strategically deploy frames to situate events and to interpret problems, to fashion a shared understanding of the world, to galvinize sentiments as a way to mobilize and guide social action, and to suggest possible resolutions to current plights."[76]

Political actors are constantly trying to frame issues to mobilize support for a given cause and make a particular policy choice acceptable to the public at large. Such framing of political problems usually takes place in an institutional

[70] Gadi Wolfsfeld, quoted in Fruct, "The movement that shaped the Lebanon pullout."

[71] See, for example, Anne Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols in Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (April 1986): 273–286; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–639; and Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspective on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[72] See Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change," 12–14.

[73] Ibid., 14.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Definition from Mayer Zald cited in ibid., 15.

[76] Ibid., 15.

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context, which in the Israeli case is often its electoral politics.[77] In the Lebanon case, reframing largely took place in the context of the 1999 election. This is not just because political leaders were trying to gain votes, but because elections allow the opportunity for leaders to debate and justify important public policy issues and thus provide a ripe moment for framing to take place.

Elections suggest when framing might take place, however, they do not answer why actors might decide to reframe a policy that has garnered widespread support for a significant period of time. Why do frames change? What is the connection between public opinion and frame changes? What are the necessary conditions for a frame change to translate into a policy shift? While various factors might lead to reframing, the Lebanon withdrawal suggests that a crisis event can provide an important catalyst for frame change. Reframing takes place because a crisis event sparks new thinking on an issue, both at the elite and mass levels. While in some cases social movements may lead framing efforts and impact policy shifts, in other cases such movements are insufficient to spark policy change if elites are not also reframing an issue and legitimizing the public trends, particularly in the national security arena. Thus, public opinion and social movements are not always sufficient mechanisms for frame change. For new frames to translate into new policy options and outcomes, political elites must form a consensus across the political spectrum that accepts the new frame. And while such reframing may not be triggered by public opinion, it certainly depends on it, suggesting that reframing must take place in a neutral or favorable public opinion context. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult to reframe an issue if the public was largely opposed to the policy with which the new frame is associated.

In the Lebanon case, political leaders from opposing parties were reframing the issue in similar ways, although for different reasons. The political leadership began to shift from the old narrative that "Israel had no choice but to occupy southern Lebanon in order to protect the north," to a new narrative that "the security zone has been an unnecessary cost to Israel since the north can be protected without it." The narrative shifted from "Lebanon as heroic work" to "Lebanon as tragedy." Thus, the old frame suggesting that there were no alternatives to the security zone because "the zone is the price we have to pay for security in the north" began to be replaced with a new frame suggesting that alternatives were possible because "withdrawal from the zone will not undermine Israeli security and will end the unnecessary loss of Israeli lives." The Israeli public was no doubt ripe for such reframing, particularly after the 1997 crisis and in the context of the changing political culture regarding military affairs. Still, the fact that leaders from across the political spectrum and with respected military credentials were reframing the security zone issue in this way had a dramatic impact, particularly since this reframing took place in public forums (public debates in the Knesset, newspaper and television interviews,

[77] Ibid.

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and speeches). Such elite reframing reinforced and legitimized the growing skepticism toward the security zone, which was caused by the helicopter crash and the rise of protest movements. The reframing of the Lebanon issue made a potential policy option a viable one that ultimately garnered widespread support and was implemented.

Withdrawal Proposals during Netanyahu's Term

The idea for withdrawal from Lebanon did not begin with Barak; rather it began to surface during Benjamin Netanyahu's tenure as prime minister. Security analysts began to raise the issue of withdrawal and to suggest that withdrawal would not jeopardize the north's security but would facilitate a settlement with Syria, whose ability to threaten Israel through Hizbullah would decrease.[78] Most Israelis preferred a withdrawal within the context of a peace agreement with Syria, which might partly explain why discussion of unilateral withdrawal did not arise when Israeli-Syrian negotiations seemed to be moving forward in the early 1990s. Thus, it may not be surprising that when peace process diplomacy slowed after the 1996 election of Netanyahu, ideas such as unilateral withdrawal began to emerge.[79] Other analysts questioned the rationale behind the security zone since the public increasingly did not differentiate between the security of citizens and the security of soldiers.[80] Political leaders such as Likud's Michael Eitan also began to suggest that current policies in Lebanon should be reconsidered and that a solution to the security zone was needed.[81] On the left, Labor party's Yossi Beilin was the most vocal advocate for unilateral withdrawal, writing a detailed guide to an Israeli withdrawal, which suggested that withdrawal could take place even without the approval of Syrian President Hafez Assad.[82] As important, discussion and proposals for an Israeli withdrawal from the security zone began to emerge from government officials in the ruling Likud party under Netanyahu's leadership.

Some Likud MKs were part of the "Koav-Yair" forum, a group of MKs supportive of an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Withdrawal supporters on the right differed from withdrawal advocates on the left. Their central concern was that a prolonged war in Lebanon would lead to public pressure to reach an agreement with Syria that would force Israel to make territorial compro-

[78] See Avraham Sela, "The Security Zone—Lebanese and Regional Aspects" in Bar-Simon-Tov, *The Security Zone in Lebanon*, 35–46 (Hebrew).

[79] I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

[80] See Dov Tamari, "The Lebanon War—A Reconsideration" in Bar-Simon-Tov, *The Security Zone in Lebanon*, 59–63 (Hebrew).

[81] Michael Eitan, "The Right to Ask Questions" in Bar-Simon-Tov, *The Security Zone in Lebanon*, 45–46 (Hebrew).

[82] See Yossi Beilin, *A Guide to an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 1998) (Hebrew).

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mises on the Golan Heights.[83] Likud and other political leaders on the right began to support withdrawal in order to delink Lebanon from Syria and thus spare Israel any need to give up the Golan. As one account stated it, "There are also those in the party [Likud] who wish to see a unilateral withdrawal so as to ensure the Syrians cannot use Lebanon as a pawn in negotiations over the fate of the Golan."[84] Still, at this early stage (in 1997), senior government officials such as Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai were critical of other Likud MKs supporting withdrawal and emphasized that there was no other option to the current situation in Lebanon and that discussion of withdrawal was damaging the morale of the IDF.[85] But the fact that senior Likud as well as Labor MKs were holding serious discussions regarding a withdrawal option by early 1997 suggested change might be on the way.

By January 1998, Defense Minister Mordechai presented a proposal for withdrawal based on UN Security Council Resolution 425, provided that Hizbullah would disarm and guarantees of safety would be given to the SLA. Two months later, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed a desire to leave Lebanon according to Resolution 425 and dispatched Mordechai to France to explore this option.[86] But the proposal never got off the ground because the Syrians, who exert military and political control over Lebanon and support anti-Israel guerrilla groups operating in the south, rejected the initiative and would not allow the Lebanese to accept it. Such an agreement was not possible without Syria's acquiescence, so the initiative never became operational.

Ariel Sharon, another Likud cabinet minister in the Netanyahu government, also proposed a withdrawal option that called for a gradual removal of the IDF from various posts in southern Lebanon to test the response and allow Israel the justification to launch harsh retaliatory strikes against Lebanon if attacks continued.[87] Again, Sharon intended to use an Israeli withdrawal to halt Syrian pressure for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.[88] Despite the failure of these Likud initiatives, withdrawal was now part of the Likud agenda, and

[83] See, for example, Naomi Levitzki, "Talking about Lebanon, Thinking about the Golan," *Yediot Ahronot*, 14 February 1997, Friday supplement (Hebrew). Ze'ev Schiff, a prominent Israeli security analyst, was critical of delinking Lebanon from negotiations with Syria and also noted that some leaders on the right supported withdrawal to prevent an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. See Schiff, "The Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon Is Connected to an Agreement with Syria" in Bar-Simon-Tov, *The Security Zone in Lebanon*, 53–57 (Hebrew).

[84] David Zev Harris, "The Lebanon question splits Likud," *The Jerusalem Post*, 15 February 2000.

[85] Levitzki, "Talking about Lebanon, Thinking about the Golan."

[86] See Ora Ariff, "Prime Minister: 'We Will Withdraw from Lebanon, If the Hizbullah will be Demilitarized from its' weapons," *Yediot Ahronot*, 1 March 1998 (Hebrew). On Mordechai's efforts, also see Nahum Barnea, "Uri Lubrani leaves Lebanon," *Yediot Ahronot*, 23 June 2000, Friday supplement (Hebrew).

[87] On Sharon's initiative, see Ron Ben-Yishai, "Sharon Returns to Lebanon," *Yediot Ahronot*, 30 December 1998, daily supplement (Hebrew). For a critique of the gradual withdrawal idea, see Ze'ev Schiff, "Gradual Withdrawal is Worse," *Ha'aretz*, 1 January 1999 (Hebrew).

[88] Ben-Yishai, "Sharon Returns to Lebanon."

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political elites began discussing and framing the issue differently than it had been in the past, particularly during the run-up to the 1999 elections for prime minister.

In an early 1999 interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu began to question the use of the security zone as he emphasized another option to respond to Hizbullah terrorism: deterrence. "Rocket attacks cannot be prevented by territorial occupation, because Katyushas can have a longer range. . . . The only thing we can do to prevent missile attacks on our territory until suitable technology is developed . . . is to deter."[89] By March 1999, Netanyahu began expressing support for unilateral withdrawal. His challenger Barak had just announced his pledge to bring Israeli troops home by June 2000 if elected, although he never presented his support in an unconditional fashion.[90] The inner cabinet in the Netanyahu government also began holding discussions on unilateral withdrawal proposals with several high-level ministers (including Sharon) supporting proposals that would remove the IDF from all but a small portion of the security zone.[91]

Still, key ministers such as the new defense minister, Moshe Arens, continued to oppose a withdrawal option, fearing it would constitute a "dangerous gamble."[92] But by April 1999, Arens was revealing plans to cut the number of IDF troops deployed in Lebanon, although he insisted that this was not a prelude to a unilateral withdrawal and that constant talk of withdrawal was undermining the morale of the IDF.[93] Nonetheless, plans to change the IDF's deployment in the security zone and discussion of evacuating the SLA from various posts were interpreted by the media and the public as the beginning of support for an Israeli withdrawal. Meanwhile, Netanyahu continued to emphasize the deterrent option—applying painful strikes against Lebanese infrastructure if attacks on the north continued—as a basis for an IDF withdrawal, even after he was defeated by Barak in the election.[94] Security analysts also began reinforcing the message that a deterrent posture could serve as the basis for an Israeli withdrawal in a way that would not increase instability or invite more

[89] "Israel: Netanyahu comments on inner cabinet decision on Lebanon," 1 January 1999, *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, from *Voice of Israel*, Jerusalem (Hebrew).

[90] "Netanyahu talks of 'unilateral' withdrawal from Lebanon for first time," *Agence France Presse*, 3 March 1999. For his reservations on withdrawal arrangements, see "Netanyahu states objection to unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 6 March 1999, from *Voice of Israel*, Jerusalem (Hebrew), 4 March 1999.

[91] See "Inner Cabinet to discuss proposal for limited withdrawal from Lebanon," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 4 March 1999, from *Ma'ariv* (Hebrew), 2 March 1999.

[92] Ibid.

[93] David Rudge and Danna Harman, "Arens plans to cut forces in Lebanon," *The Jerusalem Post*, 11 April 1999; and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Arens: Talk of unilateral pullout harming IDF morale," *The Jerusalem Post*, 15 April 1999.

[94] "Netanyahu says 'message of Lebanon' understood," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 29 June 1999, from *Voice of Israel*, Jerusalem (English), 27 June 1999.

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terrorism across the border.[95] In other words, by the time Barak came to power, the framing of the security zone issue was already beginning to change, with influential leaders suggesting that the security zone was no longer the only alternative to protect the north; deterrence also provided a viable and secure option. The security zone was no longer a necessity, but a choice that Ehud Barak would act on in the coming year.

Movement toward Withdrawal under Barak

While we will never know for certain if the Israeli withdrawal would have taken place had Ehud Barak not become prime minister of Israel in June 1999, there can be little doubt that his leadership decisively shifted the debate on Lebanon and the way the issue was perceived, both by elites and the public at large. Barak's victory allowed withdrawal to become a practical option and an implementable policy. Some have argued that Barak elevated the withdrawal issue during the 1999 election campaign because it was popular and would gain him votes; however, Barak had long expressed reservations about the security zone.[96] Barak may have chosen to raise the withdrawal issue during the campaign period in the context of his critique of Netanyahu's management of the Oslo process and his campaign message that Israel was "stuck."[97] The withdrawal from Lebanon was one way to move Israel out of its deadlock in peace process diplomacy. Still, it is unlikely that Barak believed this issue alone could win him the election, particularly since the most critical swing voters—the Russian community—were not particularly interested in this issue and the public was more concerned with Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and Syria than toward Lebanon. Indeed, if Barak was the type of leader who simply responded to popular opinion, he likely would not have continued negotiations with the Palestinians after the outbreak of the second Intifada, a policy that eroded his public support and cost him the prime ministership in the February 2001 election.

While the idea of withdrawal was becoming more popular among the public, Barak's support for the idea helped legitimize the proposal. His military credentials as one of the most respected former generals in the IDF and former chief of staff gave Barak the ability to push this initiative through even against the military's wishes and gave the idea an instant stamp of approval from the security standpoint in the minds of the public. According to a respected Israeli security analyst, Ze'ev Schiff, the withdrawal decision only became popular when Barak began promoting it; the "minute Barak moved in this direction,

[95] See, for example, Gerald M. Steinberg, "Lebanon: This way out," *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 July 1999.

[96] Some of these reservations related to concerns about relying on local Lebanese units for fear they would create an opposition force among the Shiite population in south Lebanon as well as the concern that the zone could not protect Israel from the Katyusha threat. These observations are based on author interview with Ze'ev Schiff, Tel Aviv, 18 January 2001.

[97] I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

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public opinion moved with him."[98] As Schiff puts it, the Israeli public thought "if the former chief of staff supports it, it must be ok."[99] Another analyst observed, "Ehud Barak's military record and his unquestioned expertise in security affairs were crucial to his ability to push forward the withdrawal despite the stiff and almost unanimous opposition of the IDF high command . . . it is hard to believe that Yossi Beilin or Shlomo Ben Ami could have mustered the necessary support in the cabinet, the Knesset and among the public for such a momentous and risky decision. . . ."[100]

Barak's most vocal support for a withdrawal began with his election pledge to "bring the boys home"; once he gave that pledge, according to Schiff, "it was like signing a check."[101] The question for Barak was no longer whether but how a withdrawal would happen. Throughout the election and his first year in office, Barak framed the Lebanon issue in ways that made withdrawal seem a legitimate, secure, and preferable option to maintaining the security zone. As one analyst explained, Barak assured the Israeli people, especially the residents in the north, that "the withdrawal *will not decrease but will enhance* the security and tranquility of the people living in the north . . . he has committed himself to massive retaliation against Lebanon and against Syrian interests in Lebanon for any violation of Israel's border. . . . It would seem that the Israeli public, by and large, believes Barak."[102] Like Netanyahu, Barak offered deterrence as a preferable alternative to the security zone. In addition to offering an alternative, Barak repeatedly emphasized the unnecessary nature of the security zone, arguing that it diminished rather than enhanced Israeli security. He shifted the language of the zone from a necessity to a tragedy: ". . . I intend to redeploy the IDF along the international border and defend Israel's northern settlements from there. This is in order to stop the tragedy in Lebanon that has been continuing for the last 17 years and put an end to the series of graves we have been digging in our cemeteries in order to bury the results of this tragedy. . . . I am committed to upholding my pledge and implementing this move in order to bring security to northern Israel. . . ."[103] In response to the usefulness of the zone in defending Israel from the Katyusha threat, Barak explained, "One must understand that the threat posed by Katyusha rockets does not change as a result of the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon. They can fire Katyushas into Israel today just as easily as they will be able to do after we redeploy along the international border. . . . Therefore, the roots of the issue must be dealt with."[104]

[98] Author interview with Ze'ev Schiff, Tel Aviv, 18 January 2001.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Yehuda Ben-Meir, "The Withdrawal from Lebanon and the Israeli Domestic Scene," *Strategic Assessment* 3 (June 2000), (http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v3nlp4.html).

[101] Author interview with Ze'ev Schiff, Tel Aviv, 18 January 2001.

[102] Ben-Meir, "The Withdrawal from Lebanon and the Israeli Domestic Scene."

[103] "Barak reaffirms Lebanon withdrawal pledge," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 27 November 1999, from *Voice of Israel*, Jerusalem, 25 November 1999.

[104] Ibid.

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Barak's foreign minister, David Levy, expressed concern for the residents in northern Israel but also pointed out that the security zone had not prevented missile attacks against Israel: "Look, right now we are in Lebanon and Katyusha rockets landed on Qiryat Shemona [a northern Israeli town]."[105] Even after the withdrawal, Barak repeated the security rationale he had sold to the Israeli people concerning the withdrawal: ". . . we are in a better position than before. I reduced significantly the legitimacy to shoot [at us] once we are within the borders of Israel. And I heightened a lot of the freedom of maneuver for Israel to use the right of self-defense if someone dares to do it. Once we are within Israel, defending ourselves from within our borders, the Lebanese government and the Syrian government are responsible to make sure that no one will dare hit Israeli civilians or armed forces within Israel."[106] As for the security zone's usefulness, Barak asserted, "the Security Zone ceased to be an asset militarily. It began to be a liability."[107]

But while Barak was in favor of withdrawal because of the inherent problems associated with maintaining the security zone and his belief that a deterrent posture served as a preferable alternative, he also was greatly motivated by a desire to link the withdrawal issue to his negotiations with the Syrians. Unlike the Likud supporters of withdrawal who hoped to avoid a peace agreement with Syria, Barak sought withdrawal in order to achieve one. Indeed, Barak came to office placing a high priority on the Syrian track. As part of his efforts to get the Syrian track moving, Barak believed that his proposal to withdraw from Lebanon would entice Syrian President Assad to the peace table.[108] His plan for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon included a "speedy resumption of peace talks with Syria. . . ."[109] Until the failed Israeli-Syrian talks in Geneva in the spring of 2000—when it became clear that a peace agreement with Syria was not achievable—Barak almost always associated his plans for a withdrawal from Lebanon with an agreement with Syria. A month after taking office, Barak repeated his pledge to bring the boys home, but within the context of an agreement.[110] While the IDF began planning for a possible withdrawal by the fall of 1999, its plans were based on the assumption that such a withdrawal would take place within the framework of a peace agreement.[111] Barak avoided

[105] "Foreign minister says peace with Syria possible in less than 15 months," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 20 July 1999, from *Voice of Israel*, Jerusalem (Hebrew), 18 July 1999.

[106] Lisa Beyer, "The Time Had Come to End a Tragedy," *Time*, 5 June 2000, 27.

[107] Ibid.

[108] On this point, see Siegman, "Being Hafiz al-Assad."

[109] Karin Laub, "Barak says he's confident he can withdraw from Lebanon by mid-2000," *Associated Press*, 20 May 1999. Also see Lee Hockstader, "Barak Sets Agenda for Peace Program," *Washington Post*, 21 May 1999.

[110] See, for example, Barak's speech to the Israeli Knesset, 6 July 1999 (in Hebrew from the IDF Spokesman's Center for Documentation and Information); and "Barak interviewed on peace process, domestic political issues," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 12 July 1999, from Israel TV Channel 1, Jerusalem, 9 July 1999 (Hebrew).

[111] See David Rudge, "Mofaz confirms IDF plan for possible south Lebanon withdrawal," *The Jerusalem Post*, 7 October 1999.

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discussing the possibility of a unilateral withdrawal without an agreement, at least until talks with the Syrians broke down.[112] Barak and his top advisers expected to reach an agreement with Syria and thus largely thought of the withdrawal issue in this context. Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh explained that a withdrawal from Lebanon would take place by the summer of 2000: "Because we plan to have serious negotiations with the Syrians—I hope very soon—and in this framework, we will reach an arrangement for Lebanon."[113]

Given Barak's emphasis on linking an Israeli withdrawal to peace talks with Syria, one might ask why Barak went through with the withdrawal unilaterally once it became clear that a peace agreement with Syria was not possible. Not only had Barak made a pledge to the Israeli people on which his credibility rested, but he had long believed substantively that the security zone was undermining rather than enhancing Israeli security and that Israel could better defend itself from the international border. And his efforts at reframing this issue, in conjunction with his predecessors from the opposition, created a new consensus on the security zone that became widely accepted among the Israeli public and would be difficult to reverse. Although Barak's political opposition in the Knesset criticized the way in which the withdrawal took place, leaving the SLA vulnerable as Israel departed more hastily than anticipated,[114] few opposed the withdrawal itself. In a poll taken on the evening after the withdrawal, 72 percent of the respondents believed that leaving Lebanon unilaterally was the correct decision.[115] An unusual political consensus had been reached in a typically divided country, as heroic battle against anti-Israeli guerrilla forces was transformed into an "absurd situation."[116] The security zone was no longer perceived as a necessity, but as a tragedy.[117]

Conclusion

Despite overwhelming opposition from the military and fifteen years of occupation in a security zone that was considered a strategic necessity, Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon in a stunning reversal of security policy. Why? While changing views in Israel toward the military and growing public

[112] See, for example, "Barak tells senior officers he is confident of negotiating with Syria," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 26 August 1999, from *Ha'aretz*, 24 August 1999 (Hebrew); and "Israel: Prime Minister Interviewed on Coalition, Political Issues," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, 10 September 1999, from IDF Radio, Tel Aviv, 10 September 1999 (Hebrew).

[113] Arieh O'Sullivan, "Sneh: We'll back SLA," *The Jerusalem Post*, 30 September 1999.

[114] See, for example, Nina Gilbert, "Likud call for inquiry into withdrawal," *The Jerusalem Post*, 25 May 2000.

[115] See Ben-Meir, "*The Withdrawal from Lebanon and the Israeli Domestic Scene.*"

[116] This language was used by Minister of Foreign Affairs David Levy in a press briefing on the withdrawal, 23 May 2000, Jerusalem, posted on the Israeli Foreign Ministry website (http://www.mfa.gov.il).

[117] Barak increasingly used the word "tragedy" to describe the south Lebanon situation, and he used it when declaring the end of the security zone on 24 May. See, for example, William A. Orme Jr., "Retreat From Lebanon: The Israelis; Barak Declares End to 'Tragedy' as Last Troops Leave Lebanon," *New York Times*, 24 May 2000.

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wariness with the Israeli presence in the security zone set the stage for a withdrawal, the key trigger for withdrawal was the reframing of the issue by Israeli elites across the political spectrum. For their own strategic and instrumental reasons, both Likud and Labor elites began to portray the security zone less as a strategic necessity and more as a strategic liability and offered alternatives to the zone that could bring security to Israel's north. More than anyone else, Ehud Barak elevated this issue in the public debate and legitimized the notion that an Israeli withdrawal would enhance rather than undermine Israeli security. Within only a few years, a new consensus on Lebanon emerged. The security zone became a "tragedy" that could and had to end. Barak had the credentials and power necessary to ensure that it did.

What are the implications of this case for broader Israeli security policy and security debates in the United States? While Israeli political culture is more willing to criticize the military and more wary of casualities than in the past, this case shows that this alone would not have led to an Israeli withdrawal from the zone. In other words, the public is not simply responding to high levels of violence and capitulating—the so-called violence pays thesis. Indeed, some have suggested that this is exactly how the Palestinians have interpreted the Lebanon withdrawal, believing that high numbers of Israeli casualties would force Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. But as Israel's recent military campaign into the West Bank and Gaza makes clear, Palestinian violence against Israeli civilians has only increased the Israeli presence in Palestinian areas and strengthened those political forces who oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, one lesson of Lebanon is that the Israeli public does not just respond to violence and high levels of casualties; it responds to arguments by elites who are perceived to have the authority and legitimacy to speak on such matters. It was not just sensitivity to casualties that led to the public's view on the military occupation in southern Lebanon. Rather, when elites offered viable alternatives to the security zone, the public began to believe that soldiers were dying unnecessarily.

In this sense, the Lebanon case touches on U.S. debates about the willingness of the American public to tolerate casualties.[118] The conventional wisdom, at least before September 11, was that the American public would not accept large numbers of casualties and would not support military interventions once the body bags come home.[119] However, the Lebanon case supports those who critique this simplified view of pubic opinion on military affairs,[120] suggesting that casualties are not the sole criteria by which the public judges military campaigns.

[118] I thank Beth Kier for raising this point with me.

[119] For this view, see Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (July/August 1994): 23–28.

[120] See, for example, Jonathan Foreman, "The Casualty Myth: Americans can Stand the Sight of Blood," *The National Review*, 3 May 1999, 40–41; Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "Casualty Aversion: How Many Deaths are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," *Washington Post*, 7 November 1999; James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia," *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (Spring 1999): 53–78; and Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1996).

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The Lebanon case suggests that future security policy in Israel will depend as much on how leaders frame the problems they confront and the policy alternatives they consider feasible as on the level of violence. However, such reframing is unlikely to dramatically shift security policy if it does not occur across the political spectrum and garner a new public consensus. In this sense, Lebanon may be unique in that an unusual alliance of political elites from the left and right supported the withdrawal and helped legitimize it among the Israeli public. It is more difficult to see such a consensus forming on other core security issues such as Israel's position toward the Palestinians, although growing support for a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank is beginning to cut across party lines. Still, the Lebanon withdrawal may provide a model for future thinking about Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza. For example, if the deterrence strategy seems to be working in south Lebanon, this might strengthen those in Israel who support unilateral withdrawal options in the West Bank and Gaza—options that have gained considerable attention since the breakdown of the Oslo process and the escalation of violence. A successful deterrence policy toward Lebanon would suggest that an Israeli occupation presence is not the best way to maintain security; it would be better to protect Israel from within its own internationally recognized borders (that is, the 1967 borders). However, if deterrence is perceived as failing in southern Lebanon, then those voices in Israel who have been promoting the notion of buffer zones in the West Bank—in essence, West Bank security zones—may increase and gain legitimacy.*

* I thank Elizabeth Kier, Gregory Gause, Michael Barnett, Nathan Brown, and Efraim Inbar for their helpful comments. I also thank Amir Lupovici for his research assistance. A previous version of this article was presented at the 2001 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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
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

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

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Organized Interests and American Political Development

DANIEL J. TICHENOR
RICHARD A. HARRIS

Within very recent years these [interest] groups have increased and multiplied. More important still, they have become highly organized and are today conducted by shrewd and capable leaders. . . .

—E. Pendleton Herring, 1928[1]

Ours is an era of vigorous activity by organized interests in national politics. In the past two decades we have witnessed what seems to be a virtual explosion in demands by private interest organizations in Washington. . . .

—Kay Schlozman and John Tierney, 1986[2]

The striking resonance of these quotations from leading interest group scholars generations apart suggests that something remarkably similar may have been happening at both ends of the twentieth century. Contemporary political science offers no shortage of careful research on the behavior of organized interest groups and their place in democratic theory. Yet this impressive body of scholarship routinely concentrates on the past half century of interest group politics. This article highlights the need to expand the time horizons of

[1] E. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representations Before Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929), 2–3.

[2] Kay Lehman Schlozman and John Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 1–2.

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interest group studies by exploring organized interests during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a watershed period in American political development that receives scant attention in the political science literature on interest groups. Moreover, a perfunctory treatment of the formation, maintenance, and attrition of organized interests before the New Deal (if not the 1960s) imposes a major limitation on theory building in this field. By presenting new research findings on the level and character of interest group activity in the Progressive Era, we hope to illustrate the value of bringing *both* history and theory to bear on the study of interest group politics in America.

It is often assumed that the formation and mobilization of organized interests in U.S. national politics were natural outgrowths of the modern welfare and regulatory state that emerged with the New Deal and expanded in the post-civil rights era. In truth, precious little is known about the relationship between interest groups and federal government activism over time, particularly in the Progressive Era when modern liberalism first began to take shape. More generally, systematic analysis of long-term trends in interest group growth and mortality rates remains a blind spot for most political scientists working in this area. One of the prevailing assumptions of the contemporary interest group literature is that reliable data on organized interests active in Washington politics first appears in the 1950s.[3] Many political scientists who study organized interests acknowledge that the origins of modern interest group politics might be traced to earlier historical periods for which we lack comprehensive data, if for no other reason than the fact that leading scholars of earlier generations insisted that interest group activity in Washington was undergoing profound change in *their* times.[4] Most research in this area, however, has been limited to the past half century, with scant attention paid to a significant body of qualitative historical research on earlier periods. Theoretical assumptions concerning the foundations of modern interest group politics abound, but most neglect the crucial task of gathering systematic evidence on the origins and development of modern interest group politics in America.

Building on the historical–institutional work of political scientists studying the Progressive Era, we present fresh research that illuminates significant changes in the nature and impact of group involvement in national politics dur-

[3] For example, see Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*; Jack Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Allan Cigler and Burdett Loomis, eds., *Interest Group Politics*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991); Jeffrey Berry, *The New Liberalism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999); and Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech, *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[4] Consider two classics: Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress*; and David Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).

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ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[5] In this vein, we corroborate the findings of historians who have asserted that the Progressive Era constituted both an "organizational synthesis" and a pivotal time when new interest groups flourished in U.S. politics.[6] Our empirical research underscores the need to reevaluate prevailing accounts and theories of the development of American interest group politics. We argue that key methodological and theoretical flaws in previous studies either minimize or ignore significant transformations of interest group politics before the post-World War II era. To understand patterns and secular shifts in interest group politics over time requires theory and data that are not overdetermined by the present. In order to generate empirical insights and theoretical arguments that are not confined to specific historical contexts, we propose a conceptual framework for studying interest group systems across American political history.

Cornerstones of American Politics

Beginning with *The Federalist*, No. 10 and James Madison's celebrated explication of factions, students of American government have understood that interest groups are the stuff of which politics is made.[7] And for most political scientists of the postwar era, new government programs, wartime industrial coordination, and contemporary social movements are the stuff of which modern interest groups are made.[8] One of the theoretical mainstays of interest group literature is the contention that the large-scale organization of interests in na-

[5] See Elisabeth Clemens, *The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in America, 1890–1925* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997); Elizabeth Sanders, *Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877–1917* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999); Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Stephen Skowronek, *Building A New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1879–1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[6] Arthur Link and Richard L. McCormick, *Progressivism* (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davison, 1983); Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); and Louis Galambos, "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," *Business History Review* 44 (1970): 279–290.

[7] James Madison, "Federalist, No. 10" in *The Federalist*, Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New York: The New American Library, 1961). See also Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); Herring, *Group Representation before Congress*; Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952).

[8] See Arthur Maas, *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nations Rivers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951); Marver Bernstein, *Regulation by Independent Commission* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); Lawrence Dodd and Ronald Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979); Jack Walker, "The Origins and Maintanence of Interest Groups in America," *American Political Science Review* 77 (June 1983): 390–406; Jeffrey Berry, *Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Terry M. Moe, *The Organized Interests* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980); Shlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*; Robert Salisbury, "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984): 64–76.

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tional politics stemmed from the big government programs of the modern welfare and regulatory state dating back to the New Deal. From this perspective, interest groups are organized in response to the growth of government and to specific government programs and agencies that most affect the welfare of their members. Groups may form to guard an existing program that benefits their members, to promote new forms of government aid and protection, or to fend off threats of unwanted government intervention. Jack Walker memorably traces the growth of representation for the elderly and the tobacco industry as far back as the New Deal era to illustrate the importance of governmental growth to group formation. As he concludes, "The expanding scope and size of government not only stimulated the organization of business interests; even more directly they encouraged the rapid increase of new organizations in the nonprofit and public sectors."[9] From the 1950s onward, an extensive literature documented the extent to which certain areas of policy were dominated by "subgovernments" or "iron triangles" that allowed various organized interests to become influential clients in the regulatory process.[10] Theodore Lowi has lampooned this system as "socialism for the organized and capitalism for the unorganized," asserting that the modern liberal formula of creating federal programs controlled by federal agencies to address policy problems is the wellspring of our unaccountable, unresponsive, and interest group-dominated policy process.[11]

Pendleton Herring and David Truman emphasized the significant impact of war mobilization on the organization of interests in Washington political life. Reflecting on World War I, Herring observed that there were compelling reasons for the national government to coordinate industrial production by means of new group associations that linked "separate industries and individual business concerns scattered all over the country."[12] Once the crisis of war dissipated, group members discerned important benefits of maintaining their associations in times of peace. "This trend toward organization along lines of common interest, whether vocational, industrial, moral, or social, was too fundamental to be affected by the end of the war," Herring notes.[13] In 1929, Herring estimated that there were roughly 500 national organizations "whose purpose is to keep in contact with the government and present their views to Congress."[14] In his classic, *The Governmental Process*, Truman drew similar conclusions about the

[9] Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*, 28–33.

[10] For a superb overview and critique of this literature, see Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 87–124.

[11] Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

[12] Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress*, 51.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Quoted in Marc Petracca, "The Rediscovery of Interest Group Politics" in Marc Petracca, ed., *The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 13.

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influence of major twentieth-century wars on the organization of farm groups, labor unions, and trade associations. Like Herring, Truman found that the responsibility of the federal government for unprecedented economic planning during warfare led to its active promotion of new organized interests who could simplify its tasks. But the process could be contagious: "Once the habit of associated activity was established under the stimulus of government encouragement, most such groups tended to persist and to invite imitation."[15] It can be argued as well that the cold war, which extended over more than a quarter-century, had a similar positive effect on the development of organized interests.

A third theoretical explanation posits that dramatic expansions in both the number and intensity of citizens groups and other organized interests in recent decades reflect the influential movement politics and increased prosperity of the 1960s. Jeffrey Berry, for example, suggests that "the central underlying catalyst" in the mushrooming of citizens groups in national political life can be traced to the social unrest and political efficacy of the civil rights and antiwar movements.[16] "The message of the civil rights and antiwar movements was clear to other would be reformers," he notes. "Citizens' interest groups, such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of the civil rights movement, or the Student Mobilization Committee of the antiwar movement, could have an effect."[17] Walker found that in the wake of the civil rights movement, many new groups were begun through government sponsorship and the support of private foundations eager to redirect the energies of political insurgencies into established channels. Moreover, the liberal causes that flowered during the 1960s and 1970s were eventually matched by conservative countermovements in the late 1970s and 1980s.[18]

Each of these accounts of interest group formation suggests that increased political mobilization is closely linked to a steady expansion of the power and responsibilities of the federal government. Significantly, all three accounts obscure the vibrant, protean interest group politics that flourished during the Progressive Era (historical demarcations of the period vary slightly, but it is most commonly associated with the decades of the 1890s, 1900s, and 1910s). Whereas political science has contributed to a rich understanding of U.S. party systems over time, it has been surprisingly inattentive to the origins and development of modern American interest group politics. This research gap reflects an unfortunate disconnection from impressive historical research on the unprecedented mobilization of new organized interests during the Progressive Era. Important new qualitative studies of Progressive Era interest group politics by Elisabeth Clemens and Elizabeth Sanders, among others, have had little or no impact

[15] Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 55, 71–77.

[16] Jeffrey Berry, *The New Liberalism, Encyclopedia of Associations* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1989), 25–26.

[17] Jeffrey Berry, *The Interest Group Society*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Scott Foresman, 1989), 29.

[18] Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*, 33–38, 48–55.

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on the standard political science literature.[19] In fairness, however, the historical limitations of most political science research on interest groups are largely the result of limited systematic evidence from early periods.

Practical research constraints, not the least of which is the availability of data sources, have encouraged political scientists to concentrate their analysis of interest groups on the second half of the twentieth century. Major treatises on modern interest groups rely on survey instruments, field interviews, and contemporary reference works such as the *Encyclopedia of Associations*, the Congressional Quarterly's *Washington Information Directory*, or *Washington Representatives.*[20] While these sources have yielded impressive results in terms of counting, categorizing, and expanding our understanding of interest groups, they do not permit us to track back any further than the mid-1950s. Some interest group specialists acknowledged the possibility that earlier periods might hold rich information, but little effort was made to move beyond speculation on this score. That being the case, the literature necessarily took on an ahistorical cast or, more precisely, implied that the immediate post-war period was the dawn of modern interest group politics. This politics definitely broadened in the 1970s to incorporate a strong public interest movement and deepened in the 1980s to institutionalize patterns of behavior discernable mostly to those within the Washington Beltway who understood administrative and judicial affairs. But interest group politics before the 1950s remained obscure, largely because analysts concluded that only post-war data sources could be trusted. As Walker asserts, "Without reliable estimates of both the birth and death rates of different types of groups it is not possible to reconstruct history conclusively from a cross-section survey."[21] Recent work by Gerald Gamm and Robert Putnam on voluntary associations and by Theda Skocpol and her colleagues on large membership organizations show the empirical and theoretical rewards of generating new data on group mobilization in earlier periods. But presumably because these recent works do not examine the broad array of organized interests engaged in national politics over time, they cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of how interest group politics has evolved.[22]

[19] Clemens, *The People's Lobby*; and Sanders, *Roots of Reform.*

[20] Walker, "Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups"; Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*; Jeffrey Berry, *The New Liberalism*; *Washington Information Directory* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001); and *Washington Representatives* (Washington, DC: Columbia Books, 2000).

[21] Walker, "Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups," 397.

[22] See Gerald Gamm and Robert Putnam, "The Growth of Voluntary Associations in America, 1840-1940," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 29 (Spring 1999): 511–557; Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, Ziad Munson, Bayliss Camp, Michele Swers, and Jennifer Oser, "How America Became Civic" in Morris Fiorina and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 27–80; and Theda Skocpol, Marshall Ganz, and Ziad Munson, "A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the United States," *American Political Science Review* 94 (September 2000): 527–541.

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While the interest group literature effectively portrays the post-war evolution of interest group politics and offers useful explanations of group formation in that period, we argue that it is historically incomplete. Careful examination of the Progressive Era reveals a highly developed system of interest group politics with its own characteristics and dynamics. This argument is theoretically significant because it points to evidence that organized interests burst onto the national stage before the Progressive agenda had been translated into legislation and programs. Did the rise of big government drive interest group formation in America, as much of the existing literature presumes? If the Progressive Era was the first period of widespread national interest organization, this mobilization predates the realization of the modern welfare and regulatory state during the New Deal and succeeding decades, thereby challenging prevailing causal accounts. Our research findings raise fresh questions about whether increased group formation and political mobilization actually precede, accompany, or follow extensive national policy making and state-building. These questions challenge us to think in broader theoretical terms about the connections and causal dynamics between interest groups and state-building.

More generally, as our data show, the existence of a robust set of organized interests engaged in Progressive Era political life highlights the need for careful, historically-based explanations of the relationship between interest groups and American political development. Expanding the time frame of interest group research can elucidate historical patterns and long-term shifts not discernible by relying exclusively on data since the 1950s. Little systematic information is available about the origins, maintenance, and attrition of organized interests engaged in national politics during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Likewise, our knowledge of how interest groups respond to changing institutional arrangements and policy programs of the national state and party system seem routinely overdetermined by contemporary data. Taking stock of interest group systems that have emerged in American politics over time offers a more promising basis for theory-building that is not constrained by contemporary empirical foundations and thus limited to a particular historical context. Our conception of interest group systems calls for an analysis of distinctive patterns in the number, variety, centralization, structural opportunities, and professionalism of organized interests in particular historical periods as well as of the "critical junctures" that usher in decisively new patterns of interest group politics. In this vein, we devote considerable attention to the rise of a new interest group system in the Progressive Era.

A National Interest Group System Emerges

Clearly, an assessment of interest group activity over time requires the integration of multiple data sources and must be informed by both quantitative and qualitative analysis.[23] Our strategy, therefore, is to use a variety of sources and

[23] Berry makes this argument persuasively in *The New Liberalism.*

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methods to triangulate our analysis on the research objective of identifying and explicating interest group systems.[24] In the absence of a single reliable data source, we have sought to pull together a wide variety of quantitative and qualitative materials to provide a broader historical view of organized interests in American politics since the late nineteenth century. Quantitative research on interest groups in national political life before the past half-century is hard to find. Jack Walker's pioneering work on interest group origins is one of the notable exceptions.[25] Determined to gather comprehensive data on group formation and maintenance in the United States, Walker settled on the Congressional Quarterly's *Washington Information Directory* (1980) as the best source from which to draw a reliable sample of organized interests engaged in national politics from the nineteenth century to the present. As he explained, "After checking the several sources against each other and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, the *Directory* was chosen as the source of group names most likely to provide a balanced picture of associations concerned with national affairs."[26] Eventually, he identified 913 groups that fit his purposes, 564 of which responded to the survey he administered. On the basis of survey reports of when these 564 groups were founded, Walker offered evidence that relatively few groups were formed before midcentury and that the origins of modern interest group politics lie in the postwar decades.

However, at least two elements of Walker's salutary research should give us pause. First, his survey relies on existing groups from a contemporaneous reference source to gain a sense of the overall number and variety of groups that have emerged in American national politics over time. As Walker himself acknowledges, such a source obviously does not list groups that were once active in national policy making but no longer exist. His survey responses concerning founding dates of organized interests tell us nothing about those groups that have disappeared from the political landscape. Second, he excludes several significant kinds of organizations from his analysis such as trade associations and unions. A comprehensive account of the role of organized interests should include these actors and an assessment of how they interact with the interest groups Walker and others focus on.[27] Toward that end, we employ a fivefold typology of interest groups: citizens groups, unions, trade associations, professional associations, and "other" groups. We also draw a coarser distinction between private corporations and interest groups.

To illustrate the limitations of looking at existing groups for information about long-term formation trends, we compiled a list of all interest groups printed in the latest edition of the *Washington Information Directory*. Rather than relying on a survey instrument to establish the founding dates for our sam-

[24] The concept of triangulation is discussed by William Dunn, *Public Policy Analysis*, 4th ed. (Princeton: Prentice-Hall, 1999).

[25] Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America.*

[26] Ibid., 394.

[27] See Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy.*

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ple population of organizations, we used the *Encyclopedia of Organizations* to obtain that information. The *Encyclopedia* yielded founding dates for 71.2 percent of the groups on our list (higher than the 64.8 percent response rate elicited in Walker's survey). Our results suggest that no more than a few hundred interest groups emerged in national politics before the 1920s, an outcome consistent with both standard accounts and Walker's findings.

At the same time, however, we developed completely new data from the Congressional Information Service's *U.S. Congressional Committee Hearings Index*.[28] The *Index* catalogs congressional testimony from 1833 to the present by topic and organization testifying. It offers one of the best available data sources on the number, variety, and activity of groups engaged in national affairs before the 1950s. Moreover, it allows us to track the emergence of nascent issue networks by identifying sets of organized interests that testified regularly in particular issue areas. Thus, we can track the frequency of participation to assess which groups or kinds of groups were most closely allied to the emerging Washington establishment. It is possible, for example, to develop a ratio of the number of groups in a particular category to the number of appearances by that group. As Jeffrey Berry points out, this statistic can show one facet of the relative importance and influence of an organization.[29] Another virtue of the *Index* is that it allows us to examine the same measures across time. Finally, careful analysis of when interest groups first appear at congressional hearings can serve as a proxy measure for the emergence of new groups. For hearings conducted between 1833 and 1917, we were able to track 10,656 appearances of 5,372 organized interests.

Of course, this new data set has some limitations of its own. While the *Index* lists all organizations and associations testifying at congressional hearings, it does not separate them into the categories of our typology (private corporations, trade associations, unions, professional associations, citizens groups, and "other" groups). Consequently, we had to make judgments about where to place organizations in developing our list. Another limitation of the *CIS Index* is that the list of groups derived from it is not exhaustive, since testimony before Congress depends on being invited to testify and not all groups received invitations. There is little question that interest mobilization in this period coincided with momentous changes in Congress, such as the increased number of standing committees and the growing professionalism of lawmakers. Our case study research underscores these connections between changing interest group political activities of the Progressive Era and transformations in key national policy-making structures. Indeed, our complimentary analysis of executive department papers and interest group archives suggests that organized interests were highly attentive to a variety of institutional openings and barriers that emerged in the Progressive Era. In any case, the omission from our *CIS Index* data on

[28] *C.I.S.U.S. Congressional Committee Hearings Index, Part I: 1833–1917.*

[29] Berry, *The New Liberalism*, chaps. 2 and 3.

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FIGURE 1
The Emergence of Interest Groups in National Politics



Sources: Data from *Washington Information Directory* (Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000) and *CIS Index for Congressional Hearings*, 23rd–64th Congresses (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

groups not invited to testify before Congress is a limitation that, if anything, should be expected to *underestimate* the number of groups engaged in national politics. That is, the bias of the data should favor standard accounts by undercounting the number of interest groups in national politics of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Even with the conservative bias of this measure in terms of how many new interest groups participated in national politics before 1920, our data generated from the *CIS Index* suggest that the number and variety is far greater than previous studies have recognized. Figure 1 captures just how dramatically the *Directory*—and concomitantly, Walker's survey of existing groups—understates the emergence of new groups in national politics of the early twentieth century when compared to our *CIS Index* data. Our findings from the *CIS Index* suggest a dramatic expansion in the number of groups that first appeared at congressional hearings in the Progressive Era. Consider, for example, that between 1890 and 1899, 216 interest groups appeared for the first time at a congressional hearing. Nearly three times as many groups (622) testified for the first time in the first decade of the twentieth century. During the following eight years, more than a thousand new interest groups did so.

Equally compelling are the rates at which particular kinds of interest groups first appeared before Congress during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nearly every interest group category—professional groups, trade associations/economic interests, unions, citizens groups, and other varieties of groups—increased from one decade to the next. Yet the rates of expansion by category

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FIGURE 2
Appearances of Private Corporations and Interest Groups at Congressional Hearings, 1833–1917 (23rd to 64th Congresses)



Source: CIS Index for Congressional Hearings, 23rd–64th Congresses (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985)

were clearly not equal. The number of trade associations and related economic interests that first appeared in each decade were larger in total number than any other interest group category before 1920. But just as striking is the unmatched rate of growth of citizens groups that appeared at hearings for the first time during the early twentieth century; 128 citizens groups first appeared between 1900 and 1909, less than half of the 288 new trade unions of the same period. Between 1910 and 1917, however, the number of new citizens groups testifying at hearings more than doubled to 361, nearly identical to the 368 trade unions and related economic interests that first appeared in the same eight years.

When we cast our nets more widely to examine the total number of appearances of both interest groups and private corporations at congressional hearings between 1833 and 1917, one of our most significant findings is the sharp increase in the amount of testimony by organized interests in Washington after the turn of the century. As Figure 2 indicates, appearances of interest groups and private corporations more than tripled between 1900 and 1909 from roughly 800 to 3,000. They also increased at a sharp rate in the eight years between 1910 and 1917 from 3,000 to nearly 6,000. This explosion in the representation of organized interests before congressional committees, and by implication within the Washington policy-making community more generally, is unmistakable. One also may note that private corporations appeared at hearings more often than interest groups in these years. However, private corporations tended to

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FIGURE 3
Total Number of Interest Groups Appearing Before Congress by Type, 1833–1917



Source: Created by authors from data in *CIS Index for Congressional Hearings*, 23rd–64th Congress (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

testify before Congress only once or twice during the entire period examined. Moreover, most private corporations were local and their appearances were inspired by the narrowest of concerns. That is, most of the private corporations in our data set were focused on how a specific national policy might affect a decidedly local and material interest, such as a local metal screw company testifying on tariffs for metal imports or a small Colorado mining company focused on the acquisition of nearby public lands. By contrast, a large proportion of the interest groups we analyzed appeared at several hearings and were concerned with a broader set of policy issues. This may reflect the fact that roughly half of the interest groups that testified before Congress between 1833 and 1917 were national organizations, whereas only 10 percent of the private corporations could be described as national.

Our findings with regard to an additional measure, the total number of interest groups appearing before Congress in each period, strengthen our conclusion that the early twentieth century polity was a vibrant time for interest group activism at the national level, especially when compared with the nineteenth century (see Figure 3). Whereas 256 interest groups appeared before Congress from 1890 to 1899, that figure rose to 734 between 1900 and 1909, and then nearly doubled to 1,301 over the next eight years. Moreover, when one compares the numbers of first group appearances with the total number of interest

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TABLE 1

Interest Group Appearances at Congressional Hearings, By Category (1889–1917)

	1889–1899 (*51st–55th* Congresses)		1899–1909 (56th–60th Congresses)		1909–1917 (61st–64th Congresses)	
Category	Group #	Appearances	Group #	Appearances	Group #	Appearances
Trade Associations	110 (43%)	165 (45%)	342 (47%)	667 (46%)	508 (39%)	715 (29%)
Citizens Groups	53 (21%)	66 (18%)	147 (20%)	262 (18%)	426 (32%)	819 (33%)
Unions	27 (11%)	56 (15%)	72 (9%)	240 (17%)	93 (7%)	479 (17%)
Total	256	367	734	1,442	1,301	2,459

Source: Based on data developed from the *CIS Index for Congressional Hearings*, 23rd to 64th Congresses (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985).

groups that testified at legislative hearings, it is striking just how many new interest groups comprised the total of those that testified each decade (1,008 of 1,301 interest groups between 1910 and 1917).

Finally, we found that a comparison of the total number of groups that testified by category with the total number of appearances by group category underscores Berry's recent finding that the kinds of groups with influence in the Washington policy-making setting may not always be proportional to their number (see Table 1). For instance, during the 1900s, trade associations and related economic interests comprised 47 percent of the groups appearing at hearings and 46 percent of group appearances; citizens groups were 20 percent of all groups and 18 percent of appearances; and unions accounted for 9 percent of all groups and 17 percent of total group appearances. Unions enjoyed similar influence during the next eight years, constituting 7 percent of all groups testifying and 17 percent of all appearances. And while citizens groups made up 32 percent of all groups appearing and 33 percent of all appearances between 1910 and 1917, trade associations had fewer opportunities to testify (29 percent) than their number (39 percent of all groups appearing) may have implied. Finally, the fact that citizens groups appeared more often than any other kind of interest group between 1910 and 1917 is striking, since trade associations represented 7 percent more of the total number of groups testifying. Perhaps most remarkable is that the total number of citizens groups and unions testifying in this period was roughly the same as that of trade associations, but they combined to give 50 percent of all testimony in these years compared to trade associations' 29 percent.

The Issue Network Concerning Immigration Reform

Case study research provides qualitative evidence that the Progressive Era was marked by a proliferation of national interest groups directly advancing their policy goals within the Washington establishment.[30] In particular, our own case

[30] See Sanders, *The Roots of Reform*; Clemens, *The People's Lobby*; Samuel Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* (New York: Atheneum, 1972); Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*; and Skowronek, *Building a New American State*.

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study investigations suggest that interest group activism in varied issue areas of this period was consistent with a policy-making environment more closely resembling "issue networks" than iron triangles or subgovernments.[31] The politics of national immigration reform from the 1890s to the 1920s is illustrative of these findings.

During the 1890s, a new set of interest groups led by the Immigration Restriction League (IRL) emerged at the national level to champion broad reductions in European immigration. Significantly, these groups explicitly sought to transcend traditional party politics in favor of what might be best described as Progressive notions of "direct democracy" and "scientific government."[32] The IRL, for example, was a highly intellectual and professional organization, formed by prominent academics, business leaders, social workers, civic activists, jurists, and politicians that reached across party lines for support.[33] "Our organization is a non-partisan one," the IRL declared early on, "and we do not support or oppose a candidate for office on party grounds."[34] Instead, the group adopted what it considered a "dignified," "factual," and extra-party strategy, embracing social science research, mass publicity, broad coalition-building with other groups, and direct Washington advocacy to advance its policy aims. "An office in Washington," IRL leaders concluded in 1897, "is practically indispensable for successful prosecution of the League's work."[35] Of course, the efficacy of the IRL and its allies among patriotic associations, professional groups, organized labor, and various citizens groups was contingent upon whether key officials and institutions of the national state were receptive to their novel extraparty efforts.

The standing immigration committees that were established by Congress in 1890 proved to be a crucial structural opening for the IRL and its nativist allies in this period. The creation of these committees reflected the expanding scale and complexity of congressional work at the turn of the century.[36] The formation of permanent House and Senate immigration committees was an important development for nativist groups like the IRL. Dominated by New England patricians like William Chandler (R-NH) and Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) in the Senate and Samuel McCall (R-MA) in the House, these com-

[31] See Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment."

[32] On direct democracy in Progressive Era political thought, see Sidney Milkis and Daniel Tichenor, "'Direct Democracy' and Social Justice," *Studies in American Political Development* 8 (Fall 1994): 282–340; on Progressive reverence for "scientific government," see James Morone, *The Democratic Wish* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 115–123.

[33] See the Annual Reports of the Executive Committee of the Immigration Restriction League, 1894–1899, original copies of which are found in the Prescott F. Hall Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

[34] Press statement issued by the IRL, Joseph Lee Papers, Immigration Restriction League Files, Massachusetts Historical Society, Box #3.

[35] Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the IRL, 11 January 1897, Hall Collection.

[36] Nelson Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62 (September 1968): 144–168; and Morton Keller, *Affairs of State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 301–307.

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mittees welcomed independent expertise, favored policy activism, and supported broad restrictions on European immigration. Most important, these committees breathed life into a national immigration policy network that institutionalized formal input from social science experts and activists and routinized the drafting and proposal of immigration reform legislation. Working closely with nationally organized groups like the IRL in 1896, the immigration committees shepherded literacy test legislation (targeting southern and eastern European newcomers) through both houses.[37]

Tellingly, stunned defenders of robust European immigration responded by mounting their own centralized opposition to the restrictionist measure. In Washington, trade associations such as the National Association of Manufacturers, steamship and railroad companies, and various ethnic and religious associations mobilized at the eleventh hour, vigorously lobbying the White House to veto the measure. Consequently, when Grover Cleveland vetoed the legislation, pro-immigration groups successfully pressured lawmakers to let the legislation die. In the wake of the 1896 legislative struggle, an impressive group of pro-immigration intellectuals, business leaders, social workers, and other activists formed the Immigration Protective League to mirror the advocacy work of the IRL.[38] Subsequently, traditional ethnic organizations like the German American Alliance and the Ancient Order of Hibernians were joined by representatives of newer immigrant groups, such as the Liberal Immigration League and the American Jewish Committee, which explicitly sought to counterpoise the IRL's lobbying and research activities.[39]

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, two large and diverse coalitions of interest groups waged a pitched battle in Washington over the future of national immigration and naturalization policies. For a sense of these alignments, see Table 2. If the large number of participants actively involved in this policy environment contrasted sharply with the small circle of actors associated with iron triangles or subgovernments, so too did the high visibility of the immigration issue in these years. Indeed, in their efforts to win support from uncommitted government officials and organized interests, both immigration defenders and restrictionists sought "to expand the scope of conflict" (to borrow Schattschneider's terminology).[40] Immigration restrictionists, for example, took great pains to link their cause with a host of other prominent reform impulses of the day. They reminded prohibitionists and "good government" reformers that new immigrants undermined temperance and fueled corrupt urban party machines. They cast restrictionism as "but a part of the great conservation movement," dedicated to conserving the quality of American citizenship. To social workers and welfare reformers, they warned that newcomers compounded

[37] See Daniel Tichenor, *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), chap. 4.

[38] *New York Times*, 8 January 1898.

[39] Tichenor, *Dividing Lines*, chap. 5.

[40] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinhart, and Winston, 1960).

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TABLE 2

Immigration Coalitions of the Progressive Era

	Alien Admissions Should Be:	
Alien Rights Should Be:	*Expanded or Maintained*	*Restricted*
Broad	Immigration Protective League American Jewish Committee German American Alliance Liberal Immigration League	American Federation of Labor Knights of Labor
Narrow	National Assoc. of Manufacturers U.S. Chambers of Commerce Steamship and Railroad Companies	Immigration Restriction League Patriotic Societies Asian Exclusion Leagues The Grange Eugenicist Organizations

urban poverty, crime, and overcrowding. In short, Progressive Era immigration reformers constantly sought to draw new groups and actors into the fray as fresh converts to their cause.[41]

If the congressional immigration committees were almost exclusively responsive to the restrictionist agenda during the 1890s, their changing membership and the mobilization of nationally organized pro-immigration groups made them more receptive to representatives of both camps until World War I. In fact, interest groups both for and against immigration restriction in the early twentieth century gained access to the national policy-making process in a variety of institutional settings, from congressional halls and federal courtrooms to the White House and bureaucratic offices. Significantly, each camp could point to a distinctive set of structural openings that afforded it privileged access to decision makers during the Progressive Era.[42]

The interest groups most actively engaged in immigration reform politics understood well that power within the nascent issue networks of this period often rested upon policy knowledge or expertise. A familiar set of interest group representatives frequently appeared before congressional committees in these years, ranging from Frances Kellor of the Immigration Protective League to Prescott Hall of the Immigration Restriction League, each of whom skillfully linked specific policy goals to expert findings. Both camps saw great importance in the creation of special commissions to investigate immigration and naturalization policy, believing that intellectual legitimacy was essential for winning crucial policy battles. When the Dillingham Commission was established in 1907, for example, Max Kohler of the American Jewish Committee and Union of American Hebrew Societies warned allies that its "report is likely to shape our immigration policy for a number of years. . . ."[43] In similar fashion, IRL

[41] See Tichenor, *Dividing Lines*, chap. 5.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Max Kohler to Simon Wolf, 27 September 1910, Max James Kohler Papers, National Jewish Historical Society, Box #1.

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operatives concluded that a negative report "will hurt us for many years."[44] Groups on both sides of the issue agreed that there was "no more valuable work" than developing expertise designed to shape the findings of congressional committees and investigatory commissions in this era of scientific government.[45] Policy specialists with both immigration expertise and knowledge of the complex Washington environment proved to be the most influential lobbyists in immigration reform politics.

Reinterpreting Interest Group History

When political science turns its attention to dynamic change in American politics, it often does so with periodization schemes and a theoretical language that ignore organized interests. Consider, for example, partisan realignment theory, which decades ago developed a general account of American political development built on the concept of party systems. Beyond highlighting the pivotal role of parties in our political history, work on party systems illuminated both long-term, dynamic processes associated with realignments and distinctive features that distinguish one party system from another.[46] Historically, political parties are generally understood to have served the functions of aggregating interests and expressing popular will in the policy-making process. Partisan realignments and critical elections are the mechanisms through which these functions are fulfilled: when realignments occur, state-building, major policy shifts, and regime changes follow in their wake.[47]

What is striking about this realignment scholarship in relation to the interest group literature is that organized interests are not usually viewed as agents of transformation, even though a group basis of American politics has been acknowledged since the founding. Indeed, organized interests are typically understood as either an impediment to change or as entities acted upon by external forces. In their inertial role, interest groups provide lobbyists with privileged access and undue influence on policy making. These advantages are the basis for a powerful critique of American politics.[48] In addition, American politics is understood to be primarily about incrementally allocating money and material goods, not transforming the political status quo. This, of course, is often depicted as the quintessential politics of iron triangles, subgovernments, and issue networks.

[44] Robert DeC Ward to Joseph Lee, 17 February 1907, Lee Papers, Box #1.

[45] Prescott Hall to James Patten, 4 February 1907, Lee Papers, Box #1.

[46] See Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); and Joel Silbey, "The Rise and Fall of Political Parties" in L. Sandy Maisel, *The Parties Respond* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 26–59.

[47] Burnham, *Critical Elections*.

[48] See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review* 56 (1962): 947–952; Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*; Lowi, *The End of Liberation*; Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

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In an important qualification to this bleak picture of unsystematic and unaccountable policy making, several political scientists have pointed out that the public interest movement of the 1960s and 1970s injected a vigorous element of competition into the process.[49] Berry provides a compelling articulation of this viewpoint. Rooting his thesis in the postmaterialist argument advanced by Ronald Inglehart, Berry documents the success of public interest organizations in insinuating themselves into the issue networks and shaping the policy agenda.[50] Since the 1970s, the corporate bias of subgovernmental politics, while not eradicated, has surely been modulated.

One prominent standard history of interest groups in American politics thereby begins in the 1930s and runs roughly as follows: The New Deal realignment laid the foundation for Franklin Roosevelt's administration to launch in earnest the construction of a modern liberal state that would deliver federal programs to legitimate organized labor, regulate business, provide a measure of economic security, and distribute largess to corporations and citizens alike. Modern interest group politics, in turn, developed from this milieu and gave rise to organizations that were adept at accessing federal largess and protecting the programs that mattered to them. This system reached a zenith in the early 1960s, at which point the social movements spawned by postmaterialist values began an unrelenting attack on this insular and elitist politics. These social movements for civil rights, ending the war in Vietnam, women's rights, environmental protection, consumer protection, and other causes essentially evolved into a new set of organized interests that took their place in Washington politics and fundamentally reshaped the policy process. With an enervated party system, the social movements could not be absorbed into the political arena and find expression through the electoral process. Perhaps, as Sidney Milkis has argued, the New Deal really was "the realignment to end all realignments," putting in place an administrative state that would provide the arena for future political competition.[51] In any case, it is clear that there was a regime change in the 1970s as these new interest groups, animated by quality-of-life rather than material concerns, introduced a new set of ideas and policies. These public interest lobby groups themselves were institutionalized as part of the Washington landscape, leaving us with an interest group system that is in some respects more permeable than that of the immediate post-war period.

One of the most compelling elements of this standard history is its emphasis on the rise of postmaterial values. But like most standard accounts, its portrait of interest group development reflects a linear progression since the 1960s—a

[49] See Berry, *Lobbying for the People*; Andrew McFarland, *Public Interest Lobbies* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1976); and Michael McCann, *Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[50] Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); and Berry, *The New Liberalism.*

[51] Sidney Milkis, *The President and the Parties: The American Party System Since the New Deal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

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kind of "big bang" theory of interest group origins that is severely abridged and perhaps misleading. As early as 1926 E. Pendleton Herring observed,

> . . . the first trait which these groups exhibit as factors of power is that of organization. They are organized to a degree never possible before in the history of the world. Technological processes have made this possible. In the second place, these groups are ably and intelligently directed. They know their way about. In the third place, they have all the strength of unity and cohesion which is the result of a definite program and a common aim. Let it be emphasized again that the presence of these groups means that *a systematized and integrated organization for the representation of diverse interest groups is now functioning* at Washington.[52]

It was apparent to Herring that an interest group system emerged at the national level shortly after the turn of the century, which both reflected and generated political transformations.

Upon reflection, it seems that the Progressive Era not only enjoyed a vibrant, albeit different, interest group system, but also witnessed an emphasis on nonmaterial issues on the national agenda. In addition to labor and antitrust policy, the country was absorbed with such issues as suffrage, child labor, segregation, immigration, conservation, prohibition, and municipal reform. It would be difficult to describe these issues as postmaterial, but clearly Americans were wrestling with quality-of-life concerns at both the beginning and the end of the twentieth century. This fact indicates that instead of a secular trend from material to post-material values in the postwar period, there is an ongoing tension and interaction between these sets of values. In both periods, moreover, social movements propelled these nonmaterial issues onto the national agenda without benefit of a partisan realignment. Certainly, in both periods political parties sustained withering attacks, not the least of which came from organized interest groups. Although there was a critical election in 1896, Progressive reform obviously took place in spite of that realignment, not because of it. To initiate major policy shifts of the Progressive Era, social movements organized for effective lobbying and policy advocacy at the national level. As such, they helped to inaugurate big government—a process that belies the clientele version of history in which organized interests followed on the heels of big government. Similarly, the major policy shifts of the late twentieth century documented so well by Berry and others also constituted an episode of remaking American politics by organizing new interests in support of new programs and forming new federal bureaucracies. Rather than merely arguing that there is nothing new under the sun in American politics, we are proposing that drawing connections between these two periods reveals patterns of historical change that have not been examined in the literature on interest groups.

An alternative version of interest group history, and one that we find persuasive, would posit that organized interests in both periods grew out of an interaction between social movements and the establishment. Specifically, be-

[52] Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress*, 18. (Emphasis added.)

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cause social movements at both the beginning and the end of this century found regular political institutions to be both inhospitable to reform programs and impediments to social progress, they eventually sought ways of working around or altering the status quo. These ways included not only organizing and adopting new lobbying techniques, but also reforming parties and electoral politics, opening up legislative decision making, and using the courts in new ways, essentially remaking interest group politics. The organized interests, as we have noted, pursued both material and nonmaterial—or as Herring put it—"selfish" and "altruistic" goals. In addition, our own case study work indicates that many of the characteristics of today's issue networks were in ready supply in major policy arenas during the Progressive Era. Again, this finding suggests that existing accounts of group politics are not so much wrong as incomplete.

Periods of Interest Group Politics

To help redress existing gaps in the literature, we propose a new research agenda that is attentive to distinctive periods of interest group formation, political activity, and attrition in U.S. history. Political scientists and historians alike have always been drawn to the definition of historical periods and the study of regime transformation.[53] The attraction is essentially two-fold: establishing periodization schemes imposes a theoretical order on the profound shifts in political culture, institutions, and public policy; and analyzing regime transformation provides a theoretical rigor for the normative comparison of different periods. From its inception, political analysis has sought to assess the values of democracy—participation, accountability, and popular sovereignty—across regimes. In contemporary American politics, it is clear that organized interests offer one of the most significant institutional opportunities for those values. We suggest that the study of interest group systems will provide important theoretical insights into the development of American politics—insights that have been conspicuously absent from the study of regime transformation in the United States.

We define an interest group system in terms of five major variables: the aggregate number of organized interests; the variety of organized interests; the nationalization of organized interests; the professionalism of organized interests; and the structural opportunities and obstacles confronting organized interests. The first three of these variables are fairly straightforward enumerations of the level and kind of organized interest activity. The latter two are more complex indicators of the character of interest group systems and react upon each other as groups develop resources to take best advantage of the structural milieu in which they operate. Taken together, these variables will enable us to distinguish systems of interest group politics in different historical periods.

[53] See, for example, Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981); Morone, *The Democratic Wish*; Burnham, *Critical Elections*; and Richard Harris and Sidney Milkis, *Remaking American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

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At the most elemental level, the aggregate number of organized interests active in American political life helps us to distinguish an interest group system. From Herring's classic study through current scholarship, interest group theorists have sought to estimate the size of the interest group universe. Not only is this a logical first step in empirical analysis of interest group behavior, but it also has theoretical implications for understanding broader shifts in American politics. At least since David Truman's seminal work in the early 1950s, political scientists have amassed empirical data on the formation of organized interests.[54] Their explanations and findings on group formation have been a crucially important theoretical contribution, but tell us precious little about group formation before the mid-twentieth century. Truman, for example, has argued that social, technological, and economic complexity gives rise to more groups to represent emergent interests. For our purposes, this may well imply that periods of societal transformation are the leavening for new interest group systems.[55] All of this work, however, leaves a glaring gap with respect to group attrition over the course of the past century. We should expect there to be factors that lead to an attrition of some groups even as new groups emerge to take their place. Before we can discern those factors, we need longitudinal data on group numbers and formation throughout the twentieth century to demarcate interest group systems.

Second, interest group systems may be characterized by the variety of organized interests that exist in a given historical period. The search for measurement of the mix of groups has been driven in large part by the long-standing pluralist/elitist debate. On the one hand there are those who believe, with Schattschneider, that business dominance in America insures that the heavenly chorus sings with an upper-class accent or, with Lindblom, that business enjoys a privileged position.[56] On the other hand there are those who maintain, as Bauer, Poole, and Dexter did, that even if business groups are more numerous than others, they are hardly monolithic.[57] Still others have adduced evidence to show that the influence of public interest groups has been severely underestimated.[58] Whichever side of this debate one favors, the variety of organized interests in play is a critical variable. In addition, shifts in the proportion of a particular kind of group and the relative mix of groups indicate the development of new systems. One might hypothesize, for example, that at the outset of transformational periods we should expect to find a higher proportion of interests concerned with material issues as society struggles to find its footing in

[54] See Moe, *The Organized Interests*; and Salisbury, "Interest Representation."

[55] Truman, *The Governmental Process*.

[56] Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*.

[57] Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel De Sola Poole and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); Richard Harris, *Coal Firms under the New Social Regulation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985).

[58] See Berry, *Lobbying for the People*; McCann, *Taking Reform Seriously*; and Andrew McFarland, *Public Interest Lobbies* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise, 1976).

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shifting socioeconomic relations. Conversely, one could suggest that population swings such as a more educated demographic cohort would lead to an interest group system with relatively more citizens organizations focused on nonmaterial issues. For different reasons, Walker theorizes that those groups will suffer very high mortality rates. Again, none of these theoretical questions can be answered without accumulating historical data that is lacking in contemporary scholarship. Following the typology developed by Schlozman and Tierney, we place all organized interests in one of the following categories: private businesses, trade and economic associations, unions, citizens groups, and other. The second category encompasses not only trade association, but also other economic-based organizations such as the National Grange. The last category includes the press, church-based religious groups, educational institutions, hospitals or other health care institutions, and foundations.

Third, the national versus local or regional orientation of organized interests distinguishes one interest group system from another. Students of the Progressive Era clearly see that period as a transition from classical to modern liberalism, from a negative to a positive view of government, and perhaps above all, as a transformation from state and local to national politics. Without developing strong quantitative indicators, they also postulate the nationalization of interest groups. The contemporary political science literature maintains that the postwar period is the critical time in which interest groups were reoriented to the national level. We see these views as ultimately compatible, but only with a careful extension of our empirical data back to the early part of the last century. Indicators of nationalization would include the number of interests with staff and offices in Washington, DC, testimony of national organizations before Congress on major policy issues, and coverage of group behavior in the news media.

The fourth variable that we propose to define an interest group system is the resources that organized interests mobilize in pursuit of their goals. We use the term resources in the broadest sense to include human, financial, and technological assets. Clearly, such resources will never be evenly distributed among organized interests. Still, we believe that it is possible to distinguish systems based on the amount and kind of resources that are mobilized system-wide. Moreover, there is a dynamic, competitive dimension to any interest group system such that success will be mimicked and diffused throughout the system. Thus, particular kinds of expertise, lobbying techniques, and communications technology will be adopted generally if they prove to be effective in specific cases. Groups are likely to opt for an approach that not only seems likely to work in its own historical context (that is, its own interest group system), but also matches its resources to the opportunities and obstacles of that context.

Those opportunities and obstacles presented by the evolving political institutions of the American State constitute the fifth and final variable that shapes an interest group system. Although organized interests seek change in political institutions to create a more hospitable policy environment, they also are in-

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fluenced by the nature of political institutions confronting them. The institutions with which organized interests interact may be informal (issue networks and subgovernments) as well as formal (Congress and the courts). As institutions change, so too do interest group politics. The interplay between interest groups and political parties is illustrative. While many scholars have noted the likelihood of a relationship between parties and interest groups, we know of no careful historical analysis of the developmental relationship between the two. Certainly, there is no current discussion of interest group systems that parallels that of party systems. As Charles Merriam poignantly noted in the early twentieth century, "Organizations, societies, leagues, unions, spring up all around us, and become centers of political power. . . . These groups did not exist on the same scale a generation ago, but now they rival the party and the 'machine' at many points."[59] Herring turned this logic around when he concluded, "the chief explanation for the rise of these organized groups of voters, with an alert interest in legislation and politics, is to be found in the decline of the political party as a leader in opinion.[60] Two decades later, E. E. Schattschneider asserted that the power of interest groups correlates negatively with the power of parties.[61] It is perhaps telling that organized interests proliferated and flourished in national politics during the two eras in which party power was systematically eroded by reformers: the Progressive Era and the 1960s and 1970s. Yet the dynamic interplay of interest groups and political institutions such as parties in American politics can only be assessed systematically across several historical periods and only by identifying distinct interest group systems.

Conclusion

The Progressive Era was a watershed period for organized interests in national political life. One cannot truly understand the origins and development of modern interest group politics in America without taking stock of the crucial transformations ushered in during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At a time when the nineteenth century "state of courts and parties" was in full retreat and institutions of the national state were undergoing significant change, organized interests—unprecedented in number, variety, and professionalism—became active in federal politics.[62]

As we have shown, more organized interests than ever before emerged on the political stage in these decades. Indeed, the Progressive Era system was animated by aggregate numbers far greater than the standard literature estimates. This finding alone underscores the prospects for more ambitious theory-building when political scientists are attentive to the task of gathering comprehensive historical information about politically active interest groups. It encour-

[59] Quoted in Herring, *Group Representation before Congress*, vi.
[60] Ibid., 46.
[61] Cited in Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*, 201.
[62] Skowronek, *Building a New American State*, 27.

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ages an analytical framework that apprehends not only the long-term trends in group formation and maintenance, but also group attrition. It underscores the possibility that the constellation of organized interests engaged in political life has undergone an intriguing ebb and flow over the years that merits careful theoretical explanation.

Significantly, the surge we found in politicized interest groups during this period was evident across categories, from trade and professional associations to organized labor and citizens groups. One of the defining features of the Progressive Era system is the rich variety of organized interests that mobilized in pursuit of distinct policy goals. It is crucial that the study of interest groups takes into account and seeks explanations for the varying levels of participation and influence by different types of interest groups in given historical periods. Private corporations, trade associations, unions, professional associations, citizens groups, and other organizations emerged at different rates over time and participated at varying levels within historical periods. At particular times, the frequency of participation for given categories of groups can be out of proportion with their numbers. These sorts of categorical comparisons over time hold the promise of drawing out important historical patterns for theoretical analysis, including classic questions of systemic bias in favor of business and upper-class interests.

The Progressive Era system is also characterized by an unprecedented centralization of interest group politics. Long before the New Deal or the social movement insurgency of the 1960s, interest groups of the early twentieth century increasingly focused their activities on federal governmental actors, institutions, and policies. More groups than at any previous time sought to influence policy making within the Washington Beltway in those years, and many established national offices for the first time in the nation's capital. The evidence provided here illustrates that the nationalization of U.S. interest group politics began before the rise of the modern welfare and regulatory state that emerged in later decades. Accordingly, it demonstrates the need for more careful investigation of whether interest group formation and national political mobilization precedes, coincides with, or follows big government programs.

Our findings also indicate that organized interests, adapting to the enervation of the traditional party system during the Progressive Era, made the most of new structural openings in the national state for pursuing their policy goals. In a period in which Congress grew into a more professional institution and its standing committees increased in number and power, interest groups developed new strategies and capacities to exploit these changes. Not only did more organized interests testify before Congress than ever before, but many also evolved into active partners in young policy communities. Almost a quarter-century ago, Hugh Heclo took political scientists to task for tending "to look for one group exerting dominance over another, for subgovernments that are strongly insulated from other outside forces in the environment, for policies that get 'produced' by a few 'makers.'" By searching for a privileged few, he

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observed, we overlooked "the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of power. These webs, or what I will call 'issue networks,' are particularly relevant to the highly intricate and confusing welfare policies that have been undertaken in recent years."[63] As our case study research on interest group politics and immigration reform highlights, the concept of issue networks is highly relevant to historical periods as early as the Progressive Era. Our findings challenge standard accounts of a secular shift over time from iron triangles of the old days to issue networks of today.

Our analysis suggests that a number of nascent issue networks of the Progressive Era evolved into iron triangles in later decades and then became issue networks again in recent decades. The new issue network that emerged in immigration policy making during the Progressive Era was anything but an anomaly. In the area of antitrust issues, for instance, one can observe a marked expansion in the number and kind of organized interests that became regularly involved in shaping national policy on this issue. When the antitrust issue first emerged as a fixture in national politics with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, powerful congressional parties were the central aegis for aggregating competing interests. Not surprisingly, organized interest group involvement in lobbying these two major pieces of legislation was relatively modest, confined primarily to the Grange and local trade associations. By contrast, after the turn of the century, a fairly robust and stable set of organized interests—trade associations, labor unions, and citizens groups—emerged as regular participants in the antitrust policy-making process. Another young issue network thereby was born. Our ongoing case study research suggests that the trends we have discerned in immigration and antitrust policy-making were indicative of a rich variety of nascent issue networks that emerged in this political era. Other issue networks have proven durable from one period to the next. Assessing interest groups and policy making over broad time horizons brings to light shifting proportions and constellations of issue networks and subgovernments, a phenomenon our conception of interest group systems helps capture.

When data on group formation and legislative behavior are brought to bear, we can see a picture of interest group politics that strongly suggests a set of historical patterns worthy of close examination. Organized interests did indeed burgeon in the past half-century as our current interest group literature demonstrates. However, it is equally clear that the beginning of the twentieth century also witnessed a dramatic expansion of organized interest participation in national policy making. In addition, we have shown that the Progressive Era expansion included a disproportionately high rate of citizen groups organizing, foreshadowing the well-documented surge of public interest group formation since the 1960s. Both periods reflect the initial role that citizens groups can play in advancing a national reform agenda. Moreover, our analysis of the attrition

[63] Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," 102.

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rates of Progressive Era organizations suggests that it will be possible to construct a data set that will allow a deeper historical study of interest group politics in America and to draw evolutionary connections both across interest group systems and among interest groups, party politics, and state-building. The most important potential benefit of this historical research, however, is the opportunity to explore broader dynamics of interest group politics over time. Assuming "what's past is prologue," formulating an understanding of organized interests by analyzing the past forty years is analogous to coming into a play after the second act. We can surely appreciate the dialogue among the actors, but we cannot have a very deep appreciation for the underlying currents that moved the drama to that point.*

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Subregional Economic Zones and Integration in East Asia

DAJIN PENG

Recently, a growing minority of scholars has noted that East Asian development is increasingly influenced by regional factors. In particular, informal mechanisms such as economic networks have received substantial attention. These analysts realize that an informal type of economic integration is shaping East Asia as an economic region.[1] Although scholarly interest in informal integration of East Asia has subsided since the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, in part because many of the informal factors are linked to "crony capitalism," economic networks are still highly relevant to Asian integration and development.[2] One particular example of the changed situation in the region is the decline of the Japanese-led regional production networks. This article investigates new forms of regional integration in East Asia and finds that subregional economic zones (SREZs) are playing a growing role in East Asian integration. (See Figure 1.) Although SREZs have never received much attention in the West, they are quietly changing the geo-economy (economic conditions affected by geographical factors) of East Asia, working together with economic networks. This article attempts to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date study of subregional economic zones and their patterns of development.

[1] The most influential English-language works on Asian networks are Peter Katzenstein, ed., *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill, "Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia," *World Politics* 47 (January 1995): 171–209.

[2] See two recent articles by Dajin Peng, "The Changing Nature of East Asia as an Economic Region," *Pacific Affairs* 73 (Summer 2000): 171–191; and "Ethnic Chinese Business Networks and Asia Pacific Economic Integration," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 35 (May 2000): 229–250.

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FIGURE 1
Subregional Economic Zones in East Asia



Note: The oblong circles are SREZs that have been substantiated. The round circles are SREZs that are yet to succeed.

Economic Zones

A SREZ is an economic area that serves as a medium of economic integration. Such zones are sometimes referred to as subregional economic circles, growth triangles, natural economic territories, or extended metropolitan regions.[3] Unlike a free trade area, a SREZ may include only parts of the participating countries, except in the case of relatively small city or island economies. For example, the South China (SC) SREZ comprises Taiwan and Hong Kong, but only three provinces of China: Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan. The Johor-Singapore-Riau (J-S-R) SREZ includes Singapore, but only one province of Indonesia—Riau—and one state of Malaysia—Johor.

The SREZ is a new type of informal integration in East Asia. Informal integration refers to integration that is not enforced by regional integrative organi-

[3] Min Tang and Myo Thant, "Growth Triangles: Conceptual and Operational Considerations" in Myo Thant, Min Tang, and Hiroshi Kakazu, eds., *Growth Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to Regional Economic Cooperation* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 1–28.

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zation or comprehensive legal agreement.[4] "Comprehensive agreements" refer to those that cover a dominant portion of the international exchange among all the member economies, such as free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions. In all cases of informal integration, the operation is determined mainly by economic factors. Although the private sector plays a leading part, governments often play important roles in the background. Informal integration is important in East Asia because the great diversity of the region makes the transaction costs of building FTAs too high. Furthermore, the trade barriers in East Asia are mostly informal, and FTAs are ineffective in overcoming informal barriers. Therefore, FTAs are likely to be ineffective.[5]

One feature of the East Asian economy is that economies of different levels are located close to each other. This proximity creates favorable conditions for integration between countries with higher levels of development that have abundant capital, advanced techniques, and rich experience and countries with less developed economies that have cheap labor and production materials. For example, the J-S-R SREZ combines the labor, land, and resources of Indonesia and Malaysia with the capital and technology of Singapore.

Most East Asian countries use SREZs as part of their integration strategies. Japan hopes to use the Sea of Japan Rim SREZ to promote cooperation with other Northeast Asian countries. This SREZ is also intended to develop the relatively backward areas of Japan along the Sea of Japan. For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, the growth triangles are instruments of integration to supplement their not-so-effective free trade arrangement. For China, SREZs are a major part of its strategy to gradually open up and become integrated into the international economy. It is also consciously using the expansion of SREZs, both the enlargement of existing SREZs and the establishment of new ones and continental bridges (major international railways that cross the continent to the sea coast) to reduce regional disparities. Russia is also using SREZs to integrate into the Asia Pacific economy and develop its Far Eastern region, which is remote from its European center.

Conceptual Development of the SREZ

The earliest proposal for a SREZ in East Asia dated back to 1968 when Fukushima Masamitsu, a Japanese economist, proposed the Sea of Japan Rim economic circle.[6] At that time, neither the economic conditions nor the international environment in East Asia was favorable to such a proposal. However, by the end of the 1970s, the South China SREZ had developed spontaneously

[4] Certain SREZs do get sponsorship or aid from international organizations, but the international organizations do not enforce the integration by themselves. They play more of a supportive role.

[5] For a detailed introduction on informal integration and its rationale, see Peng, "The Changing Nature of East Asia as an Economic Region," 177–180.

[6] Lin Xiaoguang, "Shixi Huan Ribenhai Jingjiquan" [A tentative analysis of the Japan Sea Rim Economic Circle], *Yatai Yanjiu* [Asia-Pacific Studies] (September–October 1992): 47–55.

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through the business activities of Hong Kong firms in South China. In 1987, Nishikawa Jun of Waseda University in Japan promoted the idea of Sea of Japan Rim economic cooperation among Japan, China, and the two Koreas. This was also the first proposal for integration among countries with different political systems.[7]

In 1989 then-Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong officially proposed an economic zone linking Singapore and adjacent areas, which resulted in the first SREZ in Southeast Asia. In Northeast Asia beginning in 1991, the UN Development Program conducted research and organized a series of discussions about the feasibility of a Tumen River SREZ among China, North Korea (DPRK), and Russia, with extensive Japanese and South Korean participation.

In the West, Ezra Vogel was the first scholar to analyze the development of SREZs. In a 1989 book, Vogel noted that the ties between Hong Kong and Guangdong were already so strong that the border seemed to be nonexistent.[8] Shortly thereafter Robert Scalapino also called attention to the phenomenon of the SREZ, which he termed "natural economic territories."[9] However, the most substantial work by a western scholar on the SREZ as a means of regional integration has been that of Gilbert Rozman, who has conducted in-depth studies on subregional integration in Northeast Asia.

Research on the SREZs has focused on only a few SREZs, and little attention has been paid to their mutual relations and interactions. In reality, however, SREZs interact and compete with one another. Furthermore, SREZs also work with the economic networks. Where economic networks are strong (South China and parts of Southeast Asia), it is very easy for SREZs to succeed. In contrast, SREZ development will face tremendous difficulties when existing networks are lacking.

This article finds that SREZ development follows an interrelated chain reaction pattern. A couple of SREZs flourished, which led to the rise of SREZs in the vicinity. This successive pattern is having a major impact on East Asian economic development. While the regional production networks are in tatters, this chain reaction of SREZs continues to forge strong de facto economic integration in East Asia.

The Rationale for the SREZ

SREZs are particularly effective in circumventing informal and political barriers. The informal nature of the SREZ helps to facilitate economic integration despite the political confrontation between governments. Many of the informal barriers are related to the cultural heterogeneity of the Asia Pacific region. Be-

[7] *Keizai Gakunin*, 22 September 1987.

[8] Ezra Vogel, *One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 442–446.

[9] Robert A. Scalapino, "The United States and Asia: Future Prospects," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Winter 1991): 19–40.

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ing geographically close and often in areas where historical ties are strong, SREZs can help to resolve political and cultural problems. In the South China SREZ, for example, people in Guangdong speak the same dialect as those in Hong Kong, while people in Southern Fujian speak the same dialect as the Taiwanese. In the J-S-R SREZ, Singapore had already developed strong ties with the Johor province of Malaysia before the SREZ was established. Integration in SREZs is based more on the export-oriented and technology sectors. Limiting the scope of integration to those sectors facilitates the development of SREZs, since most East Asian governments encourage the development of the export and technology sectors. One nation can take part in several SREZs. For instance, Malaysia and Indonesia both take part in at least three SREZs. China participates in at least six SREZs and in all the continental bridges. This way, a nation can try different schemes of integration in various parts of the nation.

In East Asia, not only are the gaps among nations high, but regional differences within a country can also be large. Some parts of a nation can be more suitable to regional integration than others. For example, South China has more "soft resources" for economic integration than most of the rest of the nation such as existing overseas connections, local entrepreneurship, and geographical proximity with Hong Kong and Taiwan. SREZs well serve the purpose by developing integration part by part.

For the lower tier members, SREZs have two major effects: absorption and radiation.[10] Absorption refers to the process by which capital and technology from the upper tier states are combined with cheap local labor and resources of lower tier states. Radiation describes the process by which the technology, management, and business culture developed within a SREZ gradually diffuse outward to influence the portions of lower tier economies not directly involved in the SREZ. For higher tier members, it is also the process by which their capital and business interests learn more about the politics and cultures of lower tier countries.

Because of the usefulness of SREZs, some FTA members also resort to SREZs to promote integration among members. ASEAN as a regional political organization has been quite successful, but in the economic arena its progress has been very slow. Although the ASEAN countries began discussing an ASEAN FTA as early as the middle 1970s, and commodities that enjoyed favorable tax benefits increased from 71 items in 1978 to 14,081 items in 1989, the intraregional trade among the ASEAN six remained at around 20 percent. This is because ASEAN countries widely use nontariff barriers, such as import quotas, import licenses, and foreign exchange controls.[11] At its fourth summit

[10] The terms "absorption effects" and "radiation effects" were first used by Xue Jinjun, a Chinese economist. In this article the contents of the two effects are much broader. See Xue Jinjun, "Zengzhangquan: Yizhong Kegong Xuanze de Yatai Hezuo Xingshi" [Growth circles: An alternative pattern for Asia-Pacific integration], *Yatai Yanjiu* (May–June 1994): 13–17.

[11] Cai Penghong, "Disijie Dongmeng Shounao Huiyi Jiqi Quyu Jingji Hezuo de Yingxiang" [The fourth ASEAN summit talk and its influence over regional economic integration], *Yatai Jingji* [Asia-Pacific Economic Review] (March–April 1992): 16–18.

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in Singapore in 1992, ASEAN endorsed growth triangles as a supportive mechanism for regional economic integration.[12] A more recent study on the effects of ASEAN FTA suggests that policy coordination, though important, may still be too weak to direct regional integration.[13] This means that informal means of integration, including SREZs, may continue to play a major role in regional integration.

The Uneven Development of SREZs

It was widely expected that different SREZs would rise simultaneously and eventually merge into a broad East Asian economic region.[14] At least fifty SREZs have been proposed in the past decade, but most of them have not materialized. Furthermore, the development of SREZs in East Asia has shown a highly unbalanced pattern. The South China and J-S-R SREZs achieved substantial success within a short time. The Yangtze River Delta (YRD) SREZ has also performed well, and the Bohai/Yellow Sea (BYS) SREZ has shown strong promise. But other SREZs either have achieved only limited success or have proceeded very slowly. Even within a SREZ, there can be uneven developments. In the relatively small J-S-R SREZ, integration is mostly bilateral (between Singapore and Indonesia and between Singapore and Malaysia), while multilateral integration of these three countries and bilateral cooperation between Johor and Riau lag behind.

We should not dismiss the importance of SREZs because the development of many SREZs did not live up to expectations. On the contrary, a subregion's performance is strongly related to the success of a SREZ. In East Asia, the most rapidly growing subregions are precisely those that have developed successful SREZs. For instance, the most dynamic and integrated subregion is the South China SREZ, which helped South China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong attain the best economic performance in East Asia.

Geographically, SREZs in East Asia can be divided into three groups: Northeast Asia, Greater China (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao), and Southeast Asia. The SREZs in Greater China are the most dynamic and play a leading role in the formation of the China Economic Area. The SREZs in Southeast Asia in general, however, have had a mediocre performance. Only the J-S-R SREZ has achieved substantial success, but it has not generated a

[12] Chia Siow Yue and Lee Tsao Yuan, "Subregional Economic Zones in Southeast Asia" in Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, eds., *Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations* (Pymble, Australia: Harper Educational Publishers, 1994), 365–380.

[13] Toh Mum Heng and Linda Low, "Linkages Among the ASEAN Economies," *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* 13 (July 1996): 52–73.

[14] Ebina Yakihiko, *Dohoku Ajia Chiiki Kyoryoku to Nihon: Reisen Shuen to Keizai Hatten o Meza Shite* [Northeast Asian regional cooperation and Japan: The end of the Cold War and working toward economic development] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1991), 29–30.

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strong chain effect in subregional integration. Northeast Asia, where expectations were the highest, turned out to be slowest in SREZ development.

Greater China

SREZs have played a prominent role in China's opening up and modernization. Just as overseas Chinese were the most important outside source of investment for China, SREZs played the greatest role in enabling China to welcome the investment. Looking at the effects of ethnic Chinese business networks (ECBNs) and SREZs in China together, the South China SREZ is the frontier of the connection between overseas Chinese networks and mainland China.[15] The South China and Yangtze River Delta SREZs have led the way in forming the China Economic Area.

Hong Kong is the leading force in the integration of Greater China. Despite the recent surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) into China from Japan, the United States, and other Western countries, Hong Kong is still the largest investor in China. By the end of 1998, 16,000 Hong Kong firms had invested $119.93 billion in China, accounting for 54 percent of China's realized foreign capital.

The development of SREZs in China can be divided into three stages. The first stage was the development of special economic zones from July 1979 to April 1990. During this time, the South China SREZ arose and led to the establishment of a number of special economic zones along the Chinese coast. The SREZ began to transform China's long-closed system of industrial coordination into an open economic circulation system. The second stage began in April 1990, when China began the Pudong project, which redirected and broadened China's economic focus from South China to East China. There has been a major effort to upgrade the industries as East China has more strength in education and science than does South China. China hopes to develop higher-tier industries by using the Yangtze River Delta SREZ as a major base. The third stage began at the turn of the century, when China decided to devote substantial resources to aid the *xibu* (western part) of the nation in order to narrow the widening gap between the east coast and the inland area.[16] The per capita GDP in the East is now almost two and a half times that of the inland. Although Northeast China is not literally in the western part, it is also included in the areas that will benefit from the plan since it is more backward than the southern and eastern coastal area. China hopes to use the Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ to lead subregional integration in Northeast Asia.

[15] Nomura Research Institute Hong Kong Limited, *Honkon to Chugoku: Yugo Suru Kajin Keizaiken* [Hong Kong and China: An integrated Chinese economic circle] (Tokyo: Nihon Noritsu Kyokai Manejimento Senta, 1994), 267.

[16] Li Jingyu, *Zhongguo yu Dongbeiya Quyu Jingji Hezuo Zhanlue Duice* [China and strategic measures of Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1999), 197.

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TABLE 1

Geo-economic Expansion of FDI in the Chinese Parts of SREZs

	1985–89	*1990*	*1993*	*1995*	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*
SC	(49%)	(53%)	(40%)	(41%)	(40%)	(37%)	(37%)
YRD	(15%)	(10%)	(26%)	(25%)	(26%)	(25%)	(25%)
BYS	(22%)	(21%)	(18%)	(20%)	(21%)	(22%)	(22%)
Northeast	(6%)	(9%)	(7%)	(6%)	(7%)	(7%)	(7%)

Note: Percentages are the shares of the national total. The South China (SC) SREZ includes Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan; The Yangtze River Delta (YRD) SREZ includes Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang; and the Bohai/Yellow Sea (BYS) SREZ includes Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Hebei, and Shandong. Northeast China (Chinese part of the Sea of Japan Rim SREZ) includes Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.

Source: China Statistical Bureau, *China Statistical Yearbooks* (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chuban-she), various years.

So far, the Southern China and Yangtze River Delta SREZs have prospered in Greater China, and a third one, the Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ, is just taking off. The South China SREZ and Yangtze River Delta SREZ have become the growth engines of the Chinese economy. They are listed as SREZs within Greater China because the South China SREZ is among four Chinese economies (the southern part of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao), and the Yangtze River Delta SREZ is a result of the unilateral opening-up of the eastern part of China. Moreover, while the Yangtze River Delta SREZ does not directly border Taiwan or Hong Kong, its ties with those two economies are very strong. When some define "Greater China," they employ the term in a narrow sense to refer to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Southeast China coast from Guangdong and Fujian provinces to Shanghai.[17] The South China and Yangtze River Delta SREZs showed the effectiveness of unilateral measures in opening up the region to economic development. China's special favorable policies toward Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas Chinese have contributed greatly to the rise of the two SREZs. The Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ is also beginning to show its dynamism as the effects of opening up in South and East China spread north and the emphasis of development of the Chinese government shifts inward.

Table 1 shows foreign direct investment in the Chinese parts of the four SREZs in Greater China and Northeast Asia and illustrates the chain reaction of SREZ development in China. South China was clearly the area that first opened up China in the 1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, South China accounted for nearly half of incoming foreign direct investment to China and it reached its height around 1990, when it absorbed slightly more than half of the foreign direct investment into China. Its importance in the Chinese econ-

[17] Yoichi Funabashi, Michel Oksenberg, and Heinrich Weiss, *An Emerging China in A World of Interdependence: A Report to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1994), 21.

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TABLE 2

Geo-economic Expansion of Trade in the Chinese Parts of SREZs

Year	*1992*	*1993*	*1994*	*1995*	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*
SC	(45%)	(47%)	(48%)	(44%)	(45%)	(47%)	(47%)	(46%)
YRD	(17%)	(17%)	(18%)	(20%)	(22%)	(21%)	(23%)	(26%)
BYS	(18%)	(16%)	(16%)	(17%)	(18%)	(21%)	(20%)	(20%)
Northeast	(10%)	(9%)	(7%)	(7%)	(7%)	(6%)	(5%)	(5%)

Note: Percentages are the shares of the national total.

Source: China Statistical Bureau, *China Statistical Yearbooks* (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, various years).

omy went down in the 1990s, accounting for just over one third of China's FDI in 1998. The rise of the Yangtze River Delta SREZ was very evident in the 1990s. Before the Pudong project was launched in 1990, its importance in the Chinese economy was actually declining. The FDI it received fell from the annual average of nearly 15 percent in the period of 1985–1989 to just under 10 percent in 1990. However, the Pudong project reversed this slide, and by 1993, the Yangtze River Delta SREZ accounted for slightly over one fourth of FDI and has kept that proportion since then. The BYS area was also of declining importance in the early 1990s. Although it accounted for a sizable portion (more than one fifth) of China's FDI in the second half of the 1980s, this ratio fell to just over one sixth by 1993. However, it came back after the BYS SREZ received more attention in the mid-1990s, and by 1998 it had recovered its position of the late 1980s. Northeast China, which is the Chinese part of the proposed Sea of Japan Rim SREZ, remained marginalized in China's expansion. The FDI it absorbed increased somewhat around 1990, when a number of initiatives were taken to enhance subregional integration. However, as most of the initiatives failed to materialize, FDI to the region was kept at low levels throughout the 1990s.

The picture of economic expansion becomes more evident when trade data of these regions is examined (Table 2). From 1992 to 1999, the rise of the YRD SREZ is very apparent. Its proportion of China's total export increased from 16.55 percent to 25.64 percent during this period. Like its FDI performance, the exports of the BYS SREZ shrank to less than 16 percent in 1993 and 1994 and began to pick up in 1995. In the last three years of the 1990s, they went back to just over 20 percent. During this period, the contribution of South China to China's export remained almost the same as did the FDI it absorbed from 1993 to 1998. The decline of Northeast China in China's expansion is much more evident from the trade table. From 1992 to 1999, its share in China's total export fell by half, showing a sharp contrast between a failed SREZ and successful SREZs (South China, Yangtze River Delta, and to a less extent, Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZs).

The interactions between SREZs were also very important. The rise of the South China SREZ was very helpful to the emergence of the YRD SREZ. As

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the labor costs and rent of South China rose, the Hong Kong and Taiwanese investment moved northward; much of it came to the YRD in the 1990s. Also, as overseas investment increased in South China, investors hoped to further explore the opportunities in other parts of China. The well-positioned YRD became a favorable destination. Hence, the two SREZs now compete with each other. This competition concerns whether Hong Kong or Shanghai will become the economic capital of China.

South China SREZ

The South China SREZ is the most successful one in East Asia. As the first SREZ in East Asia, it was a result of China's expansion. In July 1979, in order to absorb investment and promote trade, China decided to build four special economic zones in South China. The special economic zones achieved great success in attracting FDI and promoting exports. In 1984, China decided to increase the special economic zones to fourteen, of which three are in South China. From 1985 to 1988, China further opened a number of large-scale zones, which extended special privileges to all the major cities in South China. In April 1989, Hainan was declared as a new special economic zone.

The success of the South China SREZ is closely related to the ethnic Chinese business networks.[18] More than 90 percent of the overseas Chinese are from China's coastal area. Most of them are from South China.[19] A network with extensive overseas connections already existed when the South China SREZ was launched. That network not only facilitates the building of partnerships between business people from Hong Kong and Taiwan and their counterparts in South China, but also easily extends their international connections through the overseas Chinese networks.

The expansion of the South China SREZ has resulted in the transfer of labor-intensive industries from Hong Kong and Taiwan to South China. Hong Kong's manufacturing is mostly concentrated in labor-intensive industries. Since Hong Kong's manufacturing industries are derived from the transit trade, they have extensive sales networks for their products. These labor-intensive industries are very sensitive to the rise of labor costs. Since the 1980s, they have been pressured to move to the Pearl River Delta because of the rapid rise of wages in Hong Kong. The geographically close and culturally intimate Pearl River Delta, opened up under favorable conditions, was an ideal destination. By the late 1980s, more than 70 percent of large Hong Kong firms had branches or subsidiaries in South China.

[18] For a detailed study of the role of ethnic Chinese business networks in regional integration, see Peng, "Ethnic Chinese Business Networks and the Asia-Pacific Economic Integration."

[19] Jin Hongfan, *Chugoky Keizaiken: Tairiku, Honkon, Taiwan no Hokan to Kyoryoku* [The China economic area: Growing ties among mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan] (Tokyo: The Simul Press, Inc. 1995), 113.

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Taiwan's investment in South China is also mostly in the labor-intensive industries. By 1992, more than half of the Taiwanese firms in shoe, umbrella, handbag, toy, and sporting goods industries had branches and subsidiaries in South China. In 1993, Taiwan became the second largest investor in China. Initially, Taiwan's FDI in China was concentrated in South China (79 percent of Taiwanese investment in China in 1989). Today, Taiwan relies heavily on China for export processing.

The SREZ has had a tremendous impact on the development of South China as well as China as a whole. South China became a hot spot of the Chinese economy. From 1978 to 1994, Guangdong's export increased nearly thirty times, while Fujian's grew more than forty times. In 1994, South China accounted for almost half of China's export (it was less than one-sixth in 1978). In 1995, Guangdong's exports reached $56.6 billion, far surpassing that of Hong Kong's domestic export of $30 billion.[20] A new economic circulation among Taiwan/Hong Kong, South China, and North America was established. From 1978 to 1994, Guangdong's GDP rose from No. 6 to No. 1 among all the provincial units in China. Fujian's GDP also rose from 22nd to 12th place.

Hong Kong is the nexus of the SREZ. It has become the engine of growth in Guangdong by providing capital, technology, and sales channels. In 1996, Hong Kong became Taiwan's second largest trade partner because of Hong Kong's intermediate role between China and Taiwan. The integration between Taiwan and South China is still less than that between Hong Kong and South China, because Taiwan continues to ban direct trade, investment, or transportation with China.

As South China developed, its labor costs rose dramatically. Thus, its comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries was gradually lost. In 1992, investors in South China began to move their funds northward. By the mid-1990s, the driving power of South China to develop other parts of China had reached its apex. To some extent, South China was a victim of its own success, as other areas in China also gradually adopted the same policies. As other parts of China were granted similar policy favors, South China no longer enjoyed the policy advantages it had in the early period. The Yangtze River Delta SREZ has become South China's most powerful competitor.

The Yangtze River Delta (YRD) SREZ

The Yangtze River Delta includes one centrally administered city, Shanghai, and two provinces, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The YRD has higher tiers of industries and in comparison with South China it has relatively good bases of heavy and petrochemical industries. It also has much stronger educational resources.

[20] Yun-wing Sung, "Hong Kong and the Economic Integration of the China Circle" in Barry Naughton, ed., *The China Circle: Economics and Electronics in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 41–80.

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Shanghai used to be the financial center of East Asia. In the 1930s, Shanghai accounted for more than half of China's export. Its gold market was second only to London and New York. Its central role in Far Eastern economies earned it the title of "the New York of the East."

In April 1990, the Chinese government approved the Pudong Development Plan. By building Pudong, a new section of Shanghai almost from scratch, the plan envisions Shanghai as an international economic, financial, and trade center. It aims to use Shanghai as the *longtou* (dragonhead) to lead the opening-up of the Yangtze River area. The Yangtze River area will in turn lead to development in the western part of the nation. Unlike most of the other SREZs composed of parts of several economies, the YRD SREZ has been formed by the unilateral action of opening up East China. But it still qualifies as a SREZ because it is a geographical zone serving as a means of economic integration and involving broad participation from other economies in East Asia.

Hong Kong and Taiwan are major partners of the YRD SREZ. By the end of 1992, Hong Kong accounted for 39 percent of Shanghai's contracted FDI. In recent years, Hong Kong's investment continued to grow. The projects became bigger and their duration became longer.[21] Taiwanese also favors investment in Shanghai. As early as November 1990, Taiwan's then Prime Minister Hao Bochun hoped that Taiwan would focus its investment in mainland China on Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai.[22]

Japan is an increasingly important partner of cooperation for the YRD SREZ. In 1990, Japan accounted for 14.27 percent of the export of Shanghai, the center of the YRD SREZ. By 1995, the ratio increased to 30.44 percent.[23] Japan is the second largest investor in Shanghai after Hong Kong. By the end of 1997, Japan accounted for 13.76 percent of the FDI absorbed by Shanghai.[24]

To make the YRD a strong powerhouse of China's economic growth after the rise of South China, China provided a large amount of resources to develop the YRD SREZ. In the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991–1995), China invested nearly $5 billion for basic construction in Pudong alone, including bridges, freeways, port docks, electricity, and water supplies. China planned to invest another $20 billion in 1996–2000 to build a new airport, subway, tunnel, and communication centers. Pudong was not only granted all the privileges the major special economic zones enjoyed, but also a number of other special privileges

[21] Tian Zhili, *21 Shiji Zhonghua Jingjiqu* [The Chinese economic area in the 21st century] (Taipei: Lishu Wehua, 1998), 228–229.

[22] Jian Ceyuan, *Jueqi zhong de Jingji Jinsanjiao: Zhongguo Dalu, Xianggang, Taiwan* [The rising economic gold triangle: Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan] (Taipei: Yongye Publisher, 1995), 78.

[23] Wang Xinkui, "Changjiang Liuyu Jingjiquan yu 21 Shiji de Zhongri Jingji Hezuo" [The Yangtze River Valley Economic Circle and Sino-Japanese economic cooperation in the 21st century] in Wang Xinkui et al., ed., *Zhongguo Duiwai Kaifang yu Zhongri Jingji Guanxi* [The opening-up of China and Sino-Japanese economic relations] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1999), 207–214.

[24] "Liyong Waizi" [Utilization of foreign capital] (http://china-window.com/Henan20%w/China Investment/Region/shanghai/foreign/index.htm), accessed 1 October 2000.

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including special trade and financial rights.[25] In November 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange was founded, and in early 1994, a national foreign exchange center was also established in Shanghai.

The YRD SREZ quickly rose as a new center of China's development and regional integration. From 1990 to 1995, the YRD's share of FDI in the coastal area increased from 12.02 percent to 29.13 percent, while the share of Guangdong decreased from 47.95 percent to 31.92 percent. By September 1998, Shanghai had absorbed a total of $31.85 billion in contracted overseas investment.[26]

The two successful SREZs in Greater China have strong effects on other parts of China. Thus, a chain reaction dynamism is occurring in China. The Yangtze River Valley and the Bohai/Yellow Sea subregion are rising after the resurgence of the Yangtze River Delta. After gaining a strong foothold in South and East China, overseas Chinese capital is making inroads into Central and North China. The government policy plays an important role in redirecting overseas capital to the inland and the north. It provides favors to overseas capital to guarantee high profit. Policy favors prompt overseas capital to make the move inward that it would not make otherwise.[27] The inward shift of policy focus has now become a national scheme to open up Western China. By applying the strategy used in the coastal SREZs to inland China, the nation hopes to expand the geo-economic chain to achieve balanced economic development.

Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia is the subregion with the greatest unexplored economic potential in East Asia. The Northeast Asian economies are highly complementary. The Russian Far East and Mongolia have rich resources, Northeast China and North Korea have abundant cheap labor, and Japan and South Korea (ROK) have capital and technology. Japan has high expectations for the rich oil, gas, and timber resources in the nearby Sakhalin continental shelf.[28] Since the mid-1980s, various SREZs have been proposed in Northeast Asia, including the Sea of Japan Rim SREZ, Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ, and the Tumen River Delta Triangle.

The Japanese are the forerunners in promoting subregional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Nishikawa's proposal for the Sea of Japan Rim SREZ aroused

[25] Cheng Chu-yuan, *Dalu Jingmao Gaige yu Liangan Guanxi* [Economic reform in Mainland China and relations across the Straits] (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi, 2000), 210–212.

[26] Ye Shouli, "Kaizhan Kuaguo Touzi Shi Shanghai Jingji Fazhan de Yixiang Zhanlue Xuanzhe" [Transnational investment is a strategic choice for economic development in Shanghai] in Wang, *Zhongguo Duiwai Kaifang yu Zhongri Jingji Guanxi*, 70–89.

[27] Zhang Shixian, *Zhongguo Yingzi Fazhan Zhanlue Yanjiu* [A study of China's development strategy to absorb foreign investment] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), 237–238.

[28] Ogawa Kazuo and Komaki Teruo, *Kan Nihonkai Keizaiken: Hokuto Ajia Shiberia Jidai no Makuake* [The Sea of Japan Rim Economic Circle: The beginning of the era of Northeast Asia and Siberia] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1991), 36–41.

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extensive interest in subregional economic integration both in Japan and in other Northeast Asian countries. In 1988, soon after Nishikawa proposed the SREZ, China's Jin Fengde, a scholar at the China Center of International Studies, proposed the Northeast Asian SREZ. China hoped to copy its experience in the Greater South China SREZ to Northeast Asia. South Korean scholars also proposed the Yellow Sea SREZ. In July 1988, then Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced the famous "Northern policy" to seek cooperation with communist countries. The United Nations Development Program also got involved and played a major role in initiating the Tumen River Delta SREZ in the early 1990s.

However, the Northeast Asian SREZs did not achieve much success for a number of reasons. First, Northeast Asian subregional integration lacks a common focus. Russians are primarily interested in developing the Greater Vladivostok free economic zone. Japan focuses on its relatively backward Sea of Japan coast. In China, almost every northern province or major city considers itself the center of Northeast Asian cooperation. South Korea, alternatively, is most interested in developing its west coast.[29]

Second, in Northeast Asia, political problems created major hurdles for economic integration. The tensions in the Korean peninsula were especially problematic. North Korea cancelled planned projects in the Tuman River Delta SREZ several times because of political problems. The territorial disputes in the northern territories are still a major barrier to cooperation between Japan and Russia.

Third, some major partners have weak market economies. In China, the northeastern provinces are areas where the state planning was strong and market strength was weak. North Korea has the most rigid system, with almost no market economy outside a few farm fares. In the Russian Far East, the market economy was only 2 to 2.5 percent of the whole economy. Even in Japan, the entire Sea of Japan coast accounted for only 1 percent of Japan's international trade.[30] Unlike South China, where strong overseas ethnic ties are available, no ready business networks exist in Northeast Asia.

Fourth, the basic facilities in the Russian Far East, Northeast China, and North Korea are inappropriate. Other than Dalian, none of the other seaports meet international standards.[31] The lack of proper basic facilities has slowed down the subregional integration. For instance, the overburdened Tianjin port along with the lack of alternative major ports has made the opening up of North China difficult as foreign investors are wary of investing in areas that have no easy access.

[29] He Jian, *Dongbeiya Guoji Jingji Hezuo Yanjiu* [Research on international economic cooperation in Northeast Asia] (Dalian: Dongbei Caijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1996), 53–54.

[30] Gilbert Rozman, "Backdoor Japan: The Search for a Way Out via Regionalism and Decentralization," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 25 (Winter 1999): 22–23.

[31] Gao Lianfu, "Ruhe Tuidong Dongbeiye Quyu Jingji Hezuo" [How to propel regional economic cooperation in Northeast Asia], *Dangdai Yatai* [Contemporary Asia-Pacific] (January 1998): 39–44.

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Other factors include clashes of civilizations, lack of attention from central governments, and domestic problems. The rise of "yellow peril" fears in Russia has stalled the cooperation with China. Local Russian governors encouraged the media to fan a mood of hysteria that linked one-sided trade, faulty goods, illegal investments, territorial concessions, and especially Chinese sojourners as elements of an alleged conspiracy.[32] Both Japan and China have paid much more attention to the "South" than to the "North." Japan is mostly interested in the East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies and the ASEAN Four, while China pays particular attention to integration with other members of Greater China. In Russia the economy was near collapse when Boris Yeltsin finally stepped down. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect Russia to generate much regional integration. Japan, mired in stagnation, has difficulty playing an active part in regional integration.

Despite all the frustrations and setbacks, efforts to promote subregional integration in northeast Asia are continuing. The Chinese are especially persistent, believing that the conditions for the integration have significantly improved. As China's opening up gradually spreads from the south to the north and other northeast Asian countries adjust their policies, it is likely that the Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ will become the third growth center in the Chinese economy after South China and the YRD. The historical summit among the Korean leaders in June 2000 was an important step to stabilize the Korean peninsula. Business exchanges between the two Koreas is beginning to surge, and many Korean firms such as Hyundai and Samsung are rushing to invest in North Korea. South Korea's economic recovery will enable it to play a major role in subregional integration. For Japan, the setbacks the Japanese firms had in Southeast Asia have made the Japanese turn more attention to Northeast Asia. And in Russia, the Putin government is likely to adapt a more practical policy for building international economic connections.

Above all, it is the high complementarity and the economic needs of the Northeast Asian countries that keep the theme of Northeast Asian integration alive. The economies of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are expected to become more vigorous in the early twenty-first century. In the fourth informal "ASEAN + 3" meeting (China, Japan, and South Korea) in November 2000, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji proposed that China, Japan, and Korea increase their support of trilateral cooperation. He also suggested setting up an information technology working group among the three countries, which Japan and Korea embraced. They also agreed to launch institutions for trilateral economic cooperation in 2001. Thus, substantive progress is likely to be made in the next decade or so.

[32] Gilbert Rozman, "Northeast Asia: Regionalism, A Clash of Civilizations, or A Strategic Quadrangle?" *Asia-Pacific Review* 5 (Spring/Summer 1998): 105–126.

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The Sea of Japan Rim (SJR) SREZ

Once the idea of building the SJR SREZ received broad attention, Japanese business and local governments took active steps. Many local governments established new institutions and made various plans for cooperation. Meanwhile, cities along the coast of the Japan Sea built ties with their counterparts in China, Russia, and the two Koreas. By July 1993, sixteen Japanese cities and prefectures had become "sisters" of ninety-five cities and districts in the four countries.[33]

Following China's successful example, in 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Russia would begin to establish special economic zones in the Russian Far East. In 1990, the Sakhalin SEZ was launched as the first free economic zone in the Russian Far East, and in October 1990, a free economic zone was established at Nachodka. On 1 January 1992, Russia opened the long-closed Vladivostok, which signified the complete opening-up of the Russian Far East. By the middle 1990s, two full-scale free economic zones had been established in the Russian Far East: the Pacific Coast Special Economic Zone and the Border Special Economic Zone. Russia made major efforts to get involved in the Asia Pacific regional cooperation, and on 26 November 1997, Russia formally became a member of the Asian Pacific Economic Circle (APEC).

In March 1992, China allowed Hunchun, Manzhouli, Heihe, and Shuifenhe to become open border cities, which increased the border trade in Northeast Asia. The Chinese kept coming up with new schemes of integration despite all the difficulties. However, all the proposals are based on provincial city plans and there is a lack of central coordination.

After losing most of its economic contacts with the former Soviet bloc, Mongolia turned to its Asian neighbors as major economic partners. Its trade with China, Japan, and South Korea rose substantially. In 1990, Mongolia issued a foreign investment law to attract FDI. It also plans to open the eastern region close to China and Russia as free economic zones and is particularly interested in building continental bridges across Mongolia from east to west.

According to a recent summary by a Japanese scholar, the SJR SREZ has achieved the following success: the local units have become more active in internationalization; bilateral exchanges have been enhanced; research and information systems about the integration have been set up; transportation facilities have been established; and understanding of the special features of Northeast Asia has been achieved.[34]

Overall, the progress of the SJR SREZ has been much slower than expected, as efforts of the local governments were more rhetorical than substantive. Since the Sea of Japan Rim includes the most difficult parts of Northeast Asian integration (Japan's Sea of Japan coast, Northeast China, the Russian

[33] He, *Dongbeiya Guoji Jingji Hezuo Yanjiu*, 115–116.

[34] Sakata Mikio, "Hokudo Ajia – Kan Nihonkai Koryu no Seika to Mondaiten" [Achievements and problems of the Northeast Asia/Sea of Japan Rim Exchange], *Sekai Keizai Hyoron* [World Economic Review] 44 (July 2000): 18–21.

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Far East, North Korea, and Mongolia), all the problems characteristic of Northeast Asian integration apply here. The SJR economies are still waiting for true regionalism to develop.

True regionalism may come from two directions. One is the northward movement of Chinese networks, which may first get a foothold in China's Bohai Sea Rim and then expand to inland provinces of Northeast China. China's efforts to divert more support to Northeast China could also be very helpful. The other prospect is the more serious and practical efforts from the Northeast Asian countries to push for concrete measures to enhance subregional integration.

In the southern direction, help may come from the Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ, where the northward expanding Chinese networks meet the Japanese and Korean capital. In the northern direction, the breaking point may be the Tumen River Delta SREZ.

Tumen River Delta (TRD) SREZ

The TRD SREZ has attracted special attention primarily because of strong support from the UN Development Program (UNDP). In 1991, it sent a group of experts to investigate the Tumen River Delta. The group proposed building a place comparable to Hong Kong or Singapore as the beginning of the Euroasia bridge. In October 1991, in a UNDP consultative meeting held in Pyongyang, Mongolia, North and South Korea, and China agreed to establish the Tumen River Area Development Program and its Program Management Committee (PMC). Between 1992 and 1994, the committee held four executive meetings and more than ten working meetings to discuss the methods, structure, basic facilities, and law-making for the SREZ.

According to the definition of the UNDP, the TRD SREZ was composed of two tiers. The greater Tumen River Economic Development Area (TREDA) included Yanji (China), Chongjin (North Korea), and Vladivostok. The smaller Tumen River Economic Zone (TREZ) of about 1,000 square kilometers included Huichun (China), Rajin (North Korea), and Posyet (Russia). In the first phase, the TREZ would be built as a free port for export processing. In the second phase, the TREZ would be expanded ten times to TREDA.

However, the goals set for the first phase turned out to be overly optimistic. The plan for the TREZ had to be cancelled. The path of integration changed from top down to bottom up. The UNDP is no longer the main sponsor of the SREZ. Instead, it has become a coordinator. The Tumen River Area Development Program became a loose SREZ based on individual free trade zones. Although a common economic zone was decided, all the members developed in their own sections mostly by themselves. By the end of 1997, the agreed FDI was only $499 million, far from the targeted $30 billion.[35]

[35] Yu Bingdiao and Wu Hao, "Mianxiang 21 Shiji Zhongguo Dongbei yu Riben de Jingji Hezuo" [The economic cooperation between Japan and Northeast China geared to the needs of the 21st century], *Xiandai Riben Jingji* [Contemporary Japanese Economy] (November 1999): 2–3.

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In December 1995, China, Russia, and Korea signed a treaty to establish the Coordination Committee for the Development of the Tumen River Area. At the same time, China, Russia, North and South Korea, and Mongolia reached formal agreements to found a consultative committee for the SREZ. The development obviously sped up after the two agreements were signed. By 1999, the TRD SREZ had attracted a total of more than $1 billion in FDI. The Chinese and Russian parts absorbed $500 to $600 million each, and $100 to $200 million went to the North Korean part.[36]

In general, the progress of the TRD SREZ has met many obstacles. North Korea stopped its participation in the TRD projects when Russia (1990) and China (1992) established diplomatic relations with South Korea. Moreover, the North has refused to sign a treaty to grant China the right of exit to the Japan Sea. It emphasized developing its northeastern ports as the starting point of the Euroasia Bridge. Russia is more favorable to the Greater Vladivostok plan. Some local officials even think that the TRD SREZ will bring more loss than gain to Russia. Japan and South Korea are very cautious because of security considerations. The TRD area was long closed, so the environment for FDI is very poor. The separate economic zones in the three countries duplicate each other, resulting in a huge waste of limited resources.

There are hopeful signs. If South Korea makes a substantial commitment to North Korea, China invests more in this subregion following its commitment to develop the backward inland, and Russia continues its recovery and becomes more pragmatic, the TRD SREZ will have brighter prospects. But in general, there are still many uncertainties about the future of the TRD SREZ. At this stage, the major actors focus their attention on the Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ rather than on the SJR and TRD SREZs.

Bohai/Yellow Sea (BYS) SREZ

The Bohai Sea/Yellow Sea subregion includes two direct municipalities (Beijing and Tianjin) and three provinces (Hebei, Shandong, and Liaoning) in China, the west coast of North and South Korea, and West Japan (primarily Kyushu). The Chinese tend to call this SREZ the Bohai Sea SREZ since almost all the Chinese provinces and cities involved are bordering the Bohai Sea. The Koreans and Japanese call it the Yellow Sea SREZ because their territory only borders the Yellow Sea. To accommodate both names, it is called Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ in this article.

China hopes to correct its unbalanced development through the development of the BYS SREZ. The Bohai coastal area is considered the only area in Northern China that can catch up with the South.[37] The BYS SREZ has rela-

[36] Yu Guozheng, "Dongbeiya Diqu Jingji Hezuo de Xin Jinzhan" [New situation of the economic cooperation in Northeast Asian Area], *Dangdai Yatai* 63 (March 2000): 58–60.

[37] Sun Jingxin, ed., *Huan Bohai: Dongbeiya de Huangjin Didai* [China's Bohai Coastal Region: Golden area of Northeast Asia] (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1994), 3.

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tively rich natural resources and good conditions for agriculture. It is the second largest oil-producing area in China with sound transportation facilities and a level of industrialization and quality of education that is far above average in China. It is on the eastern end of the Eurasia continental bridge.

In 1986, fifteen Chinese cities founded the Bohai Sea Joint Economic Conferences of Mayors. Since then, it has held meetings every year. In 1989, leaders of ten cities and provinces concerned held a joint conference in Tianjin and founded the Bohai Sea Rim Association of Communication. In January 1994, the State Planning Committee held a symposium in Tangshan. The symposium stipulated the items and policy measures for developing Bohai Rim economies. In 1996, the ninth Five-Year Plan specifically called for the formation of the Bohai Sea Rim economic circle.

China and South Korea are the most active promoters of the BYS SREZ. China is now the major destination for South Korean FDI. As much as 80 percent of Korea's FDI to China is in the Bohai region.[38] In Shandong Province, the contracted Korean FDI was $3.7 billion by the end of 1997, making South Korea the second largest investor in Shandong next to Hong Kong.[39]

The economic exchange between Kyushu and East Asia has been rising fast since the *entaka* (rise of yen). Because Japan's development strategy focused on the Tokyo area after World War II, Kyushu has been marginalized. Kyushu strongly desires to regenerate the local economy and become a center of Asian integration and therefore is trying to shift from being "Kyushu in Japan" to "Kyushu in Asia."[40] From 1996 to 1998, four major cities in the vicinity of Kyushu (Kitakyushu, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Shimonoseki) made new plans to internationalize. In contrast to earlier schemes, these new plans define goals and contain practical measures, which are more realistic to enforce.[41] Kyushu's private investment in China is mostly in the Bohai region.

In South Korea, local economic spheres are being developed as part of the strategy to shift from a government-led economy to a private economy. The western coast of Korea is relatively less developed. Its per capita GDP is only 70 percent of the national average, and its population has been declining. The South Korean government is planning to invest 10 trillion won (nearly $10 billion) to build large industrial zones, seaports, and airports on the west coast

[38] Wei Yanshen, "Yatai Ciquyu Hezuo yu Zengzhang Sanjiu" [Asia Pacific subregional cooperation and the growth triangles] in Wei Yanshen, ed., *Yazhou Zengzhang Sanjiu Jingji Hezuoqu Yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhonggao Wiajia Chuhanshe, 1998), 1–16.

[39] Sun Yanling, "Shiji Zhijiao de Shandongshen yu Hanguo Jingmao Hezuo" [Economic and trade cooperation between Shandong Province and South Korea at the turn of the century], *Dongbeiya Luntan* [Northeast Asia Forum] (February 2000): 64–66.

[40] Haruyama Hideo, "Kyushu-Yamaguchi Keizaiken to Taigai Kankei" [Kyushu-Yamaguchi Economic Circle and external relations] in Nishimura Akira and Watanabe Hideki, eds., *Kan Kokai Keizaiken: Do Ajia no Mirai o Sagasu* [The Yellow Sea Rim Economic Circle: An exploration of the future of East Asia] (Fukuoka: Kyushu Daigaku Chupankai, 1991), 325.

[41] Li Wen and Jin Yingji, "Huanhuanghai Quyu Jingji Hezuo Fangxingweiai" [Fast unfolding regional economic cooperation along the Yellow Sea Rim], *Dangdai Yatai* (June 1999): 31–32.

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in an effort to seek cooperation with Kyushu of Japan and the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas of China.

North Korea built large projects for special export zones in the late 1980s. The Nampo port was enlarged to dock ships of 50,000 tons (from 20,000 tons). North Korea has also developed new economic strategies for international cooperation. Although North Korea is poor, its education level is high. Therefore, its development will be expedient once it adopts realistic economic policies and opens to the world.

The potential of the Bohai/Yellow Sea SREZ has received increasing attention. In 1991, Hisao Kanamori, a leading Japanese economist, pointed out that the BYS SREZ should be the core of the Northeast Asian economic integration. When developers became frustrated with the lack of programs in the SJR and TRD SREZs, they focused more on the BYS SREZ. It was expected that the Northeast Asian integration would lead to economic cooperation among Japan, China, and South Korea and move from bilateral to trilateral relations.[42] Today the BYS SREZ has become a new hot spot in East Asian development.

Chinese scholar Luo Zhaohong has suggested that while Northeast Asian integration should include all six countries, cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea is especially important. He has also encouraged U.S. participation, given its important role in the region.[43] China, Japan, and Korea share many historical, cultural, and religious factors, making it easy for them to communicate. Since the BYS subregion is where all the three meet, Japanese scholars foresee the three countries forming a trade framework in the BYS SREZ, which will lead to the rise of the Sea of Japan Rim SREZ.[44]

Such a de facto trade framework may already be on the move. Japan's FDI has often begun in Liaodong peninsula and then gradually expanded to other places in North/Northeast China. This framework, together with the move of Korean capital in Shandong, may mean that a de facto SREZ is quietly forming in the BYS rim. Japanese and Korean FDI are directed toward long-term gains and are larger in scale and more advanced in technology than the investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan. These features make it more favorable for industrial upgrades.[45]

The overseas Chinese are also playing an increasing role in the Chinese part of the BYS subregion, signaling the northward expansion of the overseas Chinese networks. Other measures are also taking effect. For example, the autono-

[42] Imai Kenichi, "Tohoku Ajia Chiiki Boeki to Sogo Ison" in Shimakura Tamio, ed., *Tohoku Ajia Keizaiken no Taido: Tozai Sekkin no Shin Furontia* [Emergence of Northeast Asian Economic Circle: New frontier of East-West rapproachement] (Tokyo: Ajia Kenkyujo, 1992), 71–72.

[43] Luo Zhaohong, "Guanyu Dongbeiya Jingji Hezuo de Gouxiang" [Thoughts on Northeast Asian economic cooperation], *Dongbeiya Luntan* (May 2000): 9–13.

[44] Ebina Yasuhiko, *Kan Nihonkai Keizaiken to Kankyo Kyosei* [The Sea of Japan Rim Economic Circle and environmental cooperation] (Tokyo: Akashi, 2000), 229–230.

[45] Fan Aijun, "Huanghai Jingjiquan Hezauo yu Shandong de Duice" [The Yellow Sea Economic Circle Cooperation and Shandong's countermeasures], *Dangdai Yatai* (May 1999): 55–60.

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mous power of the local governments has been enhanced, and they have taken the initiative of building many new free economic districts.

Of course, many problems must be solved before the BYS Rim becomes a prosperous SREZ. Although many free economic districts and industrial gardens have been established in the Chinese section, they still lack basic facilities, and internal linkages are weak. A major difference between the BYS SREZ and the South China SREZ, but typical in most SREZs relating to China, is the presence of a large number of state enterprises that makes the transformation challenging. The business culture in most of the Chinese section of the BYS subregion is weaker than that in South China and the YRD. Economic networks have yet to be developed into strong bonds across China, South Korea, and Japan, although production networks are beginning to expand among the three countries. The BYS Rim is a subregion full of potential, and parts of the area already show robust dynamism. If the three major players make a serious commitment to subregional integration here, it may well become the leader in Northeast Asian integration.

Southeast Asia

Although Southeast Asia initiated subregional integration later than Northeast Asia, the growth triangles there have been substantially more successful. The Johor-Singapore-Riau SREZ is especially successful. However, while the success of the J-S-R SREZ has led to the establishment of a number of others in Southeast Asia, their chain effect is apparently weaker than that of the SREZs in Greater China. The J-S-R SREZ has also failed to expand. Thus, it remains to be seen whether ASEAN countries can create more subregional integration through their growth triangles and quadrilaterals.

Johor-Singapore-Riau SREZ (Southern Growth Triangle)

Singapore proposed a growth triangle in order to transfer labor-intensive industries to neighboring areas. In the 1980s, the wage increase in Singapore was faster than the growth of productivity. Therefore, Singapore hoped to use the cheap labor in Johor and Riau. Moreover, the United States no longer considered Singapore a developing country and removed its trade privileges in January 1989. In response, Singapore decided to move some of its firms to Johor and Batam, which still enjoyed tariff favors from developed countries. Singapore also wanted to use the land and water of the two neighbors. Indonesia wanted to promote the growth of Batam and Riau by joining the Growth Triangle. Malaysia had an ambitious plan to develop Johor, its second most populous state, for which it required substantial funding. The growth triangle proposal provided a good opportunity for Malaysia to develop Johor. Although the ASEAN reached many formal agreements on integration, the actual progress

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in regional integration was slow. This prompted some members to seek alternatives.

The J-S-R Growth Triangle grew rapidly. In 1992, Indonesia expanded its part from Batam Island to the whole Riau Islands. By April 1994, investment in Batam alone had reached $4.7 billion. Thus far, eight industrial gardens have been built in Batam. The whole island's export increased from $40.45 million in 1989 to $1.423 billion in 1994. Its total workforce grew from less than 10,000 in 1989 to over 125,000 in 1996.[46] The plan to develop Bintan Island has also begun to be implemented. By 1998, twenty-nine firms had established branches on Bintan Island, including major multinational corporations such as Sumitomo Metal, German Plastic, Foster from the United States and Hong Guan from Singapore.[47]

Johor also benefited greatly from the growth triangle. In 1990, Singapore and Malaysia decided to open a second path connecting Singapore and Johor. Nine new industrial districts have been built since the SREZ was established. From 1990 to 1995, Singapore invested $1.06 billion in Johor (56 percent of its total investment in Malaysia), while Indonesia invested $370 million (30 percent of the total).

While Johor-Singapore and Riau-Singapore cooperation has been growing fast, the link between Johor and Riau remains weak. Malaysia and Indonesia both worried that this would turn Johor and Riau into a "corridor" subordinate to Singapore and further away from the economic centers in Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore has been able to move its labor-intensive industries to Johor and Riau. Also, by integrating with Johor and Riau, Singapore's tourism has benefited.

Although, the J-S-R SREZ has generated substantial integration among Singapore, Riau, and Johor, its development has not created new centers of growth for Malaysia or Indonesia similar to what happened in South China and the Yangtze River Delta. Singaporean business does not have the cultural resources to expand far beyond the growth triangle. Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia adopted effective policies to direct the capital in the SREZ to other parts of their nations. After the mid-1990s, the S-J-R SREZ reached its limit as labor costs and rent rose in Riau and Johor, and FDI became saturated. Thus, the J-S-R SREZ has not been able to generate a strong chain effect that results in extensive geo-economic changes in Southeast Asia.

Other SREZs in Southeast Asia

ASEAN countries have tried to build a few other SREZs. The Northern ASEAN Growth Triangle, established in July 1993 at the initiative of Malaysia,

[46] Carl Grundy-Warr, Karen Peachey, and Martin Perry, "Fragmented Integration in the Singapore-Indonesian Border Zone: Southeast Asia's 'Growth Triangle' Against the Global Economy," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 23 (June 1999): 311–313.

[47] Ding Dou, *Dongya Diqu de Ciquyu Jingji Hezuo* [Subregional economic cooperation in the East Asian region] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chuabanshe, 2000), 72–73.

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is supposed to comprise the Phuket Island of Thailand, the Pinang of Malaysia, and the Acch of Indonesia. In May 1994, officials and business people of the three countries gathered to discuss developing tourism and new routes of transportation. In July 1994, the three countries agreed to jointly develop thirteen agricultural projects aided by the Asian Development Bank as well as broaden their cooperation into communication, power supply, industrial gardens, and other fields. The full implementation of this project will require a total of $15-20 billion over a ten-year period, with the private sector bearing the bulk of the cost.[48]

The East Growth Triangle includes Malaysia's Sabah, Indonesia's Kalimantan, and the Philippines. It was first proposed by the Philipino president in March 1993. Later Brunei also joined. In March 1994, the economic ministers of the four countries signed an agreement in Davao, Philippines and formally created the East Growth Quadrangle. In November 1994, the economic officials and entrepreneurs of the four countries, together with business representatives from the United States, Singapore, and Australia, held a major meeting in the Philippines at which they agreed to build an active large free trade market and cooperate on fisheries, timber, and tourism.

In early 1993, Thailand formally proposed the Golden Quadrangle SREZ among Thailand, China, Myanmar, and Laos. Nearly 500 kilometers long, it ranges from Simao and Jinghong ports of the river to the Ban Huei Sai ports (Laos) and Saen ports (Thailand). This area is rich in hydropower, mineral, biological, and tourist resources. Two international highways were to be built along each side of the river. This river valley would become the core of the SREZ. In April 1993, the Mekong River bridge connecting Vientiane and Nong Khai (Thailand) was opened to traffic. In September 1994, Thailand and China signed an agreement to build a 500-kilometer railway across Thailand, Laos, and China. Japan, Canada, and a U.S. bank also supported this project. It was hoped that this project would not only generate economic growth, but also help to reduce drug production. In fact, over the past decade, drug production in China's Yunnan province, northern Laos, and northern Myanmar has reduced substantially. Some northern Myanmar districts have basically stopped producing drugs.[49]

The establishment of these SREZs is an important step in developing intraregional integration among the ASEAN countries. But they share the common problem of lacking economic complementarity, funding, and technology. The basic infrastructure is especially weak. Existing networks are fragile, so although they can help to generate some growth and economic exchange in certain local areas, their overall effects are limited. Being weak themselves, it is hard to expect the SREZs to reinforce each other. After the Asian financial

[48] Kishore Rao and John Newton, "Overall Findings" in Myo Thant and Min Tang, eds., *Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle: Theory to Practice* (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1996), 69–110.

[49] Ding, *Dongya Diqu de Ciquyu Jingji Hezuo*, 121–122.

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crisis broke out, these SREZs faced major difficulties. However, the flexibilities of SREZs are also shown in that when the situation is not so favorable, the SREZs can be maintained without much cost. The SREZs in Southeast Asia will continue to exist as will their potential. Once the conditions become favorable again, they will reemerge as useful means of economic integration.

SREZs and East Asian Political Economy

The emergence of SREZs has had a major impact on the political economy of East Asia. Just as in the past, if Japan has held the leading place in the multitier division of labor in East Asia, China is similarly well positioned in the subregional zones. China has a favorable geographical location. In the northeast, it neighbors Russia, Korea, Mongolia, and Japan. Its eastern part is very close to Japan and Korea, while not too far away from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Therefore, East China is able to form a strong Yangtze River Delta by itself. South China has already benefited greatly from the SREZ it formed with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. Southwest China will also be in a good position to take part in the Indochina subregional integration. Even for its western parts, new ideas about building continental bridges will be a constructive way to establish subregional integration. All these factors will enable China to use various SREZs to participate in regional integration.

Moreover, the Chinese economies have been particularly dynamic in regional economic integration. Russia, because of its chaotic economic conditions, lack of entrepreneurship, and conservative political forces could contribute little besides rhetoric. Even Japan, the largest economy of the region, was ineffective in promoting economic integration. The Sea of Japan Rim SREZ, upon which Japan focused most of its attention, is still a long way from materializing. In contrast, the Chinese are much more active in pursuing all kinds of economic integration. China has already developed Southern China through the SC SREZ. The YRD SREZ has also achieved substantial success. The BYS SREZ is taking off as well. A geo-economic chain reaction is taking place in East Asia in which China is playing a leading role. If this chain reaction continues, Northeast Asia will also be successfully integrated into the international economy. This will change the configuration of the East Asian as well as the world political economy. China is also likely to be a leader in the economic integration in East Asia.

Of course, China cannot lead the integration by itself. Given its tremendous financial and industrial power, Japan's role is vital to the success of Northeast Asian integration. This is a critical step in the expansion of Asian integration after the rise of Greater China. It is very important that China and Japan find ways to work together to create deep integration in Northeast Asia. This might be the way for both China and Japan to revitalize their economies and promote East Asia's economic growth. Northeast Asian SREZs may well serve this goal

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of enhancing the trilateral integration among China, Japan, and South Korea (with Russia playing an increasing role).

The rise of SREZs signifies the emergence of new mechanisms of regional integration after the Japan-led regional production networks (RPNs) became weakened. Until the mid-1990s, Japan played a dominant role in East Asian integration through its powerful production networks, which control technology and investment. However, the Japanese branches, subsidiaries, and their local partners suffered major losses, and many investment projects had to be cut during the Asian financial crisis. In contrast, the ethnic Chinese business networks gained more influence because the Chinese economies sustained the crisis better. Similarly, SREZs have also become important means of economic integration. Profiting from China's experience, Japan is now actively developing special economic zones and SREZs.[50]

The development of SREZs has profound implications for regional politics and security. Subregional integration achieved through successful SREZs has greatly enhanced the interdependence of East Asian economies. The relations between China and Taiwan, for example, are actually much closer than they appear on the surface, because the SREZs in Greater China have made the two economies intertwined. This greatly raises the costs of a serious conflict between the two sides. Thus, while both governments look very stubborn in making political concessions to each other, in reality they need to seek reconciliation because they simply cannot afford a direct confrontation. The growing interdependence between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait will increase the likelihood of peaceful relations between Beijing and Taipei and, therefore, enhance the regional security. The rising BYS SREZ is increasing the interdependence among China, South Korea, and Japan. Although most of the proposals for subregional integration in Northeast Asia have not materialized, they do provide important lessons. China, South Korea, and Japan have realized that it is more realistic to develop integration among their three countries, and the BYS SREZ has played a pioneering role in such integration. If efforts to enhance economic cooperation among these three countries can move forward as proposed, they will in turn make the BYS SREZ a hot spot in Asian integration and may eventually lead to the rise of other Northeast Asian SREZs.

The ASEAN countries played a leading role in regional economic cooperation. However, the actual integration achieved under the ASEAN, either through the ASEAN FTA or through broader arrangements such as EAEC and the "ASEAN + 3," has been modest. In contrast, the geo-economic chain reaction in Greater China and the BYS SREZ has quietly generated much more actual integration in terms of investment and FDI. Since the Asian financial crisis, the center of economic integration has shifted from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.

[50] Jin Xide, "Hou Yanzheng Moshi Shidai de Zhongri Guanxi" [Sino-Japanese relations in the era of post "flying geese pattern"], *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi* [World economics and international politics] 264 (August 2002): 16–21.

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The SREZ development also affects the balance of political and economic power in East Asia. China, the most active proponent of subregional integration, has benefited tremendously from successful SREZ development. Its economy has flourished as the geo-economic chain reaction unfolds in Greater China and expands to the north and inland. China's influence has also subsequently risen. Just a decade ago, China was still outside APEC. Today, it is a leading player in Asian integration. In November 2000, China proposed free trade agreements among China, Japan, and South Korea and hopes to expand them to Southeast Asia in the future. China's proposal received warm initial responses. Caution has to be taken about the prospect of establishing an effective free trade area in Northeast Asia or East Asia given the huge diversity of the region and the strong informal barriers to trade in the region. However, the Chinese proposal and the positive responses from other East Asian countries signify a major step forward in East Asian integration.

The SREZ development also has had a major impact on domestic income distribution in East Asian economies. The S-J-R SREZ has benefited Johor and Riau, making them tightly linked to Singapore. However, these regions are moving away from the mainstream Malaysian and Indonesian economies, which has caused deep concerns in the two countries. In China, the successful SREZs have greatly promoted high growth of the coastal areas, but the vast inland region has lagged behind. From 1979 to 1995, the GDP of the eastern coastal area of China grew at an annual rate of 12.8 percent, while the western inland grew only at 8.7 percent. As a result, the per capita income gap between the two regions reached 2.35 times by 1995.[51] Such skewed income distribution, if it persists, is likely to cause social and political problems and unsustained development. China has taken steps to address this problem by expanding subregional integration northward and by devising a master plan to open up the inland. Whether China can achieve sustained growth depends on whether the geo-economic chain reaction can be continued. In Southeast Asia, most of the proposed SREZs have been designed to bring up the relatively backward areas and narrow regional disparities. But such efforts, while well-intended, have not achieved substantial success. China's strategy to start from the more viable coastal areas and then expand to other areas has apparently worked much better.

Conclusion

Interest in subregional economic zones seems to have waned in recent years. However, the SREZ is still a major means of economic integration. The development of SREZs in East Asia has simply followed a pattern that is different from the expectations of early proponents. Instead of rising simultaneously all

[51] Gao Zhenggang et al., *Xibu Dakaifa Zhilu: Xin Yaou Daluqiao Fazhan Zhanlue* [The road to western exploration: Development strategy of new Asian-European continental bridges] (Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 2000), 59–63.

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over East Asia, only a few SREZs have succeeded in generating substantial subregional integration. They have become leaders of regional integration and have led to the rise of other SREZs. In Greater China, development of SREZs has resulted in a strong chain of geo-economic changes following the lead of the South China SREZ and the YRD SREZ. This chain has forged strong regional economic integration, which will lead to even greater changes if it can be extended to Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, while a number of growth triangles have also been established and have achieved success in varying degrees, they have yet to form an entire chain of changes. This explains why the Southeast Asian countries have not been doing as well as the Greater China economies in regional integration, which made them more vulnerable in the Asian financial crisis.

The two earliest SREZs, South China and J-S-R, are both based on industrial transfer from higher tiers to lower tiers. The YRD SREZ which followed the South China SREZ, also shares this characteristic. The successful SREZs gradually expanded and merged with neighboring areas, operating between domestic economies and the international economy. In contrast, other SREZs rely more on resources. They need more time and initial investment to take off. So far, the second type of SREZs has achieved only limited success.

What are the conditions for successful SREZs? When SREZs were first proposed, most scholars identified economic complementarity, geographical proximity, and political conditions as the basic conditions. Economic complementarity is an essential condition. In all the successful SREZs, complementarity has played a major role. The Eastern ASEAN quadrangle, Northern ASEAN growth triangle, and the Indochina SREZs have lagged because the mutual comparative advantages are lacking. Geographical proximity is by definition a vital condition for a SREZ. Geographical proximity reduces transaction costs and greatly facilitates integration. Politically, the role of the government is also important. Although the main driving force for most SREZs is the market and private sector, favorable government policy is still essential. Thus, at least some implicit endorsement is a necessary condition.

Yet, the three basic conditions, while necessary, are far from sufficient for success. Many more conditions have to be met before a SREZ succeeds. One of these conditions is genuine decentralization. A major reason for developing SREZs is to let a local part of a country engage in subregional integration. For this local involvement to occur, it is critical that a localism be developed so that the participants in the local area can develop their own ties with foreign participants. Another condition is the availability of soft facilities, including business networks, market forces, and business culture. In South China, strong ties and a business culture already existed, and few large state enterprises had been established. Therefore, the rise of the South China SREZ became almost automatic when the government liberalized the local economy. Basic infrastructure is also a very important condition. The success of the South China SREZ is at least partly due to the existence of a strong infrastructure when the SREZ was

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initiated. In contrast, the basic infrastructure in the TRD area is relatively weak, which made its development much more difficult. The lack of basic facilities also explains the slow progress of the Eastern ASEAN and Northern ASEAN growth triangles. The number of participants in a SREZ is also important. Donald Weatherbee has found that the larger the number of participant states, the more likely the possibility that conflicting interests and policies will hinder the development of the SREZ.[52] The SJR and TRD SREZs have had the most difficulties, partly because they involve up to six members.

Given the very demanding conditions for SREZs to succeed, it is more practical to start SREZs in areas that possess better soft facilities and basic infrastructure. It is also preferable to involve fewer members in the initial stage. Starting a few SREZs in a number of unrelated subregions that lack the above conditions, as was the case in Southeast Asia, is much less effective than focusing on one or two SREZs and then expanding them, as in Greater China.

Historically, countries have tended to be overly optimistic at the beginning of major efforts toward Asia Pacific integration. Pessimism also often prevails when reality falls short of expectations. Most scholars have studied the subregional integration by focusing on a single area and are often influenced by the experiences of their particular area. For instance, those who study Greater China tend to be more optimistic, whereas those who study Northeast Asian integration are inclined to be pessimistic. However, it is important to give a balanced view. Regional integration in East Asia will never be easy given the huge diversity of the region and nature of trade barriers. It is unrealistic to expect many SREZs to produce strong integration within a short time. It is normal that the process of building SREZs will be full of conflicts or disputes, and some may even fall apart.[53] However, as the most dynamic region of the world, market forces will always find their way toward deeper economic integration. The SREZ is one such path.

SREZs have a few valuable attributes. A SREZ is more open than a FTA to nonmembers. While a FTA focuses on internal markets, a SREZ is often oriented to the market outside the SREZ—even to the world market. The experience of SREZ development shows that a SREZ cannot succeed unless it is closely linked to the global market. Only by linking itself to international markets and capital can the labor, natural, and tourist resources in the SREZs be fully utilized. In Johor, for example, nearly three-fourths of the FDI absorbed in 1994 and 1995 was from outside the member countries.[54] The successful SREZs are all connected to relatively free economies. For example, the South China SREZ is linked to Hong Kong and Taiwan. The J-S-R SREZ is linked to

[52] Donald E. Weatherbee, "The Foreign Policy Dimensions of Subregional Economic Zones," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 16 (March 1995): 421–432.

[53] Lim Hua Sing, *ASEAN Keizai no Chikaku Hendo: 21-seiki ni Mukete no Kyokuchi Keizaiken no Keisei* [Geographical changes of the ASEAN economies: the formation of subregional economic zones toward the twenty-first Century] (Tokyo: Dobunkan, 1993), 135–136.

[54] Ma, "Dongnanya Zengzhang Sanjiao de Fazhan yu Qianjing," 93.

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Singapore. The YRD SREZ is also effectively the international production center and market through an even broader range of channels of FDI and marketing.

A SREZ is also highly flexible. Since members only have a limited commitment and only parts of a member participate in the cooperation, it can keep open the option of expanding if the SREZ succeeds. If unsuccessful, members can simply limit their participation. Therefore, the risk is low. When Russia or North Korea did not favor certain measures of the TRD SREZ, they simply withheld from implementing them. Most of the projects in the SREZs do not require participation by every member. Taiwan keeps normal economic relations with Hong Kong but restricts its economic relations with mainland China. This would be unthinkable for a free trade area.

Given these qualities, SREZs will play a major role in Asian integration. As regionalism becomes increasingly important in the world today, East Asian countries have no alternative but to seek more effective integration. The Chinese economies fared better in the Asian financial crisis precisely because they are the best integrated economies in East Asia. Genuine integration will help East Asia regenerate itself. It can be expected that SREZs, together with economic networks, will forge strong ties among East Asian economies. If this chain of geo-economic changes continues, it will have a very strong effect in reasserting East Asia as the most dynamic economic region in the world.*

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Urban Education Reform and Minority Political Empowerment

STEFANIE CHAMBERS

The quest for solutions for our failing urban schools has attracted the attention of parents, politicians, and business people as well as scholars and policy analysts concerned about the fate of our nation's schools.[1] Increasingly, blame for failing inner-city schools is being pinned on school boards, which have been criticized as financially undisciplined, corrupt, unresponsive, and unaccountable to both the communities that they serve and to the government. Like many other urban school systems, the Chicago schools have experienced numerous problems over the years because of fiscal difficulties, deteriorating physical facilities, low student achievement scores, and accounts of administrative mismanagement of the school system. Low public confidence in the school board led Mayor Richard M. Daley of Chicago in 1995 to push successfully for an appointed school board in order to establish direct accountability to the city government. While some applaud the efforts of big-city mayors radically to reform their school boards, others contend that these efforts are cosmetic and that the financial crises faced by cities are the overriding factor behind the failure of urban school systems.

At the same time that political reform is increasingly seen as an effective way to improve urban schools, minority groups have become increasingly in-

[1] See Marilyn J. Gittell, "School Reform in New York and Chicago: Revisiting the Ecology of Local Games" in Marilyn J. Gittell, ed., *Strategies for School Equity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 147–162; Clarence N. Stone, "Introduction: Urban Education in Poitical Context" in Clarence N. Stone, ed. *Changing Urban Education* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 1–20; Anthony Bryk et al., *Chartering Chicago School Reform* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Clarence N. Stone, "The Politics of Urban School Reform: Civic Capacity, Social Capital, and the Intergroup Context" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 1996); Alfred G. Hess, Jr., *School Restructuring, Chicago Style* (Newbury Park, CA: Corwin, 1991); Alfred G. Hess, Jr., *Restructuring Urban Schools* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1995); and Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir, *Schooling for All* (New York: Basic Books 1985).

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fluential in big-city governments. Scholars have shown that black and Latino political mobilization during the late 1960s and 1970s led to greater minority office holding and, ultimately, governmental responsiveness to the minority community's needs.[2] For example, black activism in many rust-belt cities during the 1960s and 1970s resulted not only in more minority representation in municipal governments, but also in administrative control of school boards and educational policy by the 1980s.[3] The fact that minority groups play a more critical role in the governing affairs of cities appears to have complicated school reform efforts. In cities such as Baltimore, minority control of the school bureaucracy coincided with a declining economy, white flight to the suburbs, and a reduction in federal aid to cities.[4] Because of the reciprocal relationship between economic crises, politics, and public education in postindustrial cities, performance improvements among students have not been evident.

The key question I raise in this article is whether minorities will gain or lose power from the new urban school reforms and especially the trend favoring the concentration of power into the hands of mayors. The move toward centralizing control of school boards is taking place as other school reforms such as voucher plans, the privatization of schools, and charter schools are being adopted in cities such as Milwaukee, Cleveland, Baltimore, and Washington, DC. A study of centralization may yield important insights on the impact of that reform. In particular, centralization may reduce minority influence in cities where they were previously well represented in educational policy making. Kenneth Meier and Robert England found that black membership on school boards leads to more equitable educational opportunities for black students.[5] Thus, if decisions are made at the top of the hierarchy without the inclusion of the minority residents served by the system, educational policy may be less responsive to minority interests. Centralization as a new reform trend requires analysis to determine its public policy implications and ultimate effect on minority students.

This article assesses the impact of urban educational reforms on minority influence in the city of Chicago. Chicago's public school system offers an unusual opportunity to study the impact of two very different philosophical approaches toward urban school reform in the same city. The first reform occurred in 1988 and was largely the result of mobilization within the black community for greater influence in educational decision making in its children's schools. This reform took place on the heels of the heightened minority mobilization in

[2] See Rufus P. Browning, Dale R. Marshall, and David H. Tabb, eds., *Racial Politics in American Cities*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1997); James W. Button, *Blacks and Social Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, *Protest is Not Enough* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Albert K. Karnig and Susan Welch, *Black Representation and Urban Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[3] See Wilbur C. Rich, *Black Mayors and School Politics* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996).

[4] See Marion Orr, *Black Social Capital* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

[5] Kenneth J. Meier and Robert E. England, "Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?" *American Political Science Review* 78 (June 1984): 392–403.

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Chicago that led to the election of Mayor Harold Washington in 1983 and 1987. The 1988 reform, enacted by the state legislature after the sudden and untimely death of Mayor Washington in 1987, decentralized control of the school system from the school board's central office to parents and community groups. The coalition forged between Chicago's business community and the black community convinced state legislators that community control was an asset to the education of Chicago children.[6] In 1995, however, the Illinois state legislature reversed its decision and recentralized educational policy making. While the 1988 reform took power from the school board and provided greater control to the community, the 1995 legislation centralized power not in the school board, but in the hands of Mayor Richard M. Daley. Therefore, control of the nation's third largest school system was, for the first time, placed in the hands of the city's chief executive with few direct checks and balances from other governmental entities.

The approach used in this study of responsiveness to minority involvement stems from Rufus Browning, Dale Marshall, and David Tabb's notion that minority group mobilization at the local level can lead to incorporation in city governance and ultimately to governmental responsiveness to minority residents' concerns.[7] This notion of responsiveness is also influenced by Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney, and Ken Thomson's contention that revitalizing urban democracy requires citizen participation to assure governmental responsiveness to the preferences of citizens.[8] This study views involvement of the minority community in educational policy making as an important aspect of democracy in urban America. The minority community is emphasized because the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) educate a student body that is 54 percent black and 34 percent Latino.[9] Responsiveness has been operationalized in this study as the ability of the administration to meet the vocalized concerns of the community.

Chicago school politics is a well researched case study.[10] Yet, in contrast to most assessments of school reform, especially since excellence in education is most often measured through indicators like test performance, researchers have often downplayed or overlooked the significance of parental assessment of school reform. In particular, research does not focus on whether parents are cognizant of school reform or whether they were consulted in the reform pro-

[6] For discussion of the short-lived alliance between Chicago's community groups and business associations, see Dorothy Shipps, "Corporate Influence on Chicago School Reform" in Stone, ed., *Changing Urban Education*, 161–183. Minority respondents in this study who were active in the creation of the 1988 legislation emphasized the role of the black community in creating this legislation in conjunction with business groups.

[7] Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, *Protest is Not Enough*.

[8] Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney, and Ken Thomson, *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 6.

[9] Statistics from the 1998 Chicago Public Schools Race Ethnic Survey.

[10] Paul E. Peterson, *School Politics: Chicago Style* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

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cess. A unique component of this study is that interview data with parents and a number of other actors are the primary source for this research.[11] To generate my sample of respondents, I used a "snowball" technique. After identifying several school administrators and community activists involved in Chicago school politics from the 1988 reform through the present, I conducted interviews. These initial respondents were then asked to name three additional people who have been active in school policy during the period under investigation. Names that were mentioned by at least three of the initial respondents were selected for interviews. These interviews provided assessments of the 1988 and 1995 school reform acts by parents and minority community activists. Despite the limited size of the parent and community member sample, the sentiments expressed by these respondents offer important firsthand information on the impact of school reform efforts in Chicago. Although retrospective interviews may contribute to more favorable recollections of past events, they are nevertheless useful when used to compare the effects of two divergent reforms on those directly affected.

In addition to consulting parent and community members for their assessment of the responsiveness of the school system under both leadership structures, I also conducted interviews with members of the school policy elite, including top-level and middle-level school administrators, teachers and principals, state legislators, and academicians. Thus, in the tradition of Michael Parenti, I examine educational policy both from the "bottom up" by focusing on those nonelites who have a tremendous stake in the policy process despite their lack of influence, as well as from the "top down" perspective of elite policy makers.[12] This study also resembles the Chicago school reform research conducted by Michael Katz, Michelle Fine, and Elaine Simon in that the structural aspects of reform are complimented by firsthand accounts of reform to create a narrative of the multilayered reform process.[13]

Finally, in addition to the interview data in this study, several indicators are also used to evaluate administrative responsiveness to the concerns of minority residents. I considered the racial and occupational background of administrative bodies to determine whether the demographics of the community served by the schools are reflected in the administrative structure. The involvement of

[11] Forty-six interviews were conducted with the following groups: eleven parents, six community activists, four former grassroots activists, one journalist, two state legislators, six past and present school board members, six teachers, two principals, seven administrators, and one recent CPS graduate. Ten of these individuals are past or present Local School Council members. Thirty-six of the respondents were African American, five were Latino, and five were white. Some of the interviewees required confidentiality and therefore none are identified. However, the author has kept a listing of the identities that correspond to each category. Interviews were conducted between the summer of 1998 and the winter of 1999.

[12] Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View From the Bottom," *The Journal of Politics* 32 (August 1970): 501–30.

[13] Michael B. Katz, Michelle Fine, and Elaine Simon, "Poking Around: Outsiders View Chicago School Reform," *Teachers College Record* 99 (Fall 1997): 117–157.

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the minority community in educational policy making is viewed in this study as an important aspect of democracy in urban America. Because voter participation by community members may reflect a level of faith in the system, I also examine voter turnout statistics for local school council elections.

Administrative Responsiveness in the Post-1988 Period

The School Board Nominating Commission and Board of Education

Chicago's 1988 school reform legislation decentralized the administrative structure of the school system by placing an unprecedented amount of power in the hands of parent and community members. One component of the 1988 law was the creation of the School Board Nominating Commission (SBNC) and Local School Councils (LSC). LSCs are councils of elected parents and community representatives, teachers, and principals in each of Chicago's 541 public schools that were created to make financial and administrative decisions.[14] The majority of LSC members are elected parent and community representatives. Twenty-eight members served on the SBNC, twenty-three of whom were directly elected representatives from regional LSCs, and five of whom were appointed by the mayor to participate on the SBNC.

Before the 1988 reform, the individuals whom mayors invited to serve on board nominating commissions were usually members of the city's political and social elite. As a result, Chicago's minority residents were often overlooked as potential nominees. In addition, despite the fact that mayors created these commissions, they were not required to select board members from those nominated by the commission. Creation of the SBNC, which provided the mayor with the list of nominees he could choose from, signified the first time that community members were formally included in school board member selection.

In addition to being descriptively representative of their community, SBNC members were committed to increasing racial, ethnic, regional, occupational, and economic diversity on the board of education.[15] Although past school boards did reflect racial and ethnic diversity, the strategy of recruiting a racially, occupationally, and economically diverse group of members was a radical departure from previous searches. The SBNC advertised in newspapers and distributed flyers throughout the community urging interested individuals to come forward for consideration. The past chairman of the SBNC explained:

> The SBNC was unique and important for a number of reasons. First, the mayor could not get around this democratic selection process; he was required to choose one of the three people we sent for each of the fifteen board positions. Many of us were grassroots activists who had played a role in the 1988 legislation and were willing to give a great deal of our time to finding the right people for the school board. Our selection processes was very open, and because we had fifteen slots to

[14] There were 541 schools at the time that the 1988 reform legislation took effect.

[15] Former grassroots activist, interview by author, Chicago, 7 July 1998.

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TABLE 1

Racial Representation on the School Board

	1980 & 1986 Boards: 11 Members		*1989 Interim Board: 6 Members*		*1990 Board: 15 Members*		*1995–July 1999 Board of Trustees & Management Team*		*August 1999–Present Board of Trustees & Management Team*	
Race	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
White	4	36	2	33	3	20	4	40	5	42
Black	5	45.5	3	50	8	53	4	40	4	33
Latino	2	18.5	1	17	3	20	1	10	3	25
Asian	0	0	0	0	1	7	1	10	0	0
Total	11	100	6	100	15	100	10	100	12	100

Source: The racial background of school board members is provided by the Office of Communications for the Chicago Public Schools.

Note: Boards were selected to highlight the changes in racial representation after the 1988 and 1995 legislation took effect. Boards in 1980 and 1986 were selected to highlight racial representation on the board before the 1988 reform. Both boards had exactly the same racial balance. The 1989 Interim board was in place for eighteen months and was appointed by the mayor.

> fill, we could be sure that there was diversity on the board according to race, economics, location in the city, the type of school they were representing, whether they were representing parents or business, and whether they had concerns that reflected a broad interest. You must also understand the commitment that we all had. We were not paid as LSC members, as subdistrict council members or SBNC members. We had to nominate 45 people for the mayor, and we usually had over 300 applications and did approximately 230 interviews. This took a lot of time, and it was a challenge to get 28 strangers together to make some really tough choices.[16]

Table 1 illustrates the changes in the racial composition of the school board between 1986 and 1990. Not only did minority representation increase on the 1990 board by 16 percent overall, but there was an increase in economic and occupational diversity on the board as well.[17] Traditionally, board members were important business or municipal actors. Under the new system, members were middle-class parents, ministers, community activists, homemakers, and professors.

Interviews with parents and community members reveal a high level of satisfaction with school board selection under the SBNC process. The new diversity that was reflected on the school board appeared to provide people with a sense of direct representation. One SBNC member explained, "The nominating commission gave the community the chance, for the first time, to have some input into how the board was selected and, consequently, how the budget was run. This gave us the system-wide input that the LSCs provided at the individual school level."[18]

[16] Former grassroots activist, interview by author, Chicago, 24 October 1998.

[17] The 16 percent increase includes black, Latino, and Asian-American representation.

[18] Community member, interview by author, Chicago, 24 October 1998.

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When asked whether they could remember any school board members selected during the time of the SBNC, many interviewees were readily able to do so. In a few interviews, respondents recalled having personal ties to board members after the 1988 law was passed. Some respondents indicated that board members had been neighbors or had children in school with their children. The fact that respondents reflected positively on the school board selection process after the SBNC was established is critical. These respondents clearly felt that there was finally a mechanism intended to include the desires of the minority community. This was important to all parent and community respondents.

While there was a high degree of satisfaction with the SBNC because more community residents were involved in the educational policy process as a result of the new reform, criticisms still emerged. One of the main problems identified by SBNC members was that they were not given the resources, office space, or legislative guidelines under which to operate. Several other community groups claimed that their representation on the SBNC was inadequate. The SBNC chairman claimed that the dissatisfaction expressed among many groups was an indication of the democratic nature of the SBNC selection process: "The first couple of years everybody was complaining because they saw people from all over appointed to the board. For example, the reform groups were upset because there weren't enough reform people on the board. We also received complaints from the mayor [and] from the unions. Because we got complaints from everyone, but also knew that many of these same people appreciated many of our choices, we felt the process was very democratic."[19]

Despite these political problems, the interviews reveal a high level of satisfaction with the school boards that were chosen through the SBNC process. The interviews also reveal a high level of contact with school board members regarding problems or concerns with the school system. One former Chicago Public School parent and current school volunteer said, "I used to go down to the Board of Education meetings, either once or twice a month after that '88 law. I'd go and they'd have meetings, and if you had a problem with the schools you could go talk to them. You only had something like two minutes to make a case, but if enough of us got together we could usually persuade a board member to combine the time and let one person speak longer."[20]

Parents and community representatives typically said that they were aware that they could attend and have their voices heard at board meetings. However, while they believed the board listened, there was a sense that board business often took too long. For example, the same parent who claimed he routinely attended board meetings said, "they sure took their time getting around to doing things."[21] The accusation that the fifteen-member board micromanaged the schools was an issue that occasionally emerged with parent and community re-

[19] Former grassroots activist, interview by author, Chicago, 24 October 1998.
[20] Community member, interview by author, Chicago, 29 October 1998.
[21] Parent, interview by author, Chicago, 29 October 1998.

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spondents, but was voiced even more fervently by the current school administration. One current administrator and former CPS lobbyist said that with the post-1988 school board there were too many committee meetings and that board members could often be found milling around the board office.[22] This perception of inefficiency appears to be associated with the amount of time board members spent addressing community concerns, but also precisely what parent and community members seemed to value, even as they criticized the board for making slow progress.

The slow rate of response among school board members to community concerns complicates a clear measure of responsiveness. Although board members appeared more accessible and interested in the concerns of community members after the 1988 legislation was enacted, their inability to act quickly became a problem. Depending on how responsiveness is operationalized, evaluations of this variable can be analyzed differently. If responsiveness is a product of listening, holding regular public meetings, making themselves available at the Pershing Road office, and eventually enacting policies that met the needs of the community, then the 1988 school board members were very responsive to minority concerns. On the other hand, if responsiveness is the result of board members rapidly enacting policies that rectify community grievances, then responsiveness cannot so readily be argued.

Reviewing post-1988 school board minutes provides some additional insight into the complicated issue of responsiveness. The sheer number of issues that the post-1988 school boards addressed, the frequency of their meetings, and their elaborate committee system that offered access to the community through open meetings are related themes that surfaced repeatedly in the interviews. As one board employee explained, "Those boards would deal with every little problem that came their way. If one of the cafeteria workers in a particular school was causing problems, they'd deal with it. If they needed to get supplies for a different school, they'd deal with it. It was definitely micromanaging, but that was how the board was set up."[23]

The procedures followed by the Board of Education, with their elaborate committee system, reporting procedures, and openness to public input, clearly slowed progress of the system. Budget deficits were also another critical problem plaguing the CPS system. One current CPS administrator and pre-1988 school board member explained, "The school board that I was a member of, similar to the board after the 1988 legislation, had one extremely important restriction—money. We used to see huge surpluses in something like the playground fund, but we couldn't touch it because it was earmarked for the playgrounds. Never mind that the schools' roofs were caving-in and that schools were crumbling, we couldn't touch it or borrow money because of the deficit and the School Finance Authority's oversight. Those new board members lis-

[22] Administrator, interview by author, Chicago, 13 October 1998.

[23] Administrator, interview by author, Chicago, 26 June 1998.

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tened, but they got tied-up in red tape and restrictions. With that committee system, there was just no way around it."[24] The slow response time and the chronic budget crisis were related. Consequently, any request made by the community that involved funding was extremely difficult to honor.

Overall, it appears that the school board created under the 1988 legislation was responsive to minority concerns compared with the previous system, which seemed closed to minorities. This is not to say that the structure established after 1988 was flawless. However, minority city residents felt better represented in the school policy-making process as a consequence of the 1988 reform because of their perception that their input was incorporated into the system. Minorities were also descriptively better represented on the board as a consequence of the 1988 legislation, which likely enhanced their levels of political efficacy, specifically in the area of educational policy making. Thus, in principle, the SBNC reflected the pluralist ideal in which multiple groups compete on an equal footing for resources and power.

Local School Councils

In addition to the radical decentralization of administrative control that the SBNC created, the other essential part of the 1988 legislation was the move toward school site-based management. The creation of Local School Councils (LSCs) essentially opened the doors for parents and community members to make educational decisions at their local schools. This was largely possible because of the temporary alliance between the black community and the business community, which lobbied the legislature for decentralization and an organization that would allow the community to have direct involvement in their neighborhood schools. This short-lived alliance between community groups and business associations is documented by Dorothy Shipps's research and substantiated by interviews for this study.[25] Because LSCs are elected by voting-age individuals in the school's neighborhood, the creation of LSCs granted the community a great deal of influence.[26]

Beyond the organizational structure, LSCs were granted tremendous discretion in curriculum and financial decisions for their school in addition to the ability to hire and fire principals. By-passing the school board, LSCs were directly allocated state Chapter One funds based on their low-income student enrollment. LSCs were also given the right of final approval of their school's

[24] Administrator, interview by author, Chicago, 23 October 1998.

[25] See Shipps, "Corporate Influence."

[26] For more detail on the 1988 reform and the creation of LSCs, see Bryk et al., *Chartering Chicago School Reform*; Anthony Bryk, David Kerbow, and Sharon Rollow, "Chicago School Reform" in Diane Ravitch and Joseph Viteritti, eds., *New Schools for a New Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 164–200; Hess, Jr., *Restructuring Urban Schools*; Edgar G. Epps, "Radical School Reform in Chicago: How Is it Working?" in Chester E. Finn, Jr. and Herbert J. Walberg, eds., *Radical Educational Reforms* (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1994), 95–116; and Hess, Jr., *School Restructuring, Chicago Style.*

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expenditure plan. The broad and expansive power granted to LSCs made them essential parts of the school administration as they made most of the decisions for their schools. The school board retained the power to oversee the school system, but it was largely restricted by the fact that the School Finance Authority (SFA) actually managed the budget. In effect, while the school board was able to monitor the school system and mandate standards and system-wide requirements, the LSCs operating across the school district were the locus of educational policy. The balance of power between the LSC and the board favored the LSC in many respects, because the vast majority of members on the SBNC were also LSC members.[27]

Dan Lewis and Katherine Nakagawa note considerable satisfaction among Chicago's public school parents during the first phase of school reform.[28] Although these authors did not try to attribute parental satisfaction to the creation of LSCs, their findings regarding parental satisfaction during the post-1988 reform period were also evident in this study. The energy that was continuously identified by respondents regarding the first LSC elections indicate that these councils reflected the highest degree of political incorporation ever experienced at the school level.

Many individuals said that their LSC members encouraged them to volunteer, to attend LSC meetings, and to consider running for election themselves. Seeing their friends and neighbors involved, many of whom did not have prestigious occupational backgrounds or extensive educational backgrounds, brought people together based on their common interest in improving educational opportunities for children. One community representative commented,

> When a spot opened on the LSC, people knew me because I was always coming to LSC meetings and volunteering whenever they needed help. You see, my children went to this school and I know not all these children don't have a parent like the kind I am. So, they said to me, "Mrs. (name), won't you think about running?" So I did. . . . I call a lot of these parents and talk to them about activities in the school and concerns that they need to know about. I called them about the leaking sky lights and the crumbling swimming pool. I also contacted a lot of people when we heard the school was being reconstituted. They need to know what is happening in their child's school and what they can do to help.[29]

The creation of LSCs offered an easy and effective way to enter the political system for many of Chicago's minority residents. A tremendous shift in the number of minority elected officials occurred after the first LSC elections. By 1994, LSCs were composed of 1,800 black (42 percent) and 700 Latino (16 percent) members.[30] Table 2 provides voter turnout figures for the first LSC elections

[27] Community member, interview by author, Chicago, 24 October 1998.

[28] Dan A. Lewis and Katherine Nakagawa, *Race and Educational Reform in the American Metropolis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 100.

[29] Community member, interview by author, Chicago, 30 October 1998.

[30] Dorothy Shipps, Joe Kahne, and Mark Smylie, "Legitimacy and Professionalism in Chicago's Layered School Reform" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, April 1998), 18.

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TABLE 2

Local School Council Voter Turnout Figures

Year	*Total*
1989	311,946
1991	173,767
1993	135,933
1996	175,845
1998	144,632

Source: Data is provided by the Office of Schools and Community Relations.

held between 1989 and 1998. Table 3 documents the number of candidates running in these elections. Although voter turnout and the number of contenders in an election are not direct measures of responsiveness, these statistics indicate the minority community's faith in the system. Both the voter turnout figures and the numbers of candidates during the first LSC elections are high and indicate a significant level of interest in these elections compared with the decline in both areas that can be seen in subsequent elections. According to one board employee in the Office of Schools and Community Relations, voter turnout for LSC elections was near 30 percent during the first round of LSC elections.[31] Given the low level of voter turnout for elections in the United States and the estimated 10 percent turnout for elections in cities where school board elections are held, this level of participation is considerable.[32] However, the community empowerment that can be seen in the first round of LSC elections significantly declined by the next round. The 1998 LSC elections yielded the fewest number of candidates and lowest voter turnout compared with all previous LSC elections, reflecting an almost 50 percent reduction in participation from the first LSC election in 1989.

When interviewees were asked about the level of LSC responsiveness to their concerns during the 1988–1995 school reform period and whether they felt that participation as voters or candidates was important, respondents shared extremely positive evaluations. When asked whether their LSC was responsive

TABLE 3

Local School Council Candidate

Year	*Community*	*Parent*	*Teacher*	*Student*	*Total*
1989	4,818	9,329	2,429	520	17,096
1991	1,858	4,739	1,545	248	8,390
1993	1,495	4,254	1,612	178	7,539
1996	1,683	4,501	1,623	211	8,018
1998	1,504	4,074	1,480	172	7,266

Source: Data as reported by the Office of Schools and Community Relations.

[31] Administrator, interview by author, Chicago, 7 July 1998.
[32] Gittell, "School Reform in New York and Chicago," 155.

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to their concerns, the response was consistently "yes." They also indicated that they recalled the excitement surrounding the first LSC elections. Respondents believed that the LSC was able to allocate money for programs that specifically met the needs of students at their local school. One frequently mentioned attribute of the LSC was that members would ask parents what types of programs they would like to see developed for their children. Because LSC members were seen as common folk, they seemed approachable to many of the parents interviewed.[33] As one principal noted, "I really liked that each school was allocated resources to make decisions about what is needed in the school. I think this is a lot better than having someone outside decide how the pie will be divided without understanding the needs of the particular school."[34]

In probing respondents as to why they felt their LSC was responsive, many answers emerged in the following categories. Some claimed that they felt comfortable talking with their representatives, while others stated that LSCs tried to provide money for programs that parents believed in. Still others said LSC members shared the goal of improving the educational environment in the particular school, that during LSC meetings parents felt welcome, and that parents felt that their presence in the schools was valued and appreciated for the first time. These comments can be seen as strong indications of a high level of responsiveness among LSC members after the initial LSCs were created following passage of the 1988 law.

However, the decline in voter turnout and the reduction in candidates seeking LSC positions remains a concern with regard to responsiveness (see Tables 2 and 3). While it could be an indication that participation declined because LSCs were seen as inconsequential political bodies, the responses received from parents do not support such a conclusion. When parents and community members were asked directly if they continued voting for LSC elections after the initial 1989 election or considered running, some respondents said they really did not participate very often after 1989. One parent explained that she believed the LSC at her school did a good job and that she trusted that good people would continue to hold positions on the council.[35] Another parent indicated that while she consistently voted in the first three LSC elections, her defeat in 1989 destroyed her interest in running again.[36] The most common response was that the LSC did a good job and people felt that they really did not need to vote. As for running for an LSC position, individuals who had served and those who had not said that the time commitment was challenging, especially when holding a full-time job and raising a family. In analyzing the decline in participation, one activist made an analogy between serving on the LSC and being a member of a condominium board. In both cases, individuals serve because they have a stake in policies, but it is a thankless duty that takes time and

[33] Parent, interview by author, Chicago, 29 October 1998.
[34] Principal, interview by author, Chicago, 21 July 1998.
[35] Parent, interview by author, Chicago, 29 October 1998.
[36] Ibid.

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provides no compensation.[37] The fact that election to a LSC offered no compensation, in contrast to many other elected positions, may explain part of this large reduction in the number of LSC candidates over time. The dwindling number of candidates reduces competition and in turn can explain the declining rates of voter participation in LSC elections.

LSCs have had their share of critics. Many who opposed the 1988 legislation claimed that parents and the average community member were not educated enough to make important policy decisions. These were sentiments made by many current CPS administrators. A related issue was the potential for too much parental interference with classroom instruction because of increased parent and community involvement after passage of the 1988 legislation. The initial legislation did not mandate training for LSC members in budgetary or curricular policy that LSCs needed to create. One former grassroots activist and current CPS administrator commented, "Think about what happened in 1988. We (black community activists) finally had some say in the schools. But the legislation came back revenue neutral. So you had all these really interested parents who felt the energy, and they were elected to LSCs. Many of them had no experience with budgets or curriculum or hiring a principal because they'd never been invited in the past to do these things. Without the money for training and because the system was in bad shape in terms of money, it seemed as if they wanted us to fail. That way the blame could be placed on these unqualified, undereducated activists."[38]

As a result, some of the programs enacted by LSCs were scrutinized and criticized by observers. However, despite the fact that the legislation did not initially mandate training, a number of grassroots community organizations conducted training sessions for interested LSC members. Philanthropic foundations in Chicago largely financed these training programs. The foundation community's support was essential despite the fact that they were not influential in the creation of the 1988 legislation.[39] The notion of training elected officials is more complicated than it appears at first glance. Although it would be ideal for all elected officials to receive comprehensive training, elected officials in the United States do not typically receive mandated training. If legislators required parents and community members to receive mandatory training for the unpaid office to which they were elected, this could have been viewed as a statement that voters in LSC elections were unable to select qualified candidates and might have reduced the pool of potential candidates.

The high degree of satisfaction expressed by parents and community activists about LSCs contrasts with the sentiments that emerged during elite interviews. The difference between elite and nonelite evaluations of the level of responsiveness of the post-1988 administration was very striking. Many of the

[37] Community member, interview by author, Chicago, 25 June 1998.

[38] Former grassroots activist, interview by author, Chicago, 24 October 1998.

[39] William S. McKersie, "Philanthropy's Paradox: Chicago School Reform," *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 15 (Summer 1993): 110.

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current CPS administrators believed that LSC members under the 1988 legislation were unqualified and should have never been granted such vast policy discretion. This was often linked to the financial problems that lingered after the 1988 legislation and the complaint that because the board's central office was weakened there was not an accountability mechanism for the school system. Overall, the new school board and the LSCs received high praise from minority residents for being open and responsive, while central actors in the policy-making process, that is, administrators, were strikingly critical of the LSCs and especially of members whom they felt were unqualified.

Administrative Responsiveness to Minorities in the Post-1995 Period

The driving force behind the 1995 legislation was the school system's financial instability. Although the schools were able to operate under financial strain for many years, by 1993 there was a $150 billion budget deficit and teachers' strikes were consistently causing schools to close their doors at the start of each academic year. No longer able to accept the budget deficits that plagued the school system for decades, a statewide business coalition created a new school reform package aimed at solving the fiscal problems of the school system. The 1995 school reform legislation dramatically reversed the previous decentralized and community-centered reform effort by centralizing administrative power in Mayor Daley's office. In addition to granting the mayor the power to appoint a five-member Board of Trustees and a Management Team, the new legislation gave the Board an unprecedented amount of financial flexibility.

The LSC system itself was retained under the 1995 legislation, perhaps to make the reform more politically feasible. Yet the autonomy, decision-making ability, and financial assets of LSCs—the source of their radical power—were restricted. Because the Board of Trustees was established largely to create a financially stable school system, it acquired complete discretion over the finances of the school system. This reversed the financial autonomy established for LSCs under the 1988 legislation. While principal selection is still the responsibility of the LSC, the Board and the Management Team have the formal authority to replace principals whom they believed are not qualified. Additionally, if LSCs are found to operate inefficiently, they can also be removed by the Board and replaced with interim LSCs. The elimination of elected officials in a school system is viewed by some as undemocratic. LSCs at two schools have been removed due to the Board's accusation that they were administratively or financially ineffective. Essentially, while the 1988 legislation had decentralized control of the school system from the school board to the local community, the 1995 legislation bypassed the school board and centralized power in the hands of the mayor.

The 1995 legislation reverted to an earlier period when Chicago's mayors exercised autonomy in school board nominations, but this legislation granted

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Mayor Daley an added layer of authority. Throughout Chicago's history, city council confirmation of school board members was required; however, the 1995 legislation no longer required city council approval. Eliminating the SBNC and the city council from board selection was a clear reversal of the democratic aspect of the previous selection process. It eliminated an important democratic check on the power of the mayor to control the city's educational policy. Additionally, because the number of minority city council members had increased since 1988, eliminating the council's role in the selection of board members further reduced minority influence over educational policy.

Another unique part of this legislation was the elimination of the superintendent. Because the school board was historically responsible for selecting a superintendent, this was a monumental shift. The position of superintendent was replaced by a five-person Management Team, also appointed by the mayor. The Management Team's purpose is to work with the mayor and the Board to efficiently address particular needs of the CPS. Among the most striking aspects of the school system's new administrative structure are the number of business people and former employees of the mayor's office who now serve on the Board and Management Team. The composition of the administration reflects the importance of the business community in designing this legislation and the influence the mayor has over the school system. This new structure reversed the trend toward a more racially and occupationally diverse school board that emerged after 1988.

The legislative process was led by a new Republican majority in the Illinois legislature. This change in leadership largely blocked participation of those active in 1988, including Democratic legislators and minority activists. Additionally, because the 1988 activists were occupied with LSC business, it has been suggested that they were unaware of the changes underway.[40] The two entities consistently active in school reform were Chicago's business and black communities. However, whereas the 1988 legislation was created by a Chicago business and community coalition devoted to decentralization, the 1995 legislation was the product of a state-wide business coalition focused on achieving financial stability for the school system.[41]

Another important change in the 1995 reform was a deemphasis on educational expertise. None of the Board or Management Team members had a background in education. To parent and community respondents, this fact increased their concern about the direction of the new reform. One parent noted, "If they know a lot about managing money or dealing with city bureaucrats, that's all well and good if we need the budget balanced and the city to listen. But, if they need to create programs for our kids, how can they do it any better than me or you? If we aren't trained in how kids learn and thrive academically, how can we know what's best. It's the same thing for the board."[42]

[40] Policy analyst, interview by author, Chicago, 26 June 1996.

[41] See Shipps, "Corporate Influence on Chicago School Reform."

[42] Parent interview, interview by author, Chicago, 29 October 1998.

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Intuitively, it made sense to have educators on a school board. The appointment of someone with knowledge of educational tools, techniques, and pedagogy would have been reassuring to the community and teachers. The teachers interviewed in this study suggested that the exclusion of professional educators from the mayor's Board indicated the consistent disregard for educators' input in school reform.[43] In an interview, a Chicago radio talk show host shared an anecdote related to the educational expertise of board members: "I had one of the board members on my show, and I didn't want to embarrass him, but he admitted he doesn't know a thing about education. These board members just don't know anything about education. I think their orders are coming from the top and they are told, 'sign here.'"[44] One Board of Trustees member said, "My background is in finance and I do municipal finance work. This means that I help local governments and school districts raise capital. Having done some of that work for the city and knowing that there is a big need for it in the schools, I think that kind of became the reason I was interviewed to be a member of the school board. If you look at our board, it is structured like a corporate board. We have a lawyer, a bank president, myself, a physician, and a public affairs specialist, much like you might find in corporate America. So we really have some expertise in public finance issues, which is obviously important for CPS. Our job has been to let the education people do their job and for us to serve as a policy board. One thing I have learned about the education industry is that there is a certain way of looking at things. I would hesitate to have that become a dominant voice in how policy is set."[45]

Although both elite and nonelite respondents reported that the finances of the school system needed improvement and that including financial experts on the Board was understandable, there was disagreement over whether a school board dominated by business professionals and political experts could make the necessary reforms. In fact, even some middle-level CPS administrators said that when the Board of Trustees expanded to seven members in August 1999 they hoped that educational experts would be placed on the Board. However, educational experts were not appointed to the Board in the 1999 restructuring.

If descriptive representation is one indicator of minority incorporation in the policy-making process, there is no question that the 1995 legislation undermined minority incorporation at the school system's highest levels. For example, since 1981 Chicago's superintendents had traditionally been black, even if the community's first-choice candidate was not always selected. In replacing the superintendent with a Management Team, the highest ranking school administrative position was replaced with a team headed by a white CEO, Paul Vallas, who was the mayor's former city budget director. A large amount of frustration was expressed by black community activists when he was selected.

[43] Five teachers, interview by author, Chicago, 14 July 1998.

[44] Community member, interview by author, Chicago, 31 October 1998.

[45] Board member, interview by author, Chicago, 23 July 1998.

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One former grassroots activists noted, "The mayor, by hook or by crook, stumbled across this board and team that we were really concerned about. The CEO was white and the last four superintendents had been African American. The president of the Board, Gery Chico, was Latino and the last two or three were African American. Because of this, African Americans wondered, 'what are you doing?' These people had fought so hard to have resources handed out more evenly, and it was just taken away."[46]

The frustration in the black community in the wake of the 1995 legislation was evident in all community and parent interviews. With respect to descriptive representation, the new board and management team at the time this research was conducted in 1998 and 1999 had only four black members from a total of ten members (Table 1). Given that the CPS currently serve a majority minority population, the 1995 legislation significantly decreased descriptive representation among board members. As Table 1 illustrates, the decrease in overall minority representation between the 1990 board and the current board is 22 percent.[47] Although the addition of one black and one Latino board member in the 1999 board restructuring did increase minority descriptive representation, the fact remains that the minority members serving on the Board and Management Team are occupationally and economically dissimilar from the majority of families served by the school system. All board members have prestigious business backgrounds or were formerly high ranking municipal employees.

Another concern voiced during interviews was that few Board and Management Team members send their children to Chicago's public schools. Except for the Board president, who sends his children to one of the newly established charter schools, the other Board and Management Team members with school-age children send their children to private, parochial, or suburban schools.[48] One parent commented, "Having children in the school system indicates a certain faith in the system. If board members won't send their own children to the public schools, what sort of message is that to those of us who have no choice? I mean, you at least used to know that they were sending their kids to school with yours or that they were interested in the schools for this reason. If they are making decisions for children that don't go home to them, why should they care?"[49]

In addition to the changed racial and occupational demographics of the board members, the standard operating procedures of the Board also changed considerably as a result of the 1995 legislation. Under the old board, meetings were held twice a month. There was also an elaborate committee system. The new Board meets once a month, televises their meetings, and has eliminated the previous committee structure. The committees have been replaced with a management team that receives delegated responsibilities based on their area

[46] Former grassroots activist, interview by author, Chicago, 7 July 1998.

[47] The 13 percent increase includes black, Latino, and Asian-American representation.

[48] Journalist, interview by author, Chicago, 3 August 1998.

[49] Parent, interview by author, Chicago, 7 August 1998.

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of specialization. The minutes of the new Board reveal that meetings are run quite efficiently.

Community participation at board meetings continues to be encouraged under the new board structure. However, parent and community respondents indicated that there is not the same "behind the scenes" interaction with board members. Regarding the post-1988 boards, members were often in contact with community activists before meetings. After 1995, contact with community actors was characterized as being more formal and exclusive.

Clearly, the new management team is making concerted efforts to reach community members through televised meetings. While many parent and community respondents claimed they had seen televised board meetings, few had actually attended one. Of those interviewed who claimed to have interacted with post-1988 board members or spoken at a meeting, only two of those individuals claimed to have interacted with the Board of Trustees or attended a Board meeting.[50] One woman claimed, "I thought the meetings would be democratic, like they were before. I went to two meetings, and it seemed to me that people are cut off quicker than before."[51]

Televising board meetings apparently has not worked to reverse the opinions of community residents that the new board is less responsive than the one created by 1988 legislation. Parents and community respondents in this study were asked whether they were familiar with school board members after passage of the 1988 or 1995 legislation. Whereas respondents claimed to have known the names of a few school board members or to have personal contact with them after the 1988 legislation, for those respondents who identified any post-1995 board members, they were primarily familiar only with CEO Paul Vallas. The interviews, however, reveal that community reaction to Vallas is positive, even among those highly critical of the mayor and his administration. Respondents frequently stated that they believe Vallas "really cares about children." Even some of the individuals who felt the Board, mayor, and management were totally unresponsive to the minority community made this type of comment about the CEO. In addition, respondents did not have contact with Board members before their appointment as some claimed to have had with those serving on school boards after the 1988 legislative initiative.

Both community members and parents overwhelmingly indicated that they thought the new school board was unresponsive. Most respondents felt they were excluded from the educational policy process because board members are inaccessible and because LSCs have been stripped of a great deal of their powers. As one parent noted, "When my daughter was held back the LSC said they didn't have the power to help, that it was the board's decision. Then I couldn't talk to anyone at the board because they wouldn't return my calls."[52] Board

[50] Three parents, interview by author, Chicago, 29 October 1998.

[51] Parent, interview by author, Chicago, 29 October 1998.

[52] Parent, interview by author, Chicago, 9 November 1998.

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member accessibility and LSC authority under the 1988 legislation were critically important issues among respondents in their discussions of what a responsive school administration ought to resemble.

Respondents consistently complained about the new policies implemented by the Board of Trustees. Among the most serious complaints were criticisms of Board actions in the areas of reconstitution of schools, the reliance on high-stakes tests to measure achievement and to determine grade promotion, the creation of charter schools, and the elimination of LSC power. Respondents who mentioned these policies emphasized that these were not the policies they advocated. Reconstitution, one of the Board's policies created for chronically low-performing schools, also authorized the Board to strip LSCs in those schools of their governing authority. Although those LSCs are free to meet and generate support for the school, they are essentially powerless. The result of the financial and governance limits placed on LSCs has, according to many elite and nonelite respondents, made membership on the LSC an ineffectual political post. Parents and community activists claimed that while LSC members were responsive to their concerns, they now seem unable to help even if they feel committed. One CPS administrator stated, "The administration would like to eliminate LSCs. What would be ideal is to have LSCs like the reconstituted LSCs, because they have no power. They are more advisory boards. In fact, it would be ideal if LSCs became part of the PTO (parent teacher organization). It just wouldn't be politically feasible to recommend their elimination. This way parents have some organization they can claim as their own."[53] The sense of political empowerment that was once felt by LSC members and non-LSC parent and community members has diminished since the 1995 legislation.

Interviews with parents and community representatives, despite the limits imposed by the sample size of this project, show that since the restriction of LSCs under the 1995 legislation, they are no longer seen as an important place to go for assistance. Although voter turnout began to decline after the first LSC election in 1989 (see Table 2), it is not surprising that turnout and the number of candidates have continued to decline given that respondents no longer see LSCs as the influential institutions they once were. Because LSCs have been stripped of much of their power, there appear to be few compelling reasons for individuals to seek office or vote.

Educational Policy under Mayor Daley

One important goal of the 1995 school reform was to facilitate administrative accountability in the school system. In placing the city's chief executive at the center of the new reform, clearly drawing upon the attributes of representative democracy, responsiveness to community concerns was thought to follow. However, in my interviews, minority residents gave Mayor Daley low marks

[53] Administrator, interview by author, Chicago, 23 October 1998.

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for his responsiveness to community concerns. In addition, Daley's governing coalition has not included a large black component, but rather a white constituency and growing Latino presence.[54] Virtually all parent and community respondents pointed out the paucity of blacks serving in the Daley administration. Among black respondents, there was a strong sense that Mayor Daley had not made concerted efforts to help the black community. One Chicago journalist commented on the mayor's objectives: "I think he recognizes that in order to keep middle-class people he has to have a decent school system. I think he cares about kids, but I think the first priority is certainly to keep his middle-class residents happy. The mayor has created magnet schools to keep the middle-class, and it remains to be seen what the impact will be on schools with poor kids because the magnet schools tend to attract middle-class parents who know how to manipulate the system."[55]

If mayors are indeed primarily concerned with the economic growth of the city at the expense of lower-income minority residents, the prospect for responsiveness to minority concerns becomes a greater challenge.[56] Because achieving a balance between economic growth concerns and minority interests is a challenge for all big-city mayors, mayoral control over public school systems brings this challenge into a vital policy arena. One community activist expanded on this idea of mayoral responsiveness to the minority community as a secondary consideration by analyzing the improvements in school buildings after the 1995 legislation: "One of the assets of this system could be seen in the improvements in school buildings. Although wealthier areas are clearly getting faster service and more new schools, there has been an increase in fixing problems across the city. This has a lot to do with the fact that the school system is now an official part of the city. The mayor can send his sanitation people or parks people over to improve the schools. The big question we need to consider is, why didn't he do this before? There were always broken windows and playgrounds that were dangerous, why the sudden interest?"[57]

Many current school administrators emphasize the new level of accountability in the school system because of mayoral control, identifying school building improvements, the recently balanced school budget, or standardized test score increases as indications of success. However, respondents did not agree that granting mayoral control of a school system leads to educational improvement. In contrast to the generally positive evaluations of CEO Paul Vallas, a degree of skepticism about Mayor Daley's control emerged during interviews. The primary concern among teachers was that the mayor has no educational training and that selecting a board based on political factors does

[54] Dianne M. Pinderhughes, "An Examination of Chicago Politics for Evidence of Political Incorporation and Representation" in Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, eds., *Racial Politics in American Cities*, 131.

[55] Journalist, interview by author, Chicago, 3 August 1998.

[56] Paul E. Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

[57] Community member, interview by author, Chicago, 7 August 1998.

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not increase educational achievement.[58] Parents and community respondents cited their concern that the system is more political than ever before and that the mayor has continued to ignore complaints about new policies enacted by the Board. In this study, many individuals expressed frustration over an unresponsive administrative system.

That the minority community appeared to feel locked out of educational policy making in Chicago is at odds with the public praise Mayor Daley has received for improving a system that President Clinton among others had once called the "worst in the nation." Despite indications of frustration among parent and community respondents, Mayor Daley has claimed credit for improvements in the CPS since he assumed control in 1995. Winning his third full term in 1999, he has continuously referred to improvements in test scores and the fact that the school system has lost its reputation as the worst in the nation. However, media coverage does not reflect the frustration parents and teachers consistently expressed during my interviews concerning the new governing structure and policies of Chicago's public school system. One parent suggested that accountability is further impaired precisely because centralization removed the principal actors from the community and thereby insulated them from community complaints. As this parent put it, "Think about it, Chicago has long been criticized as having the worst public schools. Now, if the mayor can say that he turned this around single-handedly, without coming out with the financial flexibility he was given to do so, it makes him look really good. From the outside looking in, the statistics make the system look wonderful, and the idea of having a diploma mean something is ideal. But it's not really true. These statistics are not truthful. But, it helps him get re-elected."[59]

The 1995 reform has some virtue. To their credit, the mayor and his Board of Trustees have successfully balanced the school system's budget—a challenge others were unable to conquer and something that is absolutely vital for any efficient school system. The mayor has used reports of increased student performance to his political advantage despite continuous questions regarding the accuracy of performance statistics, and a current federal investigation as to whether high-stakes testing in Chicago is hurting minority students. In fact, in May of 2000 President Clinton expressed great concern over new data on the high rates of retention among Chicago school students.[60] The financial flexibility granted to the mayor and the new Board has freed previously earmarked resources, attracted corporate investment in the schools, and possibly slowed the middle-class exodus due to the creation of new charter schools and the building of new schools in more affluent areas.

[58] Four teachers, interview by author, Chicago, 14 July 1998.

[59] Parent, interview by author, Chicago, 30 January 1999.

[60] Dan Weissmann, "Clinton Troubled by New Data on CPS Retention, Offers Help," *Catalyst* 11 (May 2000): 23.

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Conclusion

In comparing the impact of the 1988 and 1995 school reform legislation on Chicago's minority community, the interviews in this study suggest marked dissatisfaction with the level of administrative responsiveness to community concerns. Although the school system continues to receive praise in the local and national media for improved student performance, the sentiment at the community level does not correspond with these reports, nor is there clear evidence that student performance is on the rise. The 1988 reform was intended to democratize the school policy process by increasing opportunities for community participation, but the reform was shadowed by fiscal crisis and an absence of data showing that students were benefiting from this reform. These factors, combined with the fact that community members were focused on governing their local schools rather than on the possibility of losing this control, swung the pendulum toward those in favor of centralized mayoral control of the schools.

According to community and parental evaluations, the Board of Trustees and Mayor Daley have not been responsive to their input nor have they made a case for school reform. Post-1995 school board evaluations are much lower than those for the school boards created after the 1988 legislation. Taken together, the reduction in descriptive representation on the school board, the absence of educational experts at the top of the administrative hierarchy, the inaccessibility of board members, and the creation of policies that many parents and community members believe are problematic paint a more questionable picture of the Chicago schools and the level of minority incorporation in educational policy making. These findings raise concerns for other cities looking to Chicago's most recent school reform as the solution to urban education problems. It is especially important that New York City, which adopted a mayoral control model in 2002, consider the pros and cons of Chicago's model of mayoral control.

If parents and community respondents feel that they cannot rely on the administration to respond to their concerns, the question of where they can go for assistance becomes essential. One troubling aspect of this research was the sense among respondents that while the 1988 reform act was hardly perfect, the 1995 reform virtually eliminated the voice that the minority community had worked so diligently to obtain in the 1988 reform. According to the minority empowerment literature, the 1988 reform can be considered a major accomplishment.[61] If educational policy experts are correct in asserting that parental involvement is correlated with student improvement, the current administra-

[61] See Lawrence D. Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., "Race, Sociopolitical Participation and Black Empowerment," *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990): 379–393; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, *Protest is Not Enough*; and Peter K. Eisinger, "Black Empowerment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black Political Power," *American Political Science Review* 76 (June 1982): 380–392.

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tive structure of the Chicago schools raises serious concerns regarding the future of student performance improvements.[62]

One of the most important questions raised by this research is whether the trend of mayoral control is the solution to the problems that plague urban schools. Although there is clear evidence that mayoral control has increased the CPS financial efficiency, a significant level of exclusion is apparent among minority residents served by the schools. With minority participation and confidence in the schools at such a low level, it is possible that public education reform in Chicago may progress without input from the minority community. Because new reform options are continuously being proposed, the implementation of additional changes without the inclusion of those served by the schools could have a negative effect on Chicago's public school children. This negative impact could be the result of the loss in perceived legitimacy of the public school system even as its finances have stabilized. It may be that the level of centralization achieved with the 1995 reform was too great. Some form of minority input could have been preserved if at least city council confirmation of the mayor's school board appointments had been retained. If this had occurred, minority reaction to the 1995 legislation might have been less negative.

A final point is that this research also traces a change in public discourse around school reform. The emphasis on community control and decentralization that emerged during the 1960s shifted to debates about privatization, school choice, and charter schools by the 1990s. In 1995, Chicago's business community was able to make the case that the fiscal situation was so bad that only strong and centralized management could correct the dilemma of the schools and possibly reduce further white flight from the city. What we are left to ponder is the actual cost to those being served by public schools, for researchers too have abandoned this focus on community inclusion.

[62] Kathleen V. Hoover-Dembsey and Howard M. Sandler, "Why Do Parents Become Involved in their Children's Education?" *Review of Educational Research* 67 (Spring 1997): 3–42.

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SEPTEMBER 11, TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Edited by Demetrios James Caraley

This collection of essays by a distinguished group of scholars represents the first serious attempt to explain the causes and consequences of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

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Book Reviews

The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate *by Robert A. Caro. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2002. 1,170 pp. $35.00.*

One doesn't simply read a Robert Caro book; one indulges in it. Caro has spent three decades researching the life of Lyndon Johnson, and he refines his prose with the care of an epic novelist. The result is utterly engrossing as historical literature, if not always satisfying as a judgment of Johnson's deeds.

In *Master of the Senate*, the hefty third volume of Caro's unfinished biography, one listens in on hundreds of conversations LBJ had with his aides and fellow senators about how to advance or block a specific bill and impress or bully a particular lawmaker. One also learns all the details of his daily life—his love affairs, his arguments with and reliance on his wife Lady Bird, his drinking and sleeping habits, and his daily menus. (We already knew about his fondness for holding meetings while on the toilet.) When Caro narrates a major battle over a nomination or piece of legislation, one can almost hear LBJ burning the phone wires and prowling the corridors of the Capitol to find the votes he needs. No one uses oral history to more precise or more dramatic effect.

But does Caro tell us anything of importance that we don't already know about Johnson's twelve-year-long Senate career from 1949 to 1961? Previous biographers, most notably Robert Dallek, have analyzed LBJ's swift rise to majority leader and how he used that post to steer masterfully between conflicting pressures from Dixiecrats, liberals, the Eisenhower administration, and his own ambition to become president. Moreover, the Johnson "treatment" of his fellow senators has achieved almost mythical status; all Caro adds to the legend is a plethora of additional, if juicy, quotes and anecdotes.

The most fully realized segment of the book is Caro's account of the leading role LBJ took in formulating and passing the 1957 Civil Rights Act. To have any chance of gaining the White House, Johnson had to persuade the liberal wing of his party that he had broken decisively with Jim Crow tradition and with the powerful bloc of southerners generaled by his close friend and sometime mentor, Richard Russell. In almost 200 pages of thickly plotted narrative, Caro describes how LBJ juggled his convictions, his hunger for power, and a keen sense of the historical significance of the issue. Rarely, if ever, has an historian captured so fully the minute, essential actions one man took to secure the

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passage of a major bill. LBJ was famously aware of every lawmaker's public needs and private desires, and Caro shows brilliantly how he manipulated them, with the help of certain labor unions, to bring about a result that enhanced his chances for the 1960 nomination.

Yet, characteristically, Caro is better at describing how it occurred than explaining why it mattered. He waits until the very end of his story to argue that the 1957 Act decisively advanced the cause of racial equality. His reticence is understandable: LBJ was only able to push the bill through the Senate by dropping a title on public accommodations and inserting a provision guaranteeing a local jury trial to southern election officials accused of denying black citizens the right to vote. The latter basically nullified any aid the act might have given to the disenfranchised.

Caro claims that the symbolism of putting the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction on the books overshadowed the fact that it helped hardly anyone gain their civil rights. Perhaps a shrewder analyst of public opinion and social movements could have made such an argument persuasive. Caro, however, simply states it with a romantic flourish and moves on.

No one who views American politics as a gritty saga of personalities and power-wielding can fail to appreciate this book. Academics who scoff at Caro's focus ought to reflect why no one outside a tiny circle of initiates reads their own efforts to make sense of the same and related topics. But there's no reason why a crafter of dramatic prose should omit a sound, capacious interpretation of the past. Those who are able to marry the two produce the most compelling political history of all.

MICHAEL KAZIN
Georgetown University

Citizen McCain *by Elizabeth Drew. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2002. 180 pp. $23.00.*

Elizabeth Drew is one of the most respected senior journalists in Washington. For many years, she covered Congress for *The New Yorker* and is now an occasional commentator on radio and television public affairs programs. She can usually be spotted in the press galleries of the House and Senate doing what few other congressional correspondents do—observing the action on the floor below even when there is nothing of earthshaking importance transpiring. She is serious and knowledgeable, but every so often she becomes smitten with a member of Congress, usually a senator, and writes a book about him (always him). Thirty years ago, it was Iowa Democrat John C. Culver in *Senator.* In 2002, it is Arizona Republican John C. McCain.

This is an account of a major legislative battle as seen through McCain's eyes, but the general rule that constrains the writers of biographies—that they must at least admire the biographee—imposes its iron will on her account of McCain's role in the successful struggle for campaign finance reform in 2001–2002.

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John McCain is a hard man not to admire. If he did nothing else but survive the ordeal of prolonged imprisonment and torture as a prisoner-of-war in North Vietnam his fortitude would be praiseworthy. But Drew's esteem for the Arizona senator gets very close to adoration at times. She concedes that he is occasionally cantankerous; but in her account, he comes across to the reader as a person of thorough-going integrity and one of the few people in Congress with the requisite toughness to stand up to the formidable forces arrayed in defense of soft money, that peculiar form of civic alms that enables corporations, unions, and other interest groups to pour out vast amounts of money to national and state party organizations for party-building activities. These activities, such as get-out-the-vote efforts and generic badges and lawn-signs, are not supposed to benefit directly individual candidates for federal office. But, as we know, political money is fungible and some of the most creative minds in Washington belong to those people who are hired to find ways around restrictions on contributions. The cultivation and harvesting of fig leaves to cover the nakedness of political influence is a major source of agricultural labor in the nation's capital.

Elizabeth Drew's list of good guys is topped, of course, by John McCain. Joining him in this blessed circle are Wisconsin Democrat Russ Feingold, McCain's cosponsor in the Senate; and Massachusetts Democrat Marty Meehan, and Connecticut Republican Christopher Shays, cosponsors of the House campaign finance reform act. Those she boldly opposes are Kentucky's redoubtable patron of soft money, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, and the man every reformer loves to hate, House Republican Whip Tom DeLay.

More interesting, however, are those players concealed behind the arras who dart in and out of concealment to harry the noble McCain. Despite the overwhelming support accorded to reform effort by Democratic leaders in both houses, some of the skulkers are Democrats such as Robert Torricelli of New Jersey and John Breaux of Louisiana; the former member of the pair ended up voting for the bill after having done his best to scuttle it.

Those who place undue weight on roll-call data are well-advised to read more books like Drew's to cure themselves of the illusion that final votes in Congress tell very much of the story of where a member really stands. In that sense alone, the book is worth a reader's time.

ROSS K. BAKER
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Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth *by Stephen F. Knott. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2002. 352 pp. $34.95.*

It does Stephen F. Knott's fine study of Alexander Hamilton's posthumous reputation no disservice, I think, to say that it is something of an extended footnote to Merrill D. Peterson's classic of 1960, *The Jefferson Image in the American*

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Mind. For if there is anything to be learned from Knott's book about the ways Hamilton has been treated in the almost two hundred years since his death at the hands of Aaron Burr, it is that he rarely gets discussed on his own and almost ends up being presented as a contrast to Jefferson. To simplify (but only a bit), authors who like Thomas Jefferson tend to despise Hamilton, and vice versa. To be sure, there are a few inclined to look askance at both—the fans of Burr, perhaps, or the growing body of enthusiasts for John Adams.

Knott's sympathies are clearly with Hamilton. He spends a good deal of time and effort defending his hero from the charge (repeated ad nauseam by the partisans of Jefferson) that he described the people as a "Great Beast" (pp. 73–75, 122–128, 139, 155, 173, 207, 215). One can appreciate Knott's efforts to get the story right without fully accepting the implied conclusion—that Hamilton really wasn't an elitist foe of democracy. So what if he was, the reader is tempted to mutter. Surely it shouldn't bother us today if Hamilton's opinions tended in that direction, any more than it should if George Washington's or John Adams's did, any more than it should if Jefferson's attenuated version of democracy failed to find a place for African Americans or women. Hamilton's achievements as a Founder are beyond question, in any case, and students of American history in the twenty-first century ought to be able to dispense with this all too often unfortunate and unproductive obsession with grading winners and losers, heroes and villains, according to the standards of the present day.

And yet, as Knott so convincingly reminds us, Americans have always found the game of rating Hamilton and Jefferson and the rest of the Founders particularly stimulating. It is, of course, a way of talking about themselves, with the great men of the past serving as surrogates for competing visions of what America is and ought to be. Sometimes, Knott reminds us, the results can be a bit on the bizarre side, as with the Jeffersonian self-identification of the fairly Hamiltonian New Dealers. And yet it continues—almost always with Jefferson coming out on top and Hamilton losing once again. As 2004 and the two-hundredth anniversary of the murder at Weehauken approach, we are likely to have a flurry of renewed interest in Hamilton. But if Knott's history is right, there's little reason to think that this will be any more than a blip interrupting America's on-going love affair with Thomas Jefferson.

In the meantime, *Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth* can be read with a good deal of pleasure and instruction by those who find it useful to know how historical reputations are created and perpetuated in this country. There is more than one might have imagined to learn about just who contributed to Hamilton's generally dismal twentieth-century reputation; Knott's material on the poets who savaged him in their verses is particularly amusing. I am sorry to note that Knott shows us that even scholars at one of the institutions most closely identified with him, Columbia University, often joined the anti-Hamilton chorus. In short, this is not a particularly happy story. But it's hard to see, given the direction American history has taken since 1804, how it could be otherwise.

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The Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Boundaries of Law, Politics and Religion *by Lewis V. Baldwin. South Bend, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2002. 336 pp. Cloth, $42.95; paper, $24.95.*

Against Us, But For Us: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the State *by Michael G. Long. Macon, GA, Mercer University Press, 2002. 232 pp. $35.00.*

What was Martin Luther King's approach to and relationship with the state? How did King's religious views blend with his political thoughts as he helped to lead the civil rights movement from his early experiences during the Montgomery bus boycott to his death in Memphis? Although the literature on King is extensive and his prominence has been probed and questioned seemingly ad nauseum, the two books under review indicate that there are still questions about King that scholars have yet to answer adequately, and there is still plenty of fertile research territory about the man who, for better or worse, still embodies the struggle for black equality in the minds of most Americans.

Michael G. Long's important new book represents the first full-length exploration of King's views of and relationship with the state. Very much an argument-driven monograph, Long's book has a three-part thesis that takes him several pages to outline. The first part of this thesis asserts that King took a theologically-driven dialectical attitude toward the state whereby he believed that the state could easily fall sway to sinful influences, as evidenced by the woeful racial conditions in the United States that neither local, state, nor federal governments seemed inclined to confront. At the same time, King also believed that the state had the capacity to serve as a force for good and that governments had the power and opportunity to do the good works of God. Second, Long argues that King's theological understanding of the state began when he was young and remained fairly constant over his tragically short career, though at the same time his views evolved in both substance and expression over the course of time. Finally, Long argues that King's understanding of the state had its roots in the African-American traditions that he experienced at home, in church, and as the result of his educational and professional experiences.

By and large, Long makes a compelling case, applying his thesis in supple and interesting ways while he engages in a chronological exploration of King's views of the state from his childhood to his years at the acme of the struggle against white supremacy, his opposition to the Vietnam War, and his work fighting for racial and class justice in the last years of his life. Unlike many observers, Long does not see King having taken a radical transformation at the end of his life, and instead sees him maintaining a certain level of constancy in his application of his theological views of politics and the state.

Long uses as his main sources King's own writings, both published and unpublished, and so first and foremost his is an intellectual history. Long traces King's main intellectual influences in a series of chapters that follow the various stages of King's life. According to Long, the most important intellectual influences in King's life came early on from his preacher father, Martin Luther King, Sr., Reverend A. D. Williams (King, Sr.'s father-in-law and predecessor at Ebe-

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nezer Baptist Church in Atlanta), and Reverend William Holmes Borders, another local minister who lived just a block away from the Kings. In the first fifteen years of King's life, Long argues, these three men provided a theologically-based approach to politics that would remain with King his entire life. The most problematic aspect of this argument is that A. D. Williams died when King was one year old (a fact Long readily acknowledges) and so just how direct the elder preacher's influence was on King seems up for debate. Surely Williams's influence on Daddy King was significant indirectly in King's life, but Long's assertion of the direct link between Williams and King needs more substantiation to be truly compelling.

The precocious King went on to begin his undergraduate work at Atlanta's Morehouse College when he was still fifteen years old. While at Morehouse, King encountered that school's president, Benjamin Mays, as well as a number of professors who challenged King and helped him to flesh out his views on religion and the state. King's reading of Henry David Thoreau also proved to have a remarkable influence on him. All of these sources helped him to expand and reinforce the ideas he developed in his formative years rather than cause him to doubt them. Similarly, the Christian liberals who taught King at Pennsylvania's Crozer Theological Seminary helped him begin to develop a more extensive theology of the state without fundamentally challenging the views he had begun to develop as a youngster. At Crozer, King's depth of theological thought grew tremendously, which allowed him to read more rigorously to expand his views. His readings of his old Morehouse influence, Benjamin Mays, as well as the works of George Kelsey, Samuel Williams, George Davis, and Walter Rauschenbusch, all believers in social democracy, provided him with intellectual and analytical models not previously at his disposal. At Crozer, King first engaged with Mohandas Gandhi, clearly a seminal influence on King, even if the theology student did not embrace Gandhi uncritically. Similarly, his time at Boston University's School of Theology exposed him to a number of ideas, including the theological personalism of his professors, and perhaps most importantly, the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr.

The next stage of King's life allowed him to move from theory to practice; soon after he began his pastorship at Montgomery's Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, he became an agent of history with that city's epochal bus boycott. As a consequence, his thoughts about the state became increasingly relevant and his dialectical view of the state took on its richest form. He came to see the state as more and more "evil," while at the same time he pushed for the state to live up to its democratic potential for good. Over the course of the next decade, King's relationship with the state he so hoped to be able to change grew and expanded, as did his thoughts on that relationship.

Long closes the book with a sometimes trenchant conclusion in which he summarizes and assesses King's thoughts on and relationship with the state. This essay might prove to be especially useful for graduate students and others who might try to pick up where Long's work leaves off. Because the book is so thesis driven and because he tries to trace King's intellectual development vis-

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à-vis the state throughout his life, Long leaves many questions unanswered and leaves ample room for debate. In particular, someone will need to engage far more than Long does with King's civil rights activism and how specific actions, some of which Long gives little or no attention, related to King's views about the state. Nonetheless, this is an important, readable book that will enrich our understanding of King as a political thinker.

Lewis V. Baldwin has put together a collection of essays that similarly engages with questions of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s engagement with law, politics, and religion. Although it is a collection of essays, this book is first and foremost the result of Baldwin's own work and thought on King and the intersecting themes in the subtitle. Baldwin writes the introduction and four of the book's six chapters, including "To Witness in Dixie: King, the New South, and Southern Civil Religion," "Of the Relation of the Christian to the State: The Development of a Kingian Ethic," "American Political Traditions and the Christian Faith: King's Thought and Praxis," and "Beyond National Borders: King, the United Nations, and Global Politics." Barbara Holmes and Susan Holmes Winfield contribute an essay entitled "King, the Constitution and the Courts: Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution." Rufus Burrow, Jr. contributes "Personalism, the Objective Moral Order, and Moral Law in the Work of Martin Luther King, Jr." Roger D. Hatch writes the epilogue, and Clayborne Carson, editor of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Papers at Stanford contributes an introduction.

The genesis of this collection was a study group at the 1998 meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Orlando that addressed the theme "Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Dream Thirty Years After." The papers thus cohere rather well, especially given that Baldwin so dominates the proceedings; his vision prevails. As with most collections of its kind, the pieces vary in quality and relevance, but generally speaking, each essay makes a notable contribution to the literature. Furthermore, and perhaps as important, the book serves as something of a blueprint for future research. The topical essays manage to cover a great deal of ground and add greatly to our understanding of King's views on the intertwining nature of law, politics, morality, and religion while at the same time leaving many of us with ideas and questions for further exploration. Ultimately, this should be the goal of any edited collection, especially one as ambitious as Baldwin's.

In light of the publication of Long's book, it is worth noting that in his essay "American Political Traditions and the Christian Faith," Baldwin manages to support part of Long's argument about the role of religion in King's outlook while at the same time he demurs slightly, as he asserts that King "was never completely comfortable with the idea of using religion as a basis for political decision making" (p. 126). Clearly, we are at the beginning and not the end of these debates. These two books show that it is still an exciting time to be a scholar working on Martin Luther King, Jr. and his legacy, and hopefully they mark a sign of things to come in future scholarship.

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Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000 *by Alan M. Dershowitz. New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. 275 pp. $25.00.*

The Votes that Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential Election *by Howard Gillman. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001. 301 pp. $27.50.*

Books published on *Bush v. Gore* were an early casualty of September 11. Publishers and authors who expected a public eager to read about hanging chads soon found popular taste had turned to distinctions between various Islamic sects. The law that people wanted to know about was the law of military tribunals, not the law of disputed ballots. Predictions that the events in Florida would haunt the national campaigns of 2002 and 2004 now seem far away memories.

The limited attention presently given in the popular media to *Bush v. Gore* is perhaps inevitable. The public attention span is short. People were tiring of the seemingly never-ending presidential election saga by early December 2000. Serious scholars were half-seriously suggesting the matter be resolved by coin flip. This public weariness helps explain popular support for the judicial ruling that put an end to the electoral contest. Politics had to move on. Howard Gillman properly notes that whether the Supreme Court's decision plays a role in future elections will depend more on how President George W. Bush performs in office than on how the justices performed in *Bush.*

This public forgetfulness is unfortunate. The numerous academic books and articles recently published on *Bush v. Gore* raise fundamental questions about the rule of law in times of political uncertainty. Howard Gillman and Alan Dershowitz have each written particularly distinguished volumes analyzing judicial performance during the aftermath of the 2000 national election. *The Votes that Counted* and *Supreme Injustice* explore how American constitutionalism functioned when the political stakes were raised. Whether justices in the future should be trusted to maintain constitutional norms during the war on terrorism may depend on whether they demonstrated their capacity to be guided by constitutional norms during the battle for Florida.

Gillman and Dershowitz both conclude that the conservative Republican majority "cheated" in *Bush v. Gore* (*Supreme Injustice*, p. 183). Gillman declares that the judicial decision ending the national election struggle was "an unacceptable partisan short-circuiting of a messy but established constitutional process for resolving disputes over presidential elections" (*The Votes that Counted*, p. 15). Dershowitz declares the Rehnquist Court majority "shamed themselves and the Court on which they serve, and defiled their places in history" (*Supreme Injustice*, p. 4). Neither author naively maintains that constitutional interpretation is a mechanistic process that allows no place for judicial beliefs about public policy or justice. Both acknowledge that judicial values do matter and should matter when questions of constitutional interpretation arise. What should matter, however, are judicial beliefs about what principles place

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the Constitution in its best light, not judicial beliefs about who would make the better president. *Bush v. Gore* is unique, Gillman notes, because the case is a rare example of justices being motivated by the low politics of winning elections, rather than the high politics of political principle. Dershowitz asserts that *Bush v. Gore* will go down in history as the only major judicial outrage caused by justices refusing to apply the principles that the justices had consistently applied in cases of less immediate concern to the political survival of their political sponsors.

The Votes that Counted is deservedly earning the reputation as the best work on *Bush v. Gore.* The book is a model of how a study of contemporary politics may be rapidly written, expeditiously published, scholarly, and readable. Gillman provides a detailed account of the litigation that resulted from the 2000 presidential election in clear prose that keeps the reader's attention for the full book. *The Votes that Counted* discusses all the cases generated by the election dispute, not just the case that became *Bush v. Gore.* The contents of the oral arguments and legal briefs are presented in dispassionate detail. Lawyers for both sides are allowed to present their claims in their words. Academic and scholarly commentary on those cases are reported as they appeared in the press. Rather than Monday-morning quarterbacking the courts from the perspective of three months or two years, readers are given the arguments the courts got and the evaluation of those arguments by constitutional experts when those arguments were first made. Gillman is particularly effective when he notes that Republican lawyers were initially very skeptical of the arguments that later proved central to the Rehnquist Court opinions in *Bush.* The equal protection argument at the heart of the per curiam opinion was almost abandoned by lawyers for George W. Bush who thought the claim too weak. Justice Antonin Scalia at oral argument had to repeatedly prod Theodore Olson to make the Article II argument that Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and William Rehnquist would later adopt in their separate *Bush* concurrence. Academic reviewers will no doubt have their quibbles, but this is a masterful volume.

Gillman's critique of the Rehnquist Court gains force from his meticulous comparison of the performance of that tribunal with the other benches that resolved issues spawned by the presidential contest. *The Votes that Counted* carefully documents how no other tribunal behaved in as partisan a manner as the Supreme Court of the United States. Justices identified with Democrats rejected crucial Gore requests. Lower federal courts staffed by Republican appointees thought silly several arguments made by the Bush legal team. The Supreme Court of Florida merits particular praise for maintaining constitutional principle. Legalists, Gillman cheerfully admits, may disagree with that state court's decisions on the recounts. Nevertheless, those decisions were clearly based on values the justices proved willing to apply when candidate Bush was the beneficiary. The principle "count all votes" justified the Florida decision to order the recounts and the Florida decision to include various absentee ballots that were illegally filled out by Republican party members. Had the Florida

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courts insisted that only legal ballots be counted, candidate Gore would have the presidential election. Had all Floridian votes been counted, candidate Gore might have won the presidential election. The only legal result that guaranteed a Bush victory was letting stand the Florida court rulings efforts to count all the ballots that favored candidate Bush and having the Supreme Court of the United States overturn all Florida court efforts to count all the ballots that favored candidate Gore.

Supreme Injustice is better characterized as an effective polemic than as an academic study of the Supreme Court. Dershowitz has written what might be described as a work of celebrity constitutional law, a genre in which type is bigger and the bibliography shorter than in traditional scholarly works. Whereas Gillman keeps himself hidden throughout *The Votes that Counted*, *Supreme Injustice* consistently reminds readers that the author is a distinguished professor at Harvard Law School, a prominent litigator with friends in high places, and one of the leading public intellectuals in the United States. Gillman meticulously footnotes. Dershowitz presents information given to him by unnamed reliable sources. He has been informed, readers learn, that Justice Anthony Kennedy is campaigning for the chief justiceship and may have tailored his opinion in *Bush* to advance his candidacy. Such comments are routinely removed from refereed journals, but quite commonly grace the writings of popular commentaries.

Academic snobbery aside, *Supreme Injustice* is first rate celebrity constitutional law. Dershowitz is an outstanding litigator who has the uncommon ability to present complex points in plain prose. His analysis of "legal votes" under Florida law is clear and devastating to the justices in the majority. Dershowitz is equally effective when raising questions about whether the Bush campaign had standing to bring *Bush.* George Bush had not voted in Florida, so presumably he could not claim that his vote was diluted, and candidates do not normally have standing to challenge voting practices. The occasional gossip, while out of place in certain academic formats, more often than not advances the argument without being tawdry. If Justice Kennedy was campaigning for chief justice and was making sure Bush administration officials were aware of his role in *Bush*, the matter ought to be investigated more critically should Justice Kennedy be nominated to the chief justiceship. *Supreme Injustice* slows down only when Dershowitz demonstrates at too great length that *Bush* was inconsistent with the dominant trends of Rehnquist Court jurisprudence. These points are well known among scholars, and analysis suffers from overkill.

Both books and other studies critical of *Bush* might have benefited from providing a broader context for the judicial cheating that took place. What happens in courts is structured by what happens outside of courts. Gillman notes that the conservative Republicans on the Supreme Court abused law in ways the the Democrats on the Florida Court did not. Prominent Republicans similarly instigated a riot to prevent ballots from being counted, while President Bill Clinton remained on the sidelines. Surely, a president willing to cheat could

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have done as much for candidate Gore as a court willing to cheat did for candidate Bush. The central lesson of *Bush* from this perspective is that contemporary Republicans as a whole are far more willing to do whatever is necessary to gain and maintain office than contemporary Democrats.

MARK A. GRABER
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In Defense of Public Opinion Polling *by Kenneth F. Warren. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2001. 384 pp. $26.00.*

Kenneth Warren acknowledges up front that he is a pollster and that he is out to write a book to change people's minds. His effort is commendable, but it is directed to a lay audience and falls short in a number of areas of satisfying a more sophisticated reader. In his epilogue, he describes his effort as a "sympathetic defense," as one would expect from a practicing pollster. The difficulty of such a task is highlighted in Chapter 10, which takes a look at the accuracy of preelection polls in the 2000 election. Warren's review is a more gentle review of the pollsters' performance than, for example, the critiques that appear after each election in *Public Opinion Quarterly.* While the comparison between national and state polls and those for offices other than president are laudable, the emphasis on the magnitude of errors without discussion of their direction or the use of final estimates from tracking polls that do not include the widely discussed variability in the Gallup tracking poll for CNN/*USA Today* from Labor Day to Election Day are significant omissions.

The discussion of more general issues such as the media's love/hate relationships with polls are very well done. Warren describes in detail both the individual and institutional imperatives that draw journalists to polls but that also make good reporting difficult. His experience in the business makes him a good judge of good and bad polls, and he devotes considerable attention to the discussion of good and bad practices, especially shopping mall polls, media call-in polls, biased interest group-polls, and push polling, a campaign strategy where negative persuasion phone calls are made under the guise of a poll. The conclusion that well conducted polls produce good data but poorly conducted polls do not seem self-evident, although the number and type of examples that Warren cites are very illustrative. The cartoons interspersed in the text are more of a distraction than a contribution to the story he wants to tell.

This book provides a good introduction to the contemporary debate that rages about the appropriate role of polls in a democratic society, including how they can contribute to the process of democratization in political systems undergoing change. It is best suited to a reader who has not had much previous exposure to these issues rather than to a more knowledgeable reader.

MICHAEL W. TRAUGOTT
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Voting With Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance *by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002. 300 pp. $29.95.*

Ask supporters and opponents of campaign finance reform what would be the best way to pay for elections in a democracy, and they probably would agree that small contributions from large numbers of people would be ideal. They probably would also agree that we are a long way from that ideal. Yet very few people in either group are likely to have done much serious thinking about how to get from here to there. Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres have been thinking about this matter, and their book is a welcome contribution to a debate that has grown stale.

The first part of their plan is a public financing voucher system in the form of a credit card, an idea Ackerman first proposed almost ten years ago. "Call it a Patriot card, and suppose that Congress seeded every voter's account with fifty 'patriot dollars'" (p. 4). Every registered voter would get a Patriot card, which could be used only for making contributions to candidates, parties, or other political committees.

In a change to the original version of his plan, Ackerman has dropped the prohibition against private money. This is where his coauthor comes in. Ayres's contribution is the secret donation booth. This is a policy that would allow the rich to continue contributing on the condition that the recipients of their largesse never learn who gave them the money. There would still be big money in politics, but it could no longer buy access because office holders would not know for sure whether someone who claimed to have given them a big contribution was telling the truth. This would be a radical departure from our current system of financing campaigns, and the authors believe it would revive citizen participation in electoral politics. For one thing, the authors say, the Patriot card would allow ordinary citizens to participate in the "money primary." This is where candidates scare away potential rivals by using their connections to big contributors to amass huge campaign chests. "As a series of serious candidates drop out before the first vote is cast, the message will be clear: It is the money primary, not the people's primary, that counts in American politics" (pp. 163–164).

Ackerman and Ayres ask us to perform a thought experiment on the 2000 election. "How would this horserace have been different if it had run on our newly designed track"? (p. 167). They conclude that Elizabeth Dole and John McCain would at least have been much stronger candidates in the Republican primaries and that contenders who were more dynamic than Bill Bradley might have decided to enter the Democratic races.

The authors claim their plan is far superior not only to the current system but also to traditional reform. Measures such as the McCain-Feingold bill (which had not yet passed when they finished writing this book) and the "clean money" public financing laws continue to rely on command and control solutions. One

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of the key themes of this book is the futility of reforming politics through outmoded regulatory approaches. Instead of inflexible bureaucratic regulation, the Patriot card and secret donation booth rely on market mechanisms that distribute political purchasing power broadly.

Although corporations are likely to be the big losers under this system, Ackerman and Ayres are less certain about who would be the winners in what they are certain will be the great changes ahead. "One thing is clear: The game isn't obviously biased in favor of liberals or conservatives" (p. 174).

ROBERT E. MUTCH
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Governing From Center Stage: White House Communication Strategies During the Television Age of Politics *by Lori Cox Han. Cresskill, NJ, Hampton Press, 2001. 290 pp. Paper, $26.50.*

In July 1965, President Lyndon Johnson launched a massive and far-reaching expansion of the federal government by signing Medicare into law. While similar programs had been proposed and debated for decades, fierce opposition had repeatedly blocked their passage. In a book whose subtitle identifies it as a study of strategies in the "Television Age of Politics," one might expect Han's explanation of Medicare's passage to highlight an extensive and well-developed media strategy on the part of the Johnson White House. Instead, her account surprisingly emphasizes the degree to which Johnson avoided "going public" in building support for Medicare, instead relying heavily on a behind-the-scenes bargaining strategy. In fact, in her content analysis of nine months of *New York Times* coverage of the bill prior to its passage, Han is only able to identify fourteen instances where the White House appeared to initiate stories about the bill, as opposed to over 100 initiated by Congress or interest groups.

Today the thought of such a massive and far-reaching change to government policy being pursued without some form of media campaign seems inconceivable. This contrast accentuates the strengths of Han's historical study, which endeavors to provide an overview of the political communication strategies and effects of every president from John Kennedy to Bill Clinton. For each president, Han reviews the political context and extant primary and secondary literature regarding that administration's communication strategy. She then uses the *Public Papers of the President* to examine the type and volume of issues emphasized by the president, as well as the venues in which these statements were made. Finally, she selects a first- and a second-tier policy goal for each president and then presents a case study of the administration's efforts to promote these policies. The effectiveness of these efforts are measured both by the actual policy outcomes and by the content and tone of resulting news stories and commentaries in the *New York Times.*

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Unfortunately, the choice of the *New York Times* as the primary source for news media content analysis is disconcerting in a text aimed at explaining changes in the television era of presidential politics. To her credit, Han acknowledges the "obvious limitations" of her selection of the *Times*, but defends its status within the political and journalistic communities as the nation's unofficial newspaper of record. However, even conceding this status, Han's exclusive reliance on this newspaper content analysis is perplexing given her theoretical emphasis on television and the availability of archival television videotapes, abstracts, and transcripts for most of her time period.

The use of such television sources would also help buttress her findings, which indicate a surprising absence of presidential success in shaping the news agenda compared to Congress and interest groups. The case studies presented would also benefit from greater explanation and justification of their means of selection, or perhaps more use of comparable choices by other analysts. Why, for example, is Clinton's crime bill selected as his first-tier policy instead of health care reform or welfare reform? Why is social security reform selected for Reagan instead of tax reform?

These issues aside, Han performs a valuable service by situating recent developments in presidential-press relations into a larger historical context. In particular, she provides valuable historical analogues to modern efforts to bypass the national press, ration access and familiarity to foster positive coverage, and influence the news through the use of visuals, all of which help us understand the motivations and likely effects of the more recent applications of these techniques.

TIM GROELING
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Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public *by Mel Laracey. College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 2000. 304 pp. $42.95.*

In discussions of the modern presidency, it is axiomatic that presidents must reach out to the public to be successful. Members of the media and elites typically credit President John F. Kennedy and his skillful use of television as the inauguration of presidential-public relations. Scholars note President Franklin D. Roosevelt's fireside chats and highlight Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt for their discussions with the press and the creation of the trial balloon. Bulwarking these discussions of the modern president is the certainty that presidents in the nineteenth century did not go public, for reaching out surely violated the tenets and principles of the Constitution and the Founding Fathers.

Mel Laracey's book flatly disagrees with the contention that nineteenth-century presidents did not go public. More vehemently, Laracey takes umbrage

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with the conception of a constitutional requirement for a silent president, especially on matters of policy. He argues that early presidents communicated primarily via partisan newspapers. His analysis of these suggests that nineteenth- and possibly twentieth-century presidential behavior vis-à-vis the public fits into a two dimensional typology of presidential activity. The typology contains four categories of presidential conduct: the Mobilizer who goes public; the Deliberator who works only with Congress; the Celebrator who acts as national cheerleader; and the Reserved President who remains a silent figurehead. Relying upon uneven depths of inquiry, Laracey's case studies produce an even draw with eleven presidents going public and eleven remaining silent. Laracey does not argue that this division is a dramatic rewriting of the public presidency; rather he claims it is a triumph of a school of thought, heretofore unrecognized.

Laracey's typology effectively supports his contention that "the fully developed practice today [of going public] represents a constitutionally legitimate, logical evolution of the office that has been aided by the exploration of mass communication theory and technology" (p. 147). In addition, the typology might effectively aid comparisons of modern presidents with vastly different public skill sets, for example, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

In a reinvigorated exploration of *The Federalist Papers* and other works by the Founding Fathers, Laracey contends that the notion of a silent figurehead absent from legislative discussion arose only from those who wanted a presidency reminiscent of the English king. "The story of going public is not of how one universally felt behavioral norm came to be superseded by a new norm, but rather of how only one of the two original competing constitutional conceptions of the presidency in the nineteenth century has come to dominate our current understanding and expectations of that office" (p. 156).

Reintroducing the presidential newspaper, however, serves mainly to highlight the most significant component of nineteenth-century presidential communication—partisanship. Nineteenth-century presidents used newspapers to target only partisans. Modern presidents appeal to coalitions including independents and defectors. The presidential newspaper easily became the forgotten way of going public, as the partisan president barely exists in the modern era. Compare presidents who used the partisan press (Presidents John Tyler, Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan) to those who did not (Presidents Ulysses S. Grant, Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, Grover Cleveland, and Benjamin Harrison); neither set of presidents sits atop any great leader lists. The distinguishing feature between the two groups of unheralded presidents remains, to use Stephen Skowronek's term, political time. The presidents who used the newspaper served primarily between 1829 and 1868, a period of vast tumult and partisanship. The newspaper was merely one component of party, not presidential, leadership. The partisanship of the era contributes more than the triumph of a school of thought when explaining Laracey's short-lived period of outreach via the presidential newspaper.

DIANE J. HEITH
St. John's University

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Lobbying, Pluralism, and Democracy *by Luigi Graziano. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 248 pp. $65.00.*

Luigi Graziano has written an engaging and informative, if not groundbreaking, book. *Lobbying, Pluralism, and Democracy* reads more like three books than one. Part I ("Lobbying as Political Action") is a straightforward overview of the lobbying process, which is noteworthy primarily for its case studies of higher-education interest groups. Part II ("On Liberal Democratic Pluralism: Theory and History of Political Thought") is an overview of the important and long-standing "intellectual debate surrounding pluralism" (p. 117). Graziano marches confidently and impressively through a number of important theorists including James Madison, Montesquieu, and Alexander deTocqueville whom he refers to as "the forerunners of the liberal democratic variant" of pluralism [p. 104], as well as Harold Laski, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Robert Dahl. Part II is the best part of the book. Graziano encourages us to think broadly about the concept of pluralism and urges us to look to the history of thoughts and ideas to understand modern dilemmas characterizing interest group politics. Finally, Part III ("Organized Interests and Unequal Representation") summarizes recent empirical research on interest groups in the United States. Starting with E. E. Schattschneider's ideas about unequal interest representation and "bias in the pressure system," Part III summarizes what we have learned about the makeup of the universe of organized interests. Graziano attacks the conventional wisdom that citizen group proliferation has ameliorated business dominance in American national politics. Part III also examines the work of Jack Walker and raises important questions about the true nature of citizen group representation.

This is a good book. There are three particularly good reasons to read it. First, Graziano summarizes clearly and succinctly a great deal of useful literature on lobbying. Second, Graziano concisely examines the historical roots of contemporary pluralism. By linking the work of archetypal American pluralists such as Robert Dahl and David Truman to outside observers such as deTocqueville and Montesquieu, Graziano is not simply demonstrating that there is "nothing new under the sun." He is also bringing old political theory to bear on what some lesser informed pundits and analysts see as new problems of interest group power and influence. Finally, Graziano scatters useful tidbits throughout the book. For example, his case studies of lobbying demonstrate the value of gossip to the lobbyist. He makes similarly cogent observations about the widespread use of coalitions, the exclusive nature of ostensibly open and permeable issue networks, and the contributions of the oft-cited but seldom understood pluralist progenitor Arthur Bentley.

If the book has a weakness, it is the lack of a coherent sustained argument. Perhaps something is lost in the translation, but the book is more of a collection of observations and analyses than it is a fully developed argument. While this does not detract from the usefulness of the book, it does render the book more

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of a summary of existing work than an original contribution. This said, Luigi Graziano has a number of important and worthwhile things to say about interest groups in America, and one can only hope that he follows through with his promise (found in the Conclusion) to develop further his analytical framework and to apply it more broadly to more cases and more countries.

ANTHONY J. NOWNES
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Civil Servants and Their Constitutions *by John Rohr. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2002. 222 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $16.95.*

For the past three decades, John Rohr has been our national treasure in thinking through the relationships that exist between the U.S. Constitution and the duties of public servants. His books explore the constitutional values and legal principles that should undergird public administration. In this book he turns his expertise to four countries, three of them abroad (France, the United Kingdom, and Canada) and one at home (the United States).

Although the book has a four-country breadth, it is primarily directed as "a gentle corrective to certain excesses and deficiencies in the New Public Management (NPM) movement" (p. ix). By NPM he means the principles announced in David Osborne and Ted Gaebler's *Reinventing Government*, the National Performance Review that Vice President Al Gore directed at the beginning of the Clinton administration, and the flood of literature that appeared in business and public administration journals. NPM popularized such phrases as downsizing, deregulation, decentralization, delayering, right-sizing, and reengineering. Performance was to replace red tape and bureaucracy; and a private, commercial market culture would substitute for administrative, hierarchical, and professional cultures. Rohr criticizes NPM's tendency to erase distinctions between the public and the private and ignore the U.S. Constitution. The result is to take management away from governance and give a somewhat "cavalier treatment" to the rule of law, "especially its free and easy slogans about eliminating red tape and letting managers manage" (p. xi). To Rohr, "Nothing is more fundamental to governance than a constitution" (p. xii).

Rohr traces some of these themes in constitutions abroad. Most of the book, however, concentrates on the U. S. Constitution and its separation of powers, delegation, federalism, and the rights and powers of civil servants. To study the relationship of separation of powers to administrative theory, he focuses on the Government and Performance and Results (GPRA), enacted in Clinton's first year in office. GPRA, incorporating much of the NPM movement, requires federal agencies to develop "strategic plans," "annual performance plans," and "annual performance results." Rohr expresses concern about "the cloud on the GPRA horizon," which is that the individuals most involved

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in the process "seem oblivious of the constitutional dimensions of what they are about" (p. 85). In looking through a symposium on GPRA, he finds insightful articles from experts in various federal agencies, but he never saw the word "Constitution" or the expression "separation of powers." The overriding attention is to process and results, not law.

Other groups ignored GPRA's constitutional dimension. The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) completed a comprehensive study of the statute, but only one reference was made to the Constitution in the 38-page report and 6-page executive summary. Rohr says the report would have been strengthened had it grounded its references to inspectors general and the General Accounting Office to the constitutional history of those institutions. The principle of separation of powers loomed large in each.

Rohr notes that the NAPA report warns Congress "to respect the constitutional boundaries between it and the executive agencies" (p. 85). Yet this reference to legislative micromanagement could have been presented in more evenhanded fashion had the report reminded executive officers that explicit provisions in the Constitution direct Congress to play a vigorous role in overseeing the agencies (p. 85). Federal officers can only be created by law, the Senate is involved in the appointment of executive officials, and both chambers of Congress enact the authorization and appropriation bills that create and fund agency programs. Rohr reminds us throughout his writings that what we call "good government" cannot be good unless it is grounded in law and the Constitution.

LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

Moving from the Margins: A Chicana Voice on Public Policy *by Adela de la Torre. Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 2002. 150 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

Public Hispanic intellectuals are scarce. In part, this is because, as is true of Anglos, few Latinos have the breadth and depth to play this role. Additionally, many of the issues that most interest Hispanic thinkers and on which their insights might be especially informative concern a population in which mainstream media and publishers have historically been only marginally interested. There is a need for Latino voices.

Viewed within this context, this volume is of dubious value. It consists of the author's attempt via editorials published in the *Los Angeles Times* to engage the general public on six themes—immigration; education divided into bilingual, K-12, and higher education; affirmative action; health care; welfare reform and the underclass; and contemporary politics in Los Angeles. All of these are especially relevant to Latinos, and if they contributed to the respective relevant and often heated debates when they were originally published, they would

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have constituted a significant accomplishment. Unfortunately, there is no way to evaluate the impact they had. The intellectual and policy insights they offer are not sufficient to warrant their publication as an historical document. Additionally, they reflect a parochialism that is all too common in Latino circles: the essays focus on events in one state, California. Thus, not only is the volume's title misleading, it is unclear what it has to offer Latinos elsewhere in the nation.

The value of the collection is in the author's willingness to challenge the orthodoxies of Latino cultural nationalism. These are not issues that interest the general informed public, but they are vital to the evolution of the Latino intellectual community. Although none is fully and explicitly addressed in any of the essays, by raising them, even indirectly, the author offers much to be debated. The most noteworthy themes she discusses include how she chooses to describe herself vis-à-vis American society, her views on ethnic studies departments, and her criticisms of the failure of Hispanic leadership to acknowledge the extent to which the social and political world in which Latinos live has changed.

She identifies herself as an integrationist. Gregory Rodriguez has been excoriated for making empirically-based arguments describing the rise of a Latino middle class and the increase in Hispanic political integration—that is, for documenting the extent to which Latinos are integrating into mainstream society. Few members of the Latino intelligentsia have publicly identified in this way. Given that they have long rejected this label, how would they describe their relation to mainstream society?

Despite being an integrationist, the author is strongly committed to developing university-based ethnic studies departments. She argues that ethnic programs that are governed by the dictates of departments, especially with regard to faculty recruitment and tenure, will reflect those interests and stifle the intellectual growth that ethnic studies promise. Even here, her voice rings with a candor seldom heard. She asserts that the curricula of ethnic studies programs "do not reflect the intellectual rigor of established disciplines" (p. 48) and cites the notorious example of Rodolfo Acuña's tenure battle at the University of California–Santa Barbara as evidence of the problems that interdisciplinary ethnic studies programs have as they challenge departmental fiefdoms. While she is critical of the stifling effect of established disciplines, she is at least as concerned about the politics of ethnic studies programs: "Yet if ethnic studies programs do not open their intellectual doors, the promise of intellectual equality becomes merely an illusion . . . and we will continue to tokenize our scholars" (p. 49). She is similarly critical of Latino political leaders who are unwilling to acknowledge that genuine electoral opportunities exist beyond the barrio.

Overall, those who will find this collection most useful are specialists in Latino issues. Others are unlikely to find it to be of much value.

RODOLFO DE LA GARZA
Columbia University

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The Miami Fiscal Crisis: Can a Poor City Regain Prosperity? *by Milan J. Dluhy and Howard A. Frank. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2002. 169 pp. $64.00.*

Federalism and the subordinate role of cities as legal and political institutions in the American constitutional order have made cities especially vulnerable to fiscal stress. The near financial implosion of big cities like New York City and Philadelphia, and the very real fiscal crises of a number of smaller cities like Bridgeport, Connecticut and Camden, New Jersey over the last twenty-five years initiated retrenchment policies with wide ramifications for the urban poor and urban politics. Much can be learned from fiscal crises about the institutional workings of cities and the dynamics of race, class, and ethnic conflict that have shaped American cities for most of their history. But the academic literature on this subject is constrained by the relatively small number of cases of total financial collapse. Thus, additions to the literature are welcome, especially if they take on the challenge of advancing theories of the modern urban political economy.

The Miami Fiscal Crisis: Can a Poor City Regain Prosperity? by Milan J. Dluhy and Howard A. Frank adds to the literature on fiscal crisis by tracking the recent financial problems of Miami, the nation's fourth poorest city. In 1996, a federal investigation of political corruption in South Florida inadvertently uncovered Miami's precarious financial condition. The probe led to the indictment and later conviction of Miami's city manager, Cesar Odio, for contracting misdeeds. Odio's replacement immediately revealed his discovery of a $68 million budget shortfall, 25 percent of the city's total budget. Within a month, the bond rating agencies had downgraded Miami's bonds, and then again to junk bond status two months later. As in other notable cases of urban fiscal crisis, the state intervened creating an oversight board with the power to oversee the city's finances. Four years later as the national economy boomed, the city had stashed away $43 million in reserves for fiscal year 2000, cut taxes, reduced its long-term debt by over $100 million, and saw its bonds rated on the cusp of investment grade. With its job completed, the state oversight board voted itself out of existence following the city's 2001 audit.

Dluhy and Frank's contribution is the case material they provide on Miami's brush with bankruptcy and the comparative framework they offer for theorizing contemporary urban fiscal crises. Their comparison of the Miami case to the paradigmatic New York City fiscal crisis of twenty-five years ago, and the more recent fiscal collapse of Orange County, California, a crisis of an entirely different order, is to be commended. But the theorizing stops there. Dluhy and Frank present a misguided, thin, and ultimately unconvincing analysis of the internal factors causing Miami's financial problems that rests on cultural explanations borrowed from Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson's *City Politics*, Lawrence E. Harrison's work on the traditional values of Hispanic culture (*Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Political and Economic Success*),

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and Samuel P. Huntington's (edited book) *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. Thus, Dluhy and Frank place the final blame for the city's fiscal problems on the putative "private-regarding" cultural ethos of Miami's Cuban-American immigrant community, and, borrowing from Harrison, on *soberbia*, a form of "hyper-arrogance or superindividualism . . . [that] manifests itself in a childlike egoism and self-indulgence" (p. 123). They claim that *soberbia* was the critical dominant Hispanic cultural value that guided the city's corrupt Cuban-American political leadership toward near bankruptcy.

If we have learned anything at all about urban fiscal crises, we have learned that they are first and foremost political, not bureaucratic or cultural phenomena. They are not simply the consequence of mismanagement, overspending, or revenue shortfalls; and as such, they will not be averted through technocratic reforms or the adoption of the "right" cultural values. On this score, it is interesting to point out that at the time of its crisis, Miami had a council-manager form of government; it is a "reform" city nested within a regional government. Why these "Anglo," "good government" reform structures permitted fiscal mismanagement is a fatal contradiction in the authors' argument. Miami was able to balance its annual budgets through accounting gimmickry that was widely seen as acceptable by American corporations until the recent Enron scandal exposed the risks. Whose culture is to blame?

LORRAINE C. MINNITE
Barnard College

Child Care Policy at the Crossroads: Gender and Welfare State Restructuring *edited by Sonya Michel and Rianne Mahon. New York, Routledge, 2001. 352 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

"Only with adequate child care policy in place can women truly exercise their rights both to work and to care." So ends Sonya Michel's concluding chapter of this edited volume. This well captures the feminist plea to recognize that women, as well as men, may want both family and career. Even for women whose work is not fulfilling in some deeper sense, income can purchase bargaining leverage within the family, as well as provide an exit option from an abusive relationship. But female labor participation presumes either lower fertility, or nonmaternal care of children, or some combination of both.

This book exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of edited volumes. The primary strength is that each chapter is written by a country specialist who knows more about a particular country than any single book author or pair of authors possibly could. We are given nuanced and historically detailed accounts of child care policies of Japan, Spain, Poland, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Canada, Britain, the United States, Denmark, and Sweden. Each chapter is in its own way masterful. The corresponding weakness, of course, is that each author views his or her country through a slightly

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different analytical lens, with the result that the book is not entirely comparative. The variables that are highlighted in one chapter may be absent in another. Gøsta Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states (social democratic, conservative, or liberal) seems to come as close to a unifying framework as anything else, but I don't take this typology to be causal. I would have liked to see, for example, a more consistent look at the effects of electoral rules (how is a majority coalition formed?) or partisanship (would the governing party/ies benefit electorally from more females in the work force?) on policy choices. These variables appeared only sporadically, so I find myself with some useful background knowledge but not necessarily what I need to draw my own conclusions about cause and effect.

Largely tangential to this volume is a discussion of the politics of fertility. What is the connection between female labor participation and family size? It is interesting, for example, that the United States and Sweden are among the highest fertility countries in the developed world, with high female labor participation rates, but with very different child care support systems. This underscores the different trade-offs American and Swedish voters have made with respect to women's labor participation, child care, and government expenditures. American women are more fully integrated into the economy than their Swedish counterparts, who are highly concentrated in public sector jobs. On the other hand, high fertility in the United States masks high variability, with the highest being at the lowest end of the socioeconomic ladder and the lowest being in the middle, where women can't afford not to work but for whom out-of-home child care is too expensive. In contrast to Sweden, where income policy, progressive taxes, and posttax transfers bring virtually all children out of poverty, the United States is a class-stratified society with 25 percent of its children living in poverty.

Germany, Italy, and Japan are at the bottom of the league tables in both female labor participation and fertility. One interpretation of this is that women are rejecting the societal ideal of mother at home, even in the face of inhospitable labor markets for women. Instead of giving up and staying at home, they apparently expend even more time and effort trying to make a go of a career.

I would have liked to see more discussion of the trade-offs that countries are currently making, with what consequences in comparative terms. The Swedes may have solved a Prisoner's Dilemma domestically, by socializing the costs of child care and hiring women in secure public sector jobs. But how viable is this solution in an integrating global economy if the private sector has to bear substantial costs of the less productive public sector jobs?

In conclusion, this volume does an outstanding job of laying out the contours of domestic debate over child care and of explaining their resolution in a wide range of countries. It gives us a clearer picture of the odds against which women in these countries have managed to find a place in the labor market for themselves. The differences among these countries are what I find the most fascinating, because they afford us a look at what can be done better still.

FRANCES ROSENBLUTH
Yale University

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America without the Death Penalty: States Leading the Way *by John F. Galliher, Larry W. Koch, David Patrick Keys, and Teresa J. Guess. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 2002. 280 pp. $35.00.*

This book is a case study of nine states—Michigan, Wisconsin, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, Hawaii, Alaska, Iowa, and West Virginia—that have legislatively abolished the death penalty. Three other states—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—in which the death penalty has been banned as a result of court decisions, and the District of Columbia, which has resisted repeated pressure from congressional lawmakers to reinstate the death penalty, are also briefly discussed. Each case is analyzed with reference to six guiding research questions focusing on the influence of murder rates and the history of executions, economic crises, public sentiment, population diversity, the mass media, and actions of political, social, and economic elites. The authors utilize data from newspaper articles and editorials, government documents, and personal interviews to gain insight into the processes that led to both abolition and the failure of subsequent attempts to reestablish the death penalty in each state.

In the end, they report finding little difference in the history of executions in abolitionist states and those that continue to execute. The source of this conclusion is unclear, however, inasmuch as the histories of states that continue to execute were not discussed. A comparison of both murder rates and the economic histories reveals considerable variability among abolitionist states, leading the authors to conclude that neither of these factors plays a significant role in determining the fate of death-penalty legislation. The relationship between public opinion and death-penalty abolition is especially interesting. Surveys consistently show public support of the death penalty to be as high in most abolitionist states as in states that execute. But because the death penalty is perhaps less salient, due to its absence, and support for it is probably less extreme in abolitionist states, public opinion rarely translates into substantial support for reinstatement legislation. In assessing the influence of elites, the authors find that although economic elites typically are not active participants in death-penalty debates, the influence of social, political, and religious elites are significant. Antideath-penalty political leaders tend to be well organized, unified, and decisive in their exercise of power when faced with challenges from the opposition, and religious elites are typically active in "exposing issues of racism and class bias to the general public and political elites" (p. 214). Equally important to efforts of abolitionists is the mass media. In abolitionist states, newspapers have consistently sided with antideath-penalty forces by portraying execution states and their leaders, especially those in the South, as crude, racist and generally less enlightened. Finally, the authors conclude that population diversity does seem to be associated with the death penalty inasmuch as in most abolitionist states "the urge to execute dissipated as the relative size of the minority population declined" (p. 217). The exceptions to this rule are Michigan, which has the longest history of death penalty abolition and a relatively recent influx of mi-

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norities, and Alaska and Hawaii, each of which has a large and politically powerful indigenous population.

The strength of this book is in providing a much needed history of abolition in those states that do not execute. Although the analysis and discussion of each case is organized around six research questions, without a comparative analysis of states that do execute, the data can provide only suggestive answers to those questions. Thus, the analysis would have been strengthened considerably by comparing abolition states with a relevant sample of execution states. Although, as the authors acknowledge, this represents a significant limitation, the book nevertheless provides interesting and often illuminating descriptions of the history and politics of the death penalty in states that have learned to live without it.

ROBERT L. YOUNG
University of Texas at Arlington

Superfund's Future: What Will It Cost? *by Katherine N. Probst, David M. Konisky, et al. Baltimore, RFF Press, 2001. 328 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

When the U.S. Congress enacted the FY 2000 budget, they asked Resources for the Future to undertake a study to project resource needs for the Superfund toxic waste clean-up program from 2000 to 2009. The result was a superb study of the program, its costs, and its possible future. This volume is an essential work for any serious student of environmental policy. It provides an excellent description of all key elements of the program. With clear language and a transparent and simple methodology, the study estimates the program's resource needs.

The study's Executive Summary reports the following six key conclusions: "A ramp-down of the Superfund program is not imminent . . . EPA's [Environmental Protection Agency] need for Superfund monies will not decrease" (p. xxi); "The total estimated cost to EPA of implementing the Superfund program from FY 2000 through FY 2009 ranges from $14 billion to $16.4 billion" (p. xxii); government-led long-term clean-ups paid for by the Superfund trust fund will cost over $5 billion dollars in the current decade; the number, severity, and cost of high priority toxic waste sites that we identify over the next ten years is difficult to predict, which makes it difficult to project costs; the study did not have sufficient information to determine the efficiency of the EPA organizations managing the program; EPA needs to improve its work at toxic waste sites after major clean-ups are completed, because monitoring and maintaining the clean-up site are critical functions that EPA is not yet performing adequately. The study then recommends a review of the system for prioritizing clean ups, an assessment and improvement of the program's management systems, and more attention be paid to post-clean-up operations at waste sites.

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One of the most useful parts of the study for students of environmental policy is the nearly one hundred pages of appendices that provide detail on data sources, data collection, interviews conducted, and the Superfund Future Cost Model developed by Resources for the Future for this study. One can attack the study's assumptions and methods, but it is clear that the authors were determined to make their methods accessible and they succeeded in achieving that objective.

Superfund is now over twenty years old, and this reviewer cannot claim complete objectivity about the program, having served in the original Superfund staff office in 1980, planning the headquarters organization's original design and community relations program. The apparent motivation for the study was the belief by some parties that after twenty years and billions of dollars spent, the work of toxic waste clean-up should begin to wind down. Unfortunately, as this study clearly indicates, there is much work to be done. The structure of the Superfund program has always included both government-funded and private ("responsible party") funded clean-up. Government funding included a trust fund based on a tax on oil and chemicals as well as general tax revenues. Private funding and clean up was obtained because of the program's very rigorous corporate liability rules. This balanced approach, along with a number of very aggressive state-level superfund programs, has resulted in significant progress in cleaning up this nation's toxic waste problem. When Superfund was begun in 1980, people and homes were directly in the path of harm from toxic waste. Poorly managed chemical waste threatened our water and our families. While we no longer are in harm's way, renewed neglect could easily result in renewed threat. The lesson of this superb study is that the work is not yet complete and needs to continue.

STEVEN COHEN
Columbia University

Globalization and Environmental Reform: The Ecological Modernization of the Global Economy *by Arthur P. J. Mol. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 285 pp. $35.00.*

Both scholarly and popular writing on the impact of globalization on environmental quality has been dominated by those who equate economic integration with a deterioration in environmental conditions. These writers associate globalization with economic liberalization and accordingly assume that the relaxation of controls over the flow of goods and capital among nations also produces a reduction in the regulation of business activity within countries as well. The result is a race to the bottom as countries compete with one another by lowering their environmental standards.

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Globalization and Environmental Reform advances an alternative perspective. It explores and documents the ways in which economic globalization has enhanced environmental reform and thus contributed to the ecological modernization of the global economy. Ecological modernization theory had its origins in a small group of Western European countries, most notably Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, a little more than two decades ago. Its elements have evolved since then, and there is by no means agreement as to its precise meaning among its primarily European theorists. However, in essence its adherents challenge the view that economic growth has been or need be associated with environmental deterioration.

Rather, they claim that ecological interests and ideas are in the process of restructuring the central institutions of postmodern society, most notably business and government. Thanks to the role of science and technology in both curing and preventing environmental problems, the incorporation of environmental considerations into production technologies and product design, the role of markets and business organizations in disseminating improved environmental technologies, and the growing influence of environmental movements on both public and corporate policies, we are witnessing the ecological transformation of industrial societies.

It is critical for Arthur Mol to demonstrate that this transformation is not exclusively a Western phenomenon. Rather, ecological modernization also has a global dimension. This book explores the myriad ways in which globalization has or can strengthen environmental reform. Yet it by no means presents a Pollyannaish account of this dynamic. What makes this study an important contribution is its exhaustive review of the extensive scholarly literature on both the contributions and limitations of international firms; markets; national, regional, and international political institutions; and nongovernmental organizations in promoting modes of economic growth that do not harm the environment.

Thus the author discusses the role of regional integration in fostering the harmonization and strengthening of environmental standards, comparing developments in Europe, specifically the European Union, where integration has led to environmental reform, with those in East Asia, where the relative lack of integration has prevented the development of a more uniform Asian approach to environmental improvements. He contrasts the arguments of those who regard "pollution havens" as a serious obstacle to global ecological modernization with studies that demonstrate that the movement of northern capital to the south has improved the latter's environmental performance. And he offers a useful summary of the dissemination of global environmental standards among international firms.

The most fascinating chapter of the book presents original research that contrasts the environmental impact of globalization on three southern countries—Vietnam, Kenya, and Curacao. Mol convincingly demonstrates that this impact is not uniform but varies with the capacities of local political authorities to mediate the relationship between globalization and the nation-state. Due to

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Mol's insistence on engaging the work of other scholars with respect to every issue he address, his writing style is sometimes turgid. Nonetheless he provides an excellent and balanced overview of the debates both surrounding ecological modernization theory and the impact of globalization on environmental performance.

DAVID VOGEL
University of California, Berkeley

Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations *by Alexander DeConde. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 2002. 391 pp. Paper, $22.50.*

Alexander DeConde, emeritus professor of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has written numerous studies of American foreign policy. Here he asks the most important question in American constitutional law: Why does "a democracy allow presidents to exercise this immense power in foreign relations virtually as personal prerogative"? (p. 3). Unfortunately, his question is better than his answer.

DeConde advances the thesis that presidents "have a penchant for using military force unilaterally," because they are imbued with "presidential machismo" (p. 3). He defines machismo as involving "an exaggerated masculine pride, an admiration of physical aggressiveness, and an entitlement to dominate, associated often with military violence" (p. 4). It may be the case that some presidents are macho men, but there have been so many different personalities in the Oval Office it is hard to see how machismo has afflicted all of them. DeConde simply recounts case study after case study of presidential use of force and then condemns each as an example of machismo—the classic error of arguing tautologically. If one followed a more elegant line of reasoning, seeing if presidents with macho traits pursued the use of force to a greater extent than nonmacho presidents (historical analysis) or other world leaders (comparative analysis), the results might well contradict the thesis. Or to put it more concretely: when Woodrow Wilson confronted the kaiser, or FDR confronted Adolph Hitler and Tojo and Benito Mussolini, or when Bush, Sr. confronted Saddam Hussein, or when Bill Clinton confronted Raul Cedras and Slobodan Milosevic, was it really the case that the machismo involved was on the American side?

DeConde's version of history emphasizes American aggressiveness against weaker nations. This is an interesting revision of American history. Perhaps the more interesting question to ask would be why presidents with macho initial reactions subsequently forego military solutions. One might consider John F. Kennedy's approach to the Cuban missile crisis (which involved negotiations and a deal rather than capitulation, as DeConde claims on p. 179), Gerald

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Ford's withdrawal from South Vietnam, Ronald Reagan's decision to leave Lebanon, Bush's decision to break off combat against the remnants of the Iraqi expeditionary forces in Kuwait, and Clinton's decision to withdraw from Somalia. These are hardly the responses one would expect from the Oval Office if machismo were the dominant causal factor in decision making.

DeConde has organized his book chronologically rather than thematically or theoretically. This means that he provides five pages or so to each president, which is more than enough time to mangle his case studies. He makes a hash, for example, of the discussion of congressional authorization of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 by claiming that almost all Democrats opposed it. In fact, a substantial minority of Democrats voted for a resolution introduced by Steven Solarz authorizing hostilities. De Conde's discussion of the intervention in Haiti omits evidence that might back up his argument: on the last evening of negotiations with Haiti's ruling junta, the agreement was sealed when the Haitians were informed that American troop transport planes were already in the air; once they capitulated, the planes returned to their base, and American troops returned the next morning as a peacekeeping force instead of an invasion force.

One need not be a "high flying prerogative man" (in Edward Corwin's phrase) to find problems with DeConde's argument. Those of us who have developed constitutional and small-group decision-making critiques of presidential warmaking will applaud DeConde's focus on the right questions to ask, but will also remain highly skeptical of the answers he provides.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide *by Samantha Power. New York, Perseus Publishing, 2002. 600 pp. Cloth $30.00.*

In the arena of foreign policy, morality is like the emperor's clothes: everyone pretends it is there. Despite lofty rhetoric by politicians of all colors, in the end Realpolitik overwhelmes Moralpolitik. Yet, when we come face to face with stark reality, it distresses us. When we attempt to take lessons from history to heart and exclaim "never again," we want to believe that from now on our government will heed the cries of help for the victims of genocide. When we confront the shocking history of genocide—spanning from the Armenian genocide in Turkey at the dawn of the twentieth century to the "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia—we want to believe that our revered national leaders simply did not know what was going on at the time of the atrocities. Or, if they did, did they have a clear course of action? After all, doesn't every administration claim that its foreign policy is based on a moral stance? When questioned, powerful leaders in the position of making a difference either decline any prior knowledge of geno-

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cide or justify inaction by stating that there was nothing they could have done. As if to correct the first mistake of the past, in 1992 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace* called for systematic efforts toward developing early warning systems for humanitarian catastrophes. A good deal of scholarly research and money followed his call to develop a system that would forewarn the world about an impending crisis.

Samantha Power, by skillfully narrating the horrendous stories of human cruelty and savagery from a number of genocides around the world, dispels both the arguments for inaction. As unspeakable as these crimes against humanity are, the most insidious finding of her painstaking work is that the successive United States administrations not only had full knowledge of the events as they were unfolding, but also supported the genocidal regimes (in Iraq against the Kurds, Pakistan against the Bengalis, and Indonesia against the "communist" insurgents), or had indirectly created the conditions under which genocide could take place (Cambodia, Bosnia), or made every attempt at ignoring the hellish problem as long as they possibly could (Turkey, Rwanda). No U.S. president of the twentieth century escapes blame for directly or indirectly contributing to the causes of genocide. Scorn is particularly strident for Bill Clinton for his role in allowing the Rwandan genocide to take place. Most administration insiders and other world leaders, including the heads of the United Nations, share culpability. A number of individuals, such as Raphael Lamkin, a Polish Jew and an international scholar who first coined the term "genocide," worked tirelessly to bring concerted action against mass slaughter of innocent civilians. So did Senator William Proxmire. However, their hard work and good intentions were no match for the institutional forces that prevented the United States from taking a moral position in foreign policy.

Power's passionate work is a call to arms to exhort U.S. leaders into active intervention in the world of fratricidal frenzy. The most reassuring part of this book demonstrates how little it often takes for the United States to stop mass murder by genocidal regimes. She convincingly argues that a timely intervention could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives in Rwanda.

For all their strength, Power's arguments for U.S. humanitarian intervention suffer from some crucial shortcomings. First, the term "genocide," like pornography, remains nearly impossible to define. If we strictly adhere to the key terms of the 1948 genocide convention, then does the current U.S. embargo on Iraq, which is taking its horrible toll on innocent children, not qualify as a genocidal act? Alas, such is the nature of moral ambiguity. Second, the motivations for U.S. noninterventionist policies rest on the same reason why so many worthy policies from global environmental causes fail to make headway through the labyrinth of the congressional legislative processes. The benefits are diffuse among the multitude and the costs on specific targets (the military and the politicians, if the humanitarian intervention fails, regardless of the moral imperatives), remain outside of the institutional agenda. Third, and perhaps less consequentially, Power somewhat overstates her case in the title of the book. The

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twentieth century did not invent genocide; it simply found a term for it. However, Samantha Power's book should not be judged by the pragmatic reasons why we might fail to act the next time the world faces yet another humanitarian catastrophe. Her work should be judged for what it inspires us to do, regardless of the odds.

DIPAK K. GUPTA
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Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law *by Thomas Graham, Jr. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2002. 362 pp. $35.00.*

After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1961, Thomas Graham, Jr. changed five jobs in nine years before joining the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Although he initially planned to stay for three years, he quickly developed a passion for arms control and remained at ACDA for twenty-seven years. Graham's distinguished career included a long tenure as ACDA's general counsel and a subsequent stint as President Bill Clinton's special representative for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. He had been intimately involved in all the major arms control negotiations of the era, including the two rounds of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Graham also played a significant role in the bureaucratic and congressional battles over ACDA's status that ended, much to his dismay, with the agency's elimination in 1999. In serviceable, if not always graceful, prose, the book relates the author's rich experience in the international and interagency politics of arms control.

To Graham's credit, his narrative avoids the tendency of autobiographies to dish out generous helpings of gossip and/or to glorify the author's own role in the processes he describes. He focuses on arms control policy rather than on personalities; and he writes in a way that amply conveys to the reader how deeply he cares about the subject. But the author's evident passion may also be the source of the book's weaknesses. Graham's commitment to arms control and his conviction that the United States is "the greatest nation on earth" (p. 334) are so deep that they appear to prevent him from engaging in critical reflection. Throughout the book, the terms "the United States" and "the world community" are used almost interchangeably, as if their identity is an axiom rather than a contestable claim. Although Graham occasionally questions the wisdom of specific policy decisions, he avoids grappling with the fundamental criticism of the doctrine of arms control—namely that arms control tends to succeed when it is least needed, when the great powers are on relatively good terms with each other and the likelihood of war is relatively low. Graham's pas-

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sion for his subject may also explain why the book is brimming with minutiae—for example, article-by-article dissections of treaty texts, which should have been relegated to appendices if not excised altogether. The book could have benefited from a firmer editorial hand.

Because of its excessive level of detail and sometimes dry writing style, *Disarmament Sketches* is unlikely to appeal to a general readership. Nevertheless, it is a very important historical document and will undoubtedly be consulted by historians of arms control and American foreign policy in the late twentieth century. Students of bureaucratic politics and organizational behavior will also find in this book a rich mine of case study material.

IDO OREN
University of Florida

Regions of War and Peace *by Douglas Lemke. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 246 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $23.00.*

Power transition theory, developed by A. F. K. Organski in 1958, focuses on the competition for power and the likelihood of war among the leading states in a hierarchically-ordered international system. A dominant power uses its strength to create a set of political and economic structures and norms of behavior that enhance the stability of the system while advancing its own interests. Differential rates of growth lead to the rise and fall of states, and the likelihood of a major war is highest when a rising but dissatisfied state, which hopes to establish a new international order with benefits commensurate with its own growing strength, reaches parity with the dominant power.

While power transition theory has developed into an influential research program, the limitation of its scope to great power behavior leaves it unable to explain the vast majority of wars that have occurred in the last half-century. Lemke aims to correct this deficiency by extending power-transition logic to a number of regional or local subsystems that are nested within the overarching international order. Each local system includes a dominant regional power, a regional status quo, satisfied and dissatisfied states, and a competition among regional actors for the "privilege to write the rules" that govern their mutual relations (p. 68). While external great powers occasionally interfere in regional systems, in the absence of such interference the dynamics of behavior within local hierarchies parallels great power behavior within the overall international power hierarchy. Wars are most frequent when power parity coincides with dissatisfaction with the status quo. This is the book's basic hypothesis, and Lemke devotes much of his time to testing this hypothesis empirically. This is an enormously demanding task, given difficult problems of operation and measurement of key theoretical concepts, but the way Lemke deals with these problems is a real strength of the book.

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The empirical evidence provides considerable support for Lemke's multiple hierarchy model. The joint presence of power parity and dissatisfaction significantly increases the probability of war in local hierarchies, especially in the Middle East and the Far East but also in South America and Africa, though these patterns are not quite as strong as they are among the great powers in the larger international system. These effects persist when Lemke controls for other possible factors leading to war or incorporates a measure of outside great-power interference. One puzzle that does emerge from this study is the presence of substantial cross-regional variation, not predicted by the multiple hierarchy model, such as surprisingly low levels of interstate warfare in Africa and South America. Lemke demonstrates that these anomalies do not disappear, at least within local hierarchies in Africa, when other possible variables (including political instability and underdevelopment) are considered. This leaves an important puzzle for further research.

One critical region that Lemke does not address is Europe, which is included only as part of the system-wide hierarchy dominated by global powers. This precludes a meaningful test of power transition theory against the balance of power hypothesis, developed with the European but not the global system in mind. Extreme concentrations of power do not lead to stability and peace under a dominant power; instead they lead to the formation of balancing coalitions and an increased probability of major war.

For the great power system as a whole, however, and for local systems in four important regions, Lemke has demonstrated substantial empirical support for his important theoretical extension of power transition theory. In doing so, he provides a superb model for rigorous and systematic quantitative empirical research in the face of some very difficult methodological problems.

JACK S. LEVY
Rutgers University

The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes *by John Darby. Washington, DC, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 163 pp. Paper, $14.95.*

As the study of conflict management advances, we develop a more complex understanding of the processes of peace and conflict, rather than seeing two straight tracks at the fork in the road: make war, make peace. We learn that the war track often paces the peace track until the very end as a policy option, and we learn that parties often hop back and forth from one to the other.

Darby, founder of INCOME at the University of Ulster and now at the Kroc Institute at Notre Dame, has done much work on this question, first in a larger work, *The Management of Peace Processes* (coedited with Roger MacGinty in 2000) and now with this smaller work focusing specifically on the relation of violence to peace processes. The book is a composite work, half of which is Darby's reasoning on the question; the other half is comprised of five fine

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case vignettes—Sri Lanka (K. M. deSilva), Euskadi (Cynthia Irvin and James Rae), Palestine (John Wallach), South Africa (Timothy Sisk), and Ulster (Darby himself). The cases are well encapsulated by people who know their subject well and provide a setting for the analysis, although they do not address the analytical question themselves.

The analysis begins with a breakdown of the topic into agents of violence—the state, militants (rebels or militia), and the community, and secondary issues of violence—prisoners, disarmament, security forces. The policy implications, from the point of view of maintaining the momentum of the peace process, point to a strategy of reciprocal changes, a sort of ratcheting process of confidence-building measures, mutual disarmament, restored security and legality, and cooperative anticipation and monitoring. In the end, violence can be a catalyst for peace, both in producing a stalemate in the beginning of the process and in providing the demand for mechanisms to prevent future violence. The analysis concludes with five propositions: ceasefires that last past the first few months are likely to hold; peace agreements must include everyone who could destroy the agreement; zealots can be neutralized only by former militants; leaders in a peace process need to deliver their own people and only secondarily assist their opponents; and militants need to be reintegrated into normal society, but they also need to be held accountable for the effects of violence during the conflict.

There is wisdom in these conclusions, but they do not end the debate, as Darby would doubtless agree. We understand the effects of social processes when they happen, but we do not yet know the cause. Should peace agreements involve everyone who can destroy the agreement or everyone who can produce/enforce/deliver an agreement, which is a very different matter? Should leaders in a peace process build solidarity on their side for an agreement or build bridges to the other side above all? How can the goals of integration and accountability themselves be reconciled? This book leads us to think seriously about these dilemmas of peacemaking.

I. William Zartman
The Johns Hopkins University

The Diplomacy of Hope: The United Nations since the Cold War *by Newton R. Bowles. Ottawa, The United Nations Association of Canada, 2001. 216 pp. $18.95.*

The Diplomacy of Hope is an aptly named volume covering the range of United Nations activities between the end of the cold war and the beginning of the new millennium. Newton R. Bowles has been closely associated with the United Nations in one way or another for many years. He knows the organization well and is not unaware that in many respects it has not lived up to expectations. Yet, he is never without admiration for what has been accomplished or without

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hope for the UN's future. This is a book that refreshingly emphasizes the positive as it assesses the United Nations in the perspective of the Millennium Summit Meeting of the General Assembly and the many initiatives undertaken by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to prepare the organization for a new era.

The book is not a scholarly work. There are no footnotes and no bibliography. This makes for an easily digestible and felicitous read. Still, since the sources of much of the information provided are unidentified, the uninitiated reader may be left to wonder as to how seriously it should be taken. This is a shame, since from my own sources I can testify that most of what Bowles reports is on the mark, albeit a mark seen through a rose-colored prism.

The Diplomacy of Hope was written before the terrorist attackes of September 11, 2001, the renewed outbreak of hostility between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the devastating violence in the Middle East, and the negative positions taken by the new Bush administration in Washington on UN-related initiatives that came afterward. Some of the optimistic assumptions about the prospects for global security (under the aegis of the UN) seem naïve in the light of these developments. Moreover, as in any book that covers such a broad sweep of UN activities in a sparse 178 pages, a number a factual errors have crept in. While authorship of the preamble of the United Nations Charter is claimed by several people, Archibald MacLeish is not one of them. He helped draft the UNESCO Charter not, as Bowles states, the UN Charter. The account of the disastrous UN experience in Somalia is so summary as to be misleading, and the statement that the United States unilaterally declared General Mohamed Farah Aideed an enemy is inaccurate. For better or worse, this was a Security Council decision, no doubt prompted by the United States. The Department of Disarmament Affairs was created long before Kofi Annan became secretary general. Annan only restored its status after Boutros Boutros-Ghali had downgraded it. There are other such minor errors of fact, but they are not sufficient to impair the worth of this book.

The extensive quotations that Bowles has culled from the records of the General Assembly and other UN bodies are of special value in conveying a sense of prevailing attitudes among member states. Speeches given in the UN forum by national representatives seldom receive media coverage and are hardly recalled outside the limited audience of other national permanent missions to the UN. Bowles has taken the time and patience to find especially revealing excerpts that most readers would otherwise be unaware of. He has done the same in the case of speeches and reports of Kofi Annan, for whom he has unstinting admiration. He is discriminating but fair-minded in giving us quotations from all sides, some of which provide a useful counterweight to the generally optimistic disposition of the author.

In brief, *The Diplomacy of Hope* is an informative book written from the perspective of a man who has an insider's knowledge of how the UN works and a largely uncritical faith in the good works and hopeful prospects of the world organization.

JAMES S. SUTTERLIN
Yale University

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National Purpose in the World Economy: Post-Soviet States in Comparative Perspective *by Rawi Abdelal. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2001. 240 pp. $39.95.*

The rather nondescript title of this book does not hint at the remarkable scholarly contributions that saturate its pages. In addition to producing the most compelling available account of the origins of the post-Soviet states' foreign economic policies, Abdelal rescues the study of national identity from realism, develops a coherent and falsifiable constructivist theory of international political economy, and advances our understanding of the dynamics of postimperial spaces.

Of primary importance is how Abdelal distinguishes his theory of the influence of nationalism on the international economy from "economic nationalism" as traditionally understood. Compellingly, he argues that nationalism has been conflated with mercantilist or statist economic theories, usually associated with the realist tradition. In response, the author disengages from both realism and prevailing constructivist approaches that emphasize international society or state identities to argue that national identities infuse state economic policy with a fundamental social purpose.

Empirically, Abdelal uses his theoretical framework to explain variations in the foreign economic policies of the different post-Soviet states. In particular, he is interested in resolving the puzzle of why certain former republics continue to favor the maintenance of strong monetary and trade ties with Russia, while others favor rapid disengagement from the former imperial center and a more pro-Western orientation. The answer for Abdelal lies in the varying nationalist identities that characterize the societies of the post-Soviet states. Those countries endowed with historically strong and coherent national identities were more willing to jettison their Soviet-era links, despite the considerable economic costs of doing so. Well-crafted case studies of Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine demonstrate how varying national identities produce contrasting foreign economic policy orientations.

In addition to his novel theoretical framework, Abdelal advances the comparative study of postimperialism in an excellent concluding chapter entitled "Political Economy After Empire." Here, he applies his theory to other historical instances of postimperialist economic governance—the Hapsburg empire, Indonesia's disengagement from the Dutch empire, and West Africa's independence from France. In doing so, he systematically demonstrates how, in these times of systemic change, national identities dictated whether the newly independent states disengaged from or reunited with the former imperial core. While many post-Soviet scholars may flinch at this set of "comparable cases," Abdelal's rich insights suggest that we have much to learn from comparing developments in the former Soviet Union with other post-imperial spaces.

By covering this extensive ground, Abdelal raises several key questions and debatable points. Rational choice theorists will insist that the issue of identity and its content is of secondary importance to the domestic institutions, coali-

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tional politics, and bargaining dynamics that allow certain legislative agendas to triumph over others. Empirically, others might challenge the notion that national identity is a causally important force in the Central Asian states, especially as they lack the nationalist histories of their counterparts in the Baltic region or the Caucasus. Finally, realists and institutionalists might argue that more attention should be paid to the power, preferences, and causal roles played by either regionally influential states (Russia, United States, China) or international organizations (International Monetary Fund, European Union, World Trade Organization) active in various parts of the post-Soviet space.

But such criticisms are only possible because Abdelal's theoretical insights are powerful and provocative; they open multiple future research agendas. *National Purpose in the World Economy* is one of the most original and important contributions to the study of international political economy in the last decade. It is theoretically compelling, conceptually elegant, and empirically sound. It should be widely read and debated by anyone interested in international political economy, post-Soviet political economy, imperial governance and dissolution, as well as international relations theory.

ALEXANDER COOLEY
Barnard College

After the Breakup of a Multi-Ethnic Empire: Russia, Successor States, and Eurasian Security *by Suzanne Michele Birgerson. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2002. 224 pp. Cloth, $64.95; paper, $22.50.*

It is difficult to make out exactly what is original about this book and what purpose it serves. Ostensibly it represents an attempt to trace the effects of the Soviet political structure on the post-Soviet states that emerged out of the USSR and on regional security in Eurasia. Yet the book has nothing to say at all about the Transcaucasus, the most conflict-ridden and perhaps analytically provocative area of the former USSR. That is insupportable as one can hardly address these issues and wholly omit mention of two wars in Chechnya or the ethnic wars in the Transcaucasus and elsewhere. Neither are the conclusions of the book original or supportable. It is hardly news that Russia remains the strongest power of Eurasia and that it has consistently sought to intervene or interfere in the affairs of its former fellow republics. Nor does Birgerson have much to say about the republics that she covers that has not been done elsewhere and better by others.

Furthermore, it is wholly unjustified to state, as Birgerson does repeatedly, that despite the dissolution of the Soviet empire the balance of power between center and periphery has not changed. Even before September 11, 2001 that was not true. Russia, in many cases, has not been able to intervene successfully in the affairs of Central Asia, Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus despite repeated

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efforts to do so. And certainly, as the author recognizes, this has been the case too in the Baltic. That these republics are now formally sovereign states and Russia is dramatically enfeebled are major factors in the analysis of regional security in Eurasia and bely the assumption that the balance of power within the former USSR remains essentially unchanged.

The date of the publication of the book is 2002, yet the analysis essentially stops in 1998–1999. Even if events after September 11 could not have been included in this book, a lot of water flowed under the Eurasian bridge from 1998 to 2001 and should have been included in order to test the propositions and analysis laid out here. It is difficult, given these flaws, to determine what original and useful conclusions about Eurasian security are to be found here.

I also take issue with the author's effort to discuss the nature of the Soviet empire in theoretical terms. She apparently feels that empires are a unit of analysis that are different from states and that states, unlike empires, have centers or peripheries. While empires are certainly unique states, they still are states and to say that states do not have peripheries and centers flies in the face of most historical experience that this reviewer is aware of. One need only consider the American South and West in this respect, if not the Celtic fringe in England. Whatever insights the author brings to the discussion are unfortunately flawed by these puzzling interpretations of empires.

We can certainly benefit from solid analyses of the relationship of the new states' former membership in the Soviet empire to their domestic politics, economics, and security relations; but this is not the book we have been waiting for.

STEPHEN BLANK
U.S. Army War College

Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943–1991 *by Stephen Gundle. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2001. 269 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $18.95.*

This is an interesting and extensively researched book—one in which the postwar history of the Italian Communist party (PCI), as well as much of Italian history, is examined from the particular perspective of cultural policy. The book centers on a paradox. Cultural strategies played a key role for the PCI, much more than for other communist parties in Europe. As argued by Antonio Gramsci, one of the party's founders, the seizure of power needed to be premised on a battle for hegemony aimed at gaining broad acceptance in society by shaping people's world views. The irony is that while they were devising strategies to impose their values and ideas in the nation, the Italian communists did not realize that their own social referents, the popular masses, were themselves being colonized by life styles and models that were fundamentally extraneous to the party tradition. By the 1970s, at the peak of the PCI's electoral success, the battle for hegemony was for all purposes lost. Italian society was as consum-

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eristic as any other advanced society. In the 1980s, the party began its inexorable political decline.

Palmiro Togliatti, secretary of the PCI in the early postwar years, shaped the cultural strategy of the party by devoting almost exclusive attention to isolated intellectuals. Influenced by Gramsci, he believed these to be the central agents in the production of consensus. Yet the world was fundamentally changing. The role and prestige of the nineteenth-century man of letters were rapidly declining. Other forms of knowledge—technical, scientific, and economic—were ascendant. Perhaps more importantly, Italian popular culture was being shaped by Hollywood movies and gossip magazines. These propagated a vision of society and, indirectly, of politics based on individual self-realization and immediate (as opposed to delayed) gratification through consumption—a vision that had very little to do with the communist values of austerity, solidarity, and collective action.

In the end, the Italian communists were quite successful at accomplishing their intended tasks. By the 1970s, a considerable proportion of intellectuals, particularly in the literary, philosophical, and artistic fields, had joined the cause. Yet, the war was lost. The center of popular culture had inexorably shifted toward the mass media, particularly television. The colonization of intellectuals could not avoid the decline of the communist subculture, crowded out by soap operas.

Could it have gone differently? Providing counter-factuals is not the business of the historian, who is solely concerned with the careful reconstruction of events; but it is important for the social scientist, who looks at causal patterns. Gundle suggests that had the Italian communists been able to revise their cultural strategies, they might have staved off decline. Yet the book provides scant evidence of suppressed historical alternatives. The communists did not immediately understand the importance of television, but they became quite good at using it. One cannot avoid thinking that the "Americanization" of values and world views goes well beyond Italy and would be very difficult to contrast through cultural policy, even for a well-organized political force as the PCI once was.

LUCIO BACCARO
International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva

Welfare and Employment in a United Europe *edited by Giuseppe Bertola, Tito Boeri, and Guiseppe Nicoletti. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001. 291 pp. $32.95.*

The impact of European economic and monetary integration on national welfare states and labor markets is currently a major topic in academic and policy debates. This book contributes to a better understanding of that impact and to the discussion of its future course. Based on two reports by economists for the

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Italian Foundation, *Rodolfo Debenedetti*, the volume combines rich comparative analysis and refreshingly nonideological reasoning on the European Union's (EU) future.

The first report focuses on welfare systems and labor markets, given intensified economic integration and limited EU social policy. Giuseppe Bertola, Juan Franscisco Jimeno, Ramon Marimon, and Christopher Pissarides use descriptive comparative analysis to explore whether welfare states converge. The results may not be very surprising to political scientists but are less often acknowledged by economists. Considerable variety of welfare regimes exists across Europe, and there is no overall trend toward welfare retrenchment. Based on the chronology of reforms (1986–1997) in the fifteen EU countries (listed in the Appendix), Tito Boeri argues in the introduction that neither did welfare reforms lead to a "race to the bottom," nor did the "status quo" prevail.

Nevertheless, the first report acknowledges the potential downward pressure and sustainability problems of welfare states, seeking to "identify a configuration of decision processes that may lead to coherent assignment of policy choices among the EU institutions" (p. 104). The authors locate three different arenas for action: minimum social transfers should be guaranteed at EU level; contributory insurance should remain national but made more actuarially fair; and public services and labor market policies should be decided at local levels with monitoring by EU institutions.

Two commentators caution us not to expect too much from an EU basic safety net. Charles Bean warns quite frankly: "So long as urban consumers in Berlin or Copenhagen feel little in common with rural unemployed of the Italian mezzogiorno, I find it difficult to believe that such interregional fiscal flows will ever be allowed to amount to much" (p. 126). Instead, Gøsta Esping-Andersen urges the redirection of resources to "where the real dilemmas are, namely from the aged to the young, from passive transfers to 'enabling' resources like day care, aged care, skill formation, and education" (p. 140).

The interaction of product market liberalization and labor market flexibility is the topic of the second report, written by Giuseppe Nicoletti, Robert Haffner, Stephen Nickell, Stefano Scarpetta, and Gylfi Zoega. They find a high correlation of their indicator of product market regulation and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development employment protection index, expecting that continued EU liberalization would exert further pressure to flexibilize national labor markets.

In his commentary, Oliver Blanchard argues that increased competition may lead to labor hoarding and thus increase unemployment. André Sapir adds that "in theory EMU [European Monetary Union] could either increase or decrease labor-market regulation, hence the question is essentially an empirical one" (p. 247). Drawing lessons for EMU from its predecessor is difficult, as much will depend on the future response of governments, employers, and unions at European and national levels. Regrettably, the study provides no map of the future challenges to European welfare states, nor does it reflect on the

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admission of Central and Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, the book provides a concise digest of the complexity and heterogeneity of EU welfare capitalisms. By doing so, it is able to shift the debate onto more informed footing, though it takes only a tentative step in charting the EU's future path.

BERNHARD EBBINGHAUS
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne

Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia *by Philip Eldridge. New York, Routledge, 2002. 240 pp. $90.00.*

This book sums up the results of detailed research on and in countries of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asia Nations) by an honorary research associate at the School of Government, University of Tasmania. Philip Eldridge takes his survey of human rights and their politics in Southeast Asia up to May 1991. The escalation of terrorist activity and interethnic conflict in the region and elsewhere since then should not sidetrack for any of us the basic question tackled here: what does the fate of international human rights norms in the area tell us about the viability and the universal validity of international human rights norms of law as spelled out in treaties stemming from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

Eldridge takes up two basic challenges to the universality of human rights. One is the culturally based relativist doctrines such as the assertion of "Asian values" in defense of curtailing civil and political rights. The other challenge is the widespread claim of state sovereignty as a shield against outside interference. When the ASEAN countries assert their sovereignty, they follow governments in many parts of the world, the United States not excepted, in denying full or partial sway to the revolutionary principle underlying the UN and European human rights regimes—namely, the states are internationally accountable for how they protect or fail to protect the human rights of their subjects.

The new consensus across the former ideological divides of the cold war has left the world somewhat more free in the statistics of democratization. By the criteria of Freedom House and its date for 2000–2001, Asia has shared in the upsurge in the number of free, democratic countries since 1980. Southeast Asia, however, also shares a preponderance of populations living under various degrees of authoritarian rule. Eldridge pays particular attention to Mayalsia, Indonesia, and Cambodia, along with the most democratic of the ASEAN countries, Philippines and Thailand, with passing mention to unfree Brunei, Laos, and Vietnam.

This book was written before September 11, 2001 and the burgeoning hunt for sources of terrorism in discontent and Islamic radicalism. But it pays attention to causes of instability and to variations and influences of political Islam and a painstaking study of politics, nongovernmental and quasi-governmental

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organizations, some aspects of women's rights and advocacy, and ties with the international human rights system. Rising interethnic tensions and separatism in Indonesia and the undertones of violence are anticipated in this narrative. Joseph Estrada is out since early 2002 as president of the Philippines. But the transition under former Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyos carries over both sides of Eldridge's picture: a democracy with a troubled transition and local rebellion, but a democracy nonetheless.

Eldridge concludes that "Asian values" claims rest partly on a misperception of Western values as a rejection of the communalism implied in upholding economic and social rights. Given the corruption and brutality of most ASEAN governments, one is inclined to accept Eldridge's basic point, not unknown in the literature on human rights: "Asian values" and at least some aspects of sovereignty arguments are cover ups for special political interests of the local rulers.

That said, Eldridge presents considerable evidence in support of his point that the argument against taking "Asian values" literally does not preclude a basic need to temper universalism with the recognition of each country's context and its cultural and developmental complexities. Missing in this survey is more discussion of the human rights and political impact of globalization as part of the context. And that became an issue long before September 11.

PETER JUVILER
Barnard College

Korea in the Cross Currents: A Century of Struggle and the Crisis of Reunification *by Robert J. Myers. New York, Palgrave, 2001. 200 pp. $49.95.*

In several respects, Robert Myers has written a book that is in search of a readership. It is not a specialized scholarly monograph in the sense of presenting the results of recent archival research tapping little known or newly released primary source materials. It makes no use of Korean-language primary and secondary sources, relying exclusively on non-Korean secondary sources. The book does not claim to make a theoretical contribution to Korean studies by testing and affirming or rejecting any international relations theory sufficiently that specialists in the field would welcome its publication as enhancing their understanding of the subject matter and as advancing the state of the field. Nor can this work be classified as a participant memoir in the spirit of Dean Acheson's *Present at the Creation* (1969). Further, Myers's volume does not fit into the genre of standard public policy analysis of the sort produced by policy think tanks, which delimit a key issue or challenge the public policy response and costs and benefits of various policy options. Nonetheless, *Korea in the Cross Currents* seems to aim at a broad audience—a mixture of academics, policy makers, think tanks, students, and the attentive public. Myers seeks to chronicle the history of twentieth-century Korea, with a focus on the principal events

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that reshaped Korea's turbulent relations with the outside world, particularly with China, Japan, and the United States.

What is the thread that connects the struggles of three Koreas in the twentieth century: Chosun Korea (until 1910), colonial Korea (1910–1945), and divided Korea (1945–2000)? So persistent have been the effects of Korea's geopolitical vulnerability—"a shrimp among whales" syndrome—that it comes close to being the thread for which we are looking. As suggested in the subtitle of the book, for Korea this was a century of an elusive quest for independence and reunification. In this slim volume Myers surveys in a chronological fashion the struggles of Chosun Korea in the cocoon of the Sinocentric world order (Chapter 2), Korea's struggle for national independence during the Japanese colonial period (Chapters 3–5), and the foreign relations of the two Koreas (Chapters 6–9).

Although Myers effectively lays to rest the revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Korean War, drawing from the recent (post-cold war) scholarly literature (Chapter 6), the coverage of divided Korea is extremely thin and uneven in treatment and quality. Only one of the four chapters on divided Korea since 1945 is devoted to North Korea (Chapter 9). Myers has little to say about what really makes North Korea tick. Despite the subtitle there is virtually no mention, let alone any analysis, of "the crisis of reunification."

This book is also marred by numerous factual errors and untenable claims: a jet belonging to the South Korean civilian airline KAL was blown up in 1993 [it was 1987] (p. 136); the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in 1949 [1948] (p. 81); German division lasted until 1992 [1990] (p. 148); the Perry Report is not so much a policy as an attitude (p. 150); and North Korea's position on Korean reunification by conquest has remained constant (p. 136). Moreover, the work is immeasurably blemished by numerous mismatches between references in the text and corresponding endnotes, as well as missing authors' names. The manuscript was apparently rushed to publication without outside peer vetting or in-house copyediting, or perhaps the copy editor was sleeping on the job.

Myers concludes by practicing a bit of personality cult. He showcases himself as an unabashed admirer of President Kim Dae Jung, who is praised to the sky as having "moved boldly in all areas of Korean political life" (p. 171), while he dismisses a rampant and seemingly unending series of corruption scandals of the Kim Dae Jung government, including the imprisonment of two of Kim's three sons, "as a facet of universal human nature, not restricted or specific to [South] Korean politics" (p. 168).

Taken as a whole, Myers seeks to cover too much—the entire history of twentieth-century Korea—only to cover so little so unsatisfactorily. Because of a hefty price and the highly uneven quality of scholarship, the book is not an ideal textbook for courses on Korean history or foreign relations.

SAMUEL S. KIM
Columbia University

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Chinese Ambassadors: The Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism Since 1949 *by Xiaohong Liu. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2001. 282 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper $25.00.*

Liu describes the gradual transformation of the People's Republic of China's ambassadorial corps from a "People's Liberation Army in civilian clothes" to a modern group of professional diplomats. Her theme of professionalization examines how China managed the tension between the political demands placed on diplomatic representatives by the Communist party and the special occupational demands of the diplomatic profession. Liu draws upon a range of histories, documents, and published and unpublished memoirs by Chinese diplomats as source material, supplemented by interviews and her own twelve years of experience in the Chinese foreign service. She occasionally references the Western literature on diplomacy and professionalism in order to put the Chinese experience in context.

Liu identifies four generations of Chinese ambassadors. The initial group of seventeen (1949–1954) consisted mainly of senior military officers. The second generation of ambassadors (1954–66) included many provincial cadres who lacked diplomatic experience, but were selected for their political experience and reliability. Third generation ambassadors (1966–1984) began their careers in other professions but accumulated substantial experience in the foreign ministry prior to appointment as an ambassador. Fourth generation ambassadors (1984–1990s) were recruited for their foreign language skills and spent their entire careers working in the foreign ministry.

In general, Liu sees a trend towards increasing professional skills and effectiveness but declining political influence. Most first and second generation ambassadors had independent political reputations and personal ties that gave them access and a degree of policy influence with senior Chinese political leaders. By contrast, later ambassadors had authority by virtue of their positions and reported to top leaders only through formal channels. Liu argues that third and fourth generation diplomats have significantly improved their performance in their reporting and representational roles. The author gives a good sense of how various political and economic reform movements affected China's diplomatic objectives and the roles played by its ambassadors. The description of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on individual Chinese diplomats and on the Chinese foreign service as a whole is particularly interesting.

Liu's focus on the professionalization of the Chinese ambassadorial corps over four generations of ambassadors is an effective organizing device. The analytical chapters describing each generation are complemented by eight case studies of individual diplomats. The case studies provide detailed profiles that describe each ambassador's personal background, previous work experience, and performance as an ambassador. The diplomats in the case studies appear to have been chosen as representatives of the average Chinese ambassador. The case study of Zhang Wentian, a first-generation ambassador whose politi-

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cal credentials included a period as the top leader of the Chinese Communist party in the late 1930s, is a significant exception.

Although the book works well on its own terms, the research design and organization will limit its usefulness for some readers. Despite a few interesting anecdotes in the final two chapters, there is relatively little information on the role China's ambassadors play in the Chinese foreign policy-making process or how an ambassador functions within the context of a typical Chinese embassy. The focus on the average first- or second-term Chinese ambassador also means that many of China's most prominent ambassadors are not discussed. Nevertheless, Liu's study is a significant addition to the literature on Chinese foreign policy. It will also be of value to scholars studying the impact of political movements and economic reforms on the Chinese bureaucracy and those interested in comparative studies of diplomacy.

PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS
Monterey Institute of International Studies

The Asian American Century *by Warren I. Cohen. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002. 150 pp. $22.95.*

This slim volume is a gem that sparkles with vivid observations and crystalline insights. Like many gems, however, it is not without flaws that underlie its facets. Warren Cohen, a preeminent historian of U.S.–East Asian relations, reconsiders the long, intricate, and intertwined history of trans-Pacific foreign relations and cultural exchange. Ostensibly based on the 2000 Edwin Reischauer Lectures at Harvard, the book is organized into chapters that correspond to the three segments of Cohen's lectures.

The forte of *The Asian American Century* lies in two simple yet audacious claims—bound to please some, provoke others, and frustrate most. In chapter one, entitled "The Struggle for Dominance in East Asia," Cohen characterizes the evolving role of the United States as a reluctant hegemon. The reader is taken on a whirlwind tour of U.S.–East Asian diplomatic history that comes to rest with the first claim: that "most people in East Asia are far better off today than they would have been if the Americans had stayed home" (p. 32).

This controversial assertion is supported with just enough detail to tantalize, but not enough to defeat rival accounts of American hegemony. In particular, Cohen stakes his ground by taking disputatious views on matters such as the origins of military conflict in Korea and by finessing distinctions between the "forced" Americanization of the Philippines and post-World War II Japan and the "freely chosen" Americanization elsewhere. Cohen also defends his assertion with a somewhat capricious use of counterfactual reasoning and edges perilously close to conflating democracy, freedom, and development as he evaluates the welfare gains of Asian nations and its peoples. As Adam Przeworski

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and others have demonstrated, liberty, prosperity, and competitive elections are not necessarily coterminous phenomena.

In the remaining chapters of the book, titled "The Americanization of Asia" and "The Asianization of America," Cohen develops his second central claim: that everyday lives in Asia and America have become so closely intertwined and imbricated that both cultures are today coconstructed. These chapters are chock-full of examples and indicia that foray fearlessly into the realm of popular culture. Chapter two details the integration of American icons like Disney, McDonald's, and Coca Cola into Asian cultural life and their consequent reconstitution into hybrid, distinctly Asian representations. In parallel, chapter three argues that Buddhism, Hong Kong film, acupuncture, and the like have fundamentally reconstituted American culture.

The arguments in these chapters fall shy of their mark in several aspects. For one, the examples of trans-Pacific cultural flow are imbalanced: Asian influences on American culture are disproportionately of high art and elite consumption (excepting the proliferation of Asian ethnic restaurants), while American influences on Asian cultures are decidedly lowbrow (excepting the occasional reference to Walt Whitman, John Dewey, and others). Cohen also leans heavily on anecdotes, mostly of Chinese and Chinese-American origin. Cohen's Asia is mostly "East Asia" and almost never "South Asia." Also, Cohen's thesis begs the question of how "Asianization" compares to cultural influences on America—of Hispanic Americans or other immigrant groups today, or immigrant groups from other eras. Finally, Cohen is deafeningly hush about the underbelly of such cross-cultural transfusion as the persistence and prevalence of anti-Asian and anti-American sentiments, the exploitative transnational flows of capital and labor, the emerging fundamentalist backlash in both Asia and the United States.

In sum, *The Asian American Century* provides absorbing and thought-provoking reading. Cohen envigorates the idea of U.S.–East Asian cross-cultural transfusion by claiming it is an ubiquitous and unambiguously beneficial phenomenon. The multicultural, cosmopolitan vision that underlies this thesis is a timely antidote in a post-September 11 world that evokes Samuel Huntington's prophesy of a "clash of civilizations." But ultimately, such a strong version of the thesis runs afoul of the book's brevity and Cohen's limited evidence and conceptual framework.

TAEKU LEE
University of California, Berkeley

Evangelicals and Protestants in Asia, Africa and Latin America *by Paul Freston. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 344 pp. $59.95.*

This is the first cross-national study of Christian evangelical involvement in politics in developing countries. Written by sociologist Paul Freston, an expert on

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evangelical politics in Latin America (especially Brazil), the study includes case studies in twenty-seven countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The author draws upon documents, direct observation, personal interviews, and scholarly publications from each country. The bibliography (English, Spanish, Portuguese) alone is fifteen pages and a most useful tool.

The survey clearly shows that evangelical Christians are no longer shunning politics in developing countries nor giving knee-jerk support to authoritarian regimes, common characteristics in their earlier evolution. The economic, political, and social processes of globalization have opened up spaces for new political movements, especially in Africa and Latin America where redemocratization has occurred since the 1980s. Evangelical political parties have formed that compete in multiparty elections and support important public issues such as religious freedom and honesty in government. These parties have served as avenues of entry into politics for many lower-class persons in developing countries (since that is the class where evangelical Christianity is rooted) who would not normally have political voices. In Latin America alone, there are now over twenty new political parties formed by evangelical leaders in the past two decades.

Freston also sees several characteristics of these new political movements that he considers problematic for their own success and for wider democratic politics. They often seek government privileges only for their own churches (legal recognition, media permits, subsidies for church projects). They do not accept easily a nonconfessional state nor tolerate all faiths equally. They triumphantly assume they have a divine right to rule and that by electing an evangelical Christian the major problems facing a country will be solved. They also lack a programmatic focus for complex public policies, particularly in the area of economics, and often view the root causes of public problems (poverty, corruption, and lack of social justice) as demonic spirits rather than as structural imbalances and a lack of personal accountability. It is perhaps because of this lack of a well thought out approach to societal complexities that when evangelicals have been able to obtain executive office (in Guatemala, South Korea, Zambia, the Philippines) corruption has plagued their administrations as much as it has secular presidencies. Evangelicals sometimes resort to repression to achieve their aims, and their social policies have not significantly improved the lot of their own clientele, the poor.

Freston is not pessimistic about the future of evangelical politics in these countries, provided there be more self-reflection among them as to what the exercise of power entails, how economies function, what religious freedom really means, and how to balance one's own moral beliefs with a commitment to the public good. Thus far, however, the book provides little evidence that this maturing process is occurring, given the lack of educational preparation of most evangelical political leaders who come from lower-class backgrounds and are relatively isolated from international Christianity.

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Despite its fine contribution to understanding evangelical politics comparatively, the book has some weaknesses. Although Freston claims to focus on evangelical Protestantism (and defines its characteristics in the introduction), throughout the case studies he often intermingles mainline Protestantism, evangelicalism, and pentecostalism. The chapters often read like reports and factual cataloging. The final chapter deals with some larger theoretical issues about ingredients necessary for democratic consolidation, which often range far beyond the case studies. But the book would have been more useful if some of this were done in the introduction and a theoretical framework used throughout to highlight important larger issues that appear in each case study.

BRIAN H. SMITH
Ripon College

Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina *by Paul H. Lewis. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001. 280 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $25.00.*

This book is a sequel to Lewis's *Crisis of Argentine Capitalism.* A second tour de force, it provides additional evidence for his thesis of the political origins and repercussions of Argentina's permanent economic stalemate between liberal and populist economic strategies, and the corresponding class struggle involving employees and small producers against the monied oligarchy compounded by military intervention and guerrilla warfare.

Is there any other Latin American country that can boast of nineteen different presidents and twenty-one governments during the brief period from the military coup in 1930 to the onset of the "dirty war" in 1976? Considering that during twenty-seven of those forty-six years, Congress was either dissolved or a compliant tool of the executive, Lewis presents Argentina as an undesirable model of institutional instability and rule by decree. To add to the instability, Argentina also hosted the largest number of urban guerrillas in the hemisphere.

Recruited from students and young professionals with blocked careers in a stagnant economy with little demand for their skills, the guerrillas came to life encouraged by the Cuban revolution. Cuba's cult of the heroic guerrilla became an outlet for their frustrations, whether their violence was masked by a revolutionary ideology or accepted for its own sake. But labeling young intellectuals "psychotics" in getting even with a society that snubbed them reveals Lewis's contrary bias instead of being dictated by the evidence.

The first appearance of Cuban-inspired guerrillas began on Christmas 1959, when the Uturuncos attacked a police outpost in the town of Frías in Santiago del Estero. Other actions followed with increasing intensity in response to the banning of the Peronist party and its populist strategy. Lewis covers all the guerrilla organizations, their leaders, ideologies, and strategies from the launching of the first rural guerrillas to the last urban guerrillas in the failed takeover of the

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military garrison of La Tablada in January 1989. But he makes one exception. His failure to include Abraham Guillén, the grey eminence behind the Argentine guerrillas, is an egregious oversight in an otherwise well documented study.

Guillén was responsible for the first guerrilla plan of 1955 adopted by the deposed President Jaun Domingo Perón when he gave the signal for guerrilla resistance in January 1956. Later, posing as an agronomist, Guillén visited Frías, took mental notes of the police station's interior, and passed the information to the guerrillas. Convicted of aiding and abetting them, after a brief prison sentence he sought asylum in Uruguay. There he instructed the Tupamaros in urban guerrilla warfare based on his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*, summarizing his experience during the Spanish Civil War. Brazilian exiles translated it into Portuguese for the use of Carlos Marighela's guerrillas in their country. At most, Lewis acknowledges that the Tupamaros' and Marighela's strategies were decisive in shaping the Argentine guerrillas.

Lewis shows how the military responded by targeting the guerrillas' civilian network. A mirror image of the guerrillas, the generals aimed to build their own terrorist network on every block of every big city, with cells, front organizations, intelligence apparatus, hideouts, and terrorist squads. Massive arrests, interrogations, torture, and disappearance of civilians were not, of course, practiced by the guerrillas. Although homeland security was the generals' rationale for human rights violations, Lewis notes that they turned to shakedowns of wealthy businessmen, abductions, and ransoms for their release. In the course of "saving the nation" they became rich. To this day the dirty war remains unforgotten and unresolved. The leading players on either side continue unrepentant. Thus, Lewis foresees a new outbreak of violence when the dirty war begins anew.

DONALD C. HODGES
Florida State University

Brazil's Second Chance: En Route toward the First World *by Lincoln Gordon. Washington, DC, Brookings Instutition Press, 2001. 243 pp. $28.95.*

Is Brazil a spectacularly successful case of economic development or a dismal failure of underachievement and inequality? Will Brazil stagnate or emerge as a great economic power? Over the last fifty years, the Brazilian economy has been labeled in a bewildering variety of ways. Now Lincoln Gordon, an economist and former U.S. ambassador to Brazil from 1961 to 1966, has redeployed another label: Brazil could be en route to the "first world," defined as the kind of political economy enjoyed by members of the Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Brazil's first chance for entry into the first world, according to Gordon, was missed during the second republic of

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1945–1964. However, this lost opportunity might be redeemed in the current period, which began with the introduction of the Real Plan in 1994.

This book makes three contributions to our understanding of Brazil's political economy. First, it surveys the trajectory of economic development in Brazil from the end of World War II to the present, with comments on past and present debates about that trajectory. Gordon emphasizes the phenomenal growth and structural transformation of the Brazilian economy for most of this period, seeing the process as far more positive than negative. This is clearly the most successful aspect of the book, reflecting Gordon's training as an economist and his flair for comparative analysis.

The book also argues in favor of policies oriented toward the achievement of first world economic status; this entails a broad defense of the economic management of the military regime (1964–1985) and a more qualified approval of the policies of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). This aspect of the book, in my view, is somewhat less successfully argued than the first. For example, Gordon rather unconvincingly denies a link between political repression and economic policies under the military regime. He also describes the Left as a threat to economic progress, characterizing it rather sweepingly as mired in "backward-looking nationalistic populism" and protective of "entrenched privileges and obsolete modes of governance," (p. 228). Yet some would argue that it has been leftist parties that have done the most to clean up and democratize city politics in Brazil. And Gordon does not consider whether a center-leftist program at the national level might, as it has in some European countries, boost employment and alleviate poverty and inequality—goals that Gordon admits the Cardoso administration has only a mixed record in achieving.

Finally, the book contains an analysis of the causes of the 1964 military coup d'etat that deposed elected President João Goulart and a justification of Gordon's own role as ambassador at that time. This element is polemical, at odds with most historical accounts, and to this reviewer, unpersuasive. For example, like U.S. policy makers in the failed coup attempt against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela on 11–13 April 2002, Gordon resorts to blaming the deposed president for his own downfall. Thus, Goulart planned a dictatorial seizure of power. Gordon presents very weak evidence for this claim and is struck with the fact that Goulart never actually made a clear move in that direction before his ouster. Similarly, Gordon alleges that the pattern of U.S. economic assistance during Goulart's term was not politically motivated and did not seek to discriminate between supporters and opponents of the president at the state level. In addition, Gordon claims that the Brazilian coup plotters knew nothing of Operation Brother Sam, the U.S. task force that was ready (but did not need) to give logistical support for the coup. This seems unlikely, given that declassified documents show that leading organizers of the uprising were asking the U.S. government for such support as early as 1963.

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Overall, this book is a serious, comprehensive, and well-written analysis, making especially good use of Brazilian sources. Its seventy-four tables and figures present a wide variety of valuable data on Brazil's economic, political, and social conditions; and the author knowledgeably addresses many important aspects of Brazil's historical and contemporary political economy. For Brazil specialists, much of the material is not new, but Gordon's arguments are provocative. The work succeeds admirably as economic history, even if its political arguments are less convincingly crafted.

ANTHONY W. PEREIRA
Tulane University

Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right *edited by Victoria González and Karen Kampwirth. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 343 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

Radical Women in Latin America breaks with most writings on Latin American women by exploring the origins, trajectory, and dilemmas of rightwing women's movements. The book provides a compelling account of women's participation in organizations as diverse as the Nicaraguan contras, Brazilian Integralist Action (a fascist party of the 1930s), and *El Poder Feminino*, an alliance of women's groups that opposed the Allende government in Chile. In their introduction to the volume, editors González and Kampwirth note that women's involvement in rightwing political movements has been largely ignored and that this has inhibited a more realistic understanding of Latin American women's lives: "We need a full accounting of women's participation in public politics, and the record must include reprehensible acts as well as laudable ones. Until women's capacity for antidemocratic activism is accepted and understood, women will not be seen as fully human" (p. 26).

Radical Women's contributors raise a number of other compelling theoretical issues. The chapters compare rightwing and leftwing mobilization, analyze alliance formation among women of different ideological persuasions, explore the use of maternalist discourses to justify political activism, and identify the significant challenges to feminist-oriented policy change as well as the changing meanings and controversies surrounding feminism, among other topics. The volume should be of interest to scholars and students of gender and politics, social movements, and Latin American politics.

The book's chapters analyze various dimensions of women's experiences in several Latin American countries. Victoria González studies women who supported the Somoza regime and their rightwing National Liberal Party, Karen Kampwirth compares women in the Sandanista and contra movements, and María Teresa Blandón analyzes a multiparty alliance of women in Nicaragua in the 1990s. On El Salvador, Patricia Hipsher explores women's attempts to build cross-partisan coalitions around women's rights, while Kelley Ready focuses on policy change on child support as a case study of a women's alliance.

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Ilja Luciak's chapter on Guatemala analyzes women's participation in the guerrilla movement and the challenges faced by advocates of gender equality after the 1996 peace accords. Moving to the Southern Cone, Sandra McGee Deutsch compares women's roles in social Catholic movements, rightwing nationalist leagues, and fascist organizations between 1900 and 1940 in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile; Liesl Haas explores the complicated relationship between Brazil's feminist movement and the leftwing Workers' party. The last two chapters of the book focus on Chile: Lisa Baldez studies how both rightwing and leftwing women employed a strategy of nonpartisanship while mobilizing for and against the Pinochet regime, and Margaret Power investigates the way rightwing women transformed the discourse and purpose of their political activities to adapt to the challenge of the democratic transition.

One concern raised by the book is the possibility of alliance-formation between right- and leftwing women. Though difficult to build and sustain, multipartisan and ideologically diverse women's alliances were a striking feature of Latin American democracies in the 1990s. These alliances worked best when organized around specific issues such as women's political participation and domestic violence. Alliances rarely formed around more controversial issues like abortion or around issues that challenged neoliberal economic policies. As Patricia Hipsher notes in her chapter, "the issues on which women have been able to form alliances are either 'practical gender interests'—those that emerge out of women's traditional roles as wives and mothers—or are issues that affect all women equally, regardless of class, race, or other differences" (p. 151). Lisa Baldez's chapter shows that a strategy of nonpartisanship can cement a women's alliance, though her discussion also suggests that such alliances endure only when their goal is clearly defined, such as overthrowing Allende or assuring a "no" vote in the 1988 plebiscite on the continuation of Pinochet's rule.

The book helps us understand the relationship between women's mobilization and feminism. In most cases, feminists were associated with leftwing movements and parties; the right eschewed feminism. Kampwirth's study of women activists in Nicaragua shows that "women's politicization through radical leftwing politics is far more likely to nurture later struggles for gender equality than politicization through right-wing politics, no matter how radical" (p. 104). Yet the left has had a complicated relationship with feminism, particularly in countries where the left also had ties to the progressive church. Many leaders in Brazil's Workers' party, for example, embraced liberal positions on gender issues.

The left-right distinction may no longer correspond directly to feminist and antifeminist positions. As Margaret Power points out in her chapter on Chile, even rightwing women who rejected feminism spoke a language permeated by feminist ideas. This rich collection inspires hope that other scholars will further explore the complexities of women's mobilization on all sides of the political spectrum.

MALA HTUN
New School University

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Launching Into Cyberspace: Internet Development and Politics in Five World Regions *by Marcus Franda. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 298 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $22.00.*

Over the last decade, the internet has substantially influenced politics and society in advanced industrial democracies. The growth of the internet has prompted scholars and pundits to speculate about its possible impact on new democracies and authoritarian states. Some have focused on information technology's tremendous liberating potential and its capacity to help build civil society, to foster connections across borders, to provide alternate sources of information, and to create more efficient and profitable commerce. Others have emphasized sinister implications of the internet's evolution; it could ease communication for criminals, spies, and terrorist organizations; introduce additional forms of surveillance by the state; and create new classes of haves and have-nots. Marcus Franda's interesting book shows that all of these benefits and concerns are features of the of the internet's global expansion.

The book is divided into a series of case studies, with one chapter for Africa, two for the Middle East, three for postcommunist Europe and Eurasia, and one combining China and India. Franda draws upon a wide range of sources, including media reports, data on internet access, scholarship from various disciplines and the internet itself to produce a carefully researched survey of the byways of the information superhighway. The case studies describe variation in government policy toward information technology, citizen access and usage patterns, the effect on nongovernmental organizations, and the role of commerce.

While this variation generates questions for future analysis, some common patterns emerge. Inadequate telecommunications infrastructure, poor policy decisions on privatization, and high access costs impede the extension of electronic communications beyond a privileged elite, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Internet expansion has been substantially influenced by international actors who created the technology, set the standards, and dominate content provision. Governments have enacted restrictions on the internet, with a handful of states fully controlling access and punishing individuals who use electronic communication to promote dissent. Real world conflicts have expanded to the internet, with cyberwar occurring between Palestinians and Israelis, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Indians and Pakistanis, and others.

The internet has also produced positive developments. Opposition groups have used the internet to organize their activities against authoritarian rule; Franda notes that electronic communication facilitated the defeat of communist rule in Poland and the Soviet Union. Information technology has promoted dialogue between members of groups in conflict. The internet has helped repressed segments of society find new freedoms. For instance, women in Saudi Arabia have created successful e-businesses, despite restrictions on activities outside the home.

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Although the book provides important insights into the interaction between technology and politics, there are some shortcomings. Most notably, its coverage of the five regions is uneven. Also, the analysis is not clearly focused around specific themes, making it more difficult to assess the overall implications of this technological innovation on domestic and international politics. The final chapter attempts to pull together some of the findings, but a parallel structure to the case studies would yield more straightforward comparisons. The book's deficiencies are minor; it successfully details how the internet has expanded globally and how different societies have responded.

Launching Into Cyberspace is a valuable reference for scholars and others interested in politics and technology. Franda addresses how the evolution of information technology molds politics and how political actors strive to use technology to achieve their ends. He also provides technical details about telecommunications that are accessible to nonspecialists. The book is a worthy companion to the author's other work on information technology and contributes to a growing literature on an important new topic.

ERIK S. HERRON
University of Kansas

Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas, Transnational Policy Entrepreneurs, and Environmental Regimes *by Lasse Ringius. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001. 261 pp. Paper, $23.95.*

The half-century-long odyssey over management of radioactive waste has yet to result in anything approaching consensus. Lasse Ringius offers an insightful analysis into the demise of one possible disposal method that has now been banned through a 1993 international accord—ocean dumping. From the dawn of the nuclear age through the 1960s, nations such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan used this technique for some forms of low-level radioactive waste. These wastes include a range of by-products from nuclear plants as well as hospitals and medical research, including exposed clothing, tools, and animal carcasses.

Ringius provides a detailed political history of the evolution of national and international policy leading up to the 1993 international agreement. The book emphasizes the limitations of traditional bodies of theory to explain this period and examines ultimate regime change that reflected the overwhelming support of participating nations. In particular, it finds conventional power-based and interest-based perspectives ill equipped to account for these policy changes.

Instead, Ringius submits that "transnational entrepreneurial coalitions," drawing heavily upon environmental interest groups and public opinion, were pivotal forces that tend to be downplayed in other approaches to international environmental relations. These coalitions are packed with policy entrepreneurs

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who inject "principled ideas" into national and international policy deliberations and have an enduring impact on recasting how policy options are framed and ultimately implemented.

Greenpeace is singled out as the most influential entrepreneurial force. Ringius reviews Greenpeace's familiar abilities to mobilize public opposition, but also argues that the organization helped forge a transnational coalition to sustain this opposition to ocean dumping over many years, providing vital monitoring of national disposal practices and forcefully building a case for the ban.

This is an engaging work, both as a longitudinal political history but also as a challenge to much conventional thinking on environmental policy. It effectively argues that policy entrepreneurs—and their ideas—need to be taken more seriously in understanding regime change. At the same time, the book leaves questions inherent in any effort to advance an alternative theoretical approach on the basis of a single-case analysis. There is little effort to consider how typical the radioactive waste case may be, particularly given features that may be rather unique in the environmental arena. Radioactive waste is generated in a limited number of countries, its sources and total volume are well-established, and the risks it poses to human health are clearly understood. So how differently might transnational coalitions operate in very different contexts, such as global climate change? Moreover, it remains somewhat unclear just how important an international agreement has been in this area, given the strong national opposition among many leading waste generators. The United States, for example, abandoned ocean dumping nearly a quarter-century before the international accord, and other countries were clearly moving away from this method prior to 1993. Is, for example, the work of groups like Greenpeace on the international stage much easier—and its role inflated—when it builds on a movement already underway in many influential nations?

Finally, the book does not consider policy options for radioactive waste or how the coalition has evolved in the past decade in which on-site storage has emerged as the de facto approach for waste management. Can transnational coalitions evolve further and form long-term strategies or are they confined to blocking more visible and controversial disposal methods?

These types of questions receive relatively little attention but need to be explored by Ringius and others to fully establish the role of transnational entrepreneurial coalitions in the international environmental arena. Nonetheless, this book offers an unusually insightful glimpse into one instance of regime change and thereby challenges scholars to be more attentive to forces that often go overlooked.

BARRY G. RABE
University of Michigan

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Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth-century British Politics *by Keith Laybourn. New York, Routledge, 2002. 250 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

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Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development 2002/2003 *edited by Oystein B. Thommessen. Lysaker, Norway, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2002. 336 pp. $75.00.*

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

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

Falling Up

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

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

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

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

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

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